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Abstract 
 
To address the growing frequency and intensity of disasters a global effort is 
underway to change the dominant approach to disaster policy from disaster 
response to integrating disaster risk reduction (DRR) throughout development 
activities. Research into how DRR policy progresses in a government context is 
lacking. Using a qualitative case-study approach this research examines how 
the global policy prescription of mainstreaming disaster risk reduction (DRR) is 
unfolding within the Government of Nepal. In particular, this research a) 
challenges the rhetoric of substantive policy change that underpins the concept 
of mainstreaming and b) questions its efficacy as a neoliberal post-New Public 
Management policy tool given that the disaster vulnerability literature implicates 
neoliberalism as a driver of disaster risk. Finding change to be the dominant 
theme throughout the research, it applies theories and frameworks from the 
policy paradigm change literatures (e.g. Advocacy Coalition Framework, social 
learning and paradigm policy change) to explain what was found in the Nepal 
case-study. Eight months of fieldwork took place throughout 2014-2016. In total, 
eighty-eight in-depth interviews were conducted with bureaucrats and political 
party members at the central, district, and local levels. This research advances 
the disaster vulnerability scholarship through its critique of neoliberal policy 
discourse and its application of policy change literature. 
 
It is argued that the concept of mainstreaming fits the criteria of a neoliberal 
buzzword; the findings of this research demonstrate why this is problematic. The 
lead ministry responsible for disaster management appropriated the global 
policy rhetoric of mainstreaming DRR in order to minimize any substantive policy 
change that the DRR agenda promotes. Despite this, evidence is also found of a 
growing awareness and advocacy of DRR within the Government of Nepal. This 
is suggestive of an advocacy coalition starting to develop, which is being built 
through social learning. The role of individual bureaucrats and political party 
members, rather than a centralised legalistic approach, is found to be 
fundamental to changing the disaster response policy paradigm. This research 
calls attention to the need to critically analyse how top-down global DRR policy 
prescriptions are interpreted by nation-states. Empty and hollow global policy 
buzzwords are easily translated into a rhetoric that does not match with the 
reality of the governing and the policy environment.  
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1 Mainstreaming Disaster Risk 
Reduction Policy in Nepal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Midday on April 25th, 2015 Nepal experienced the M 7.6 Gorkha earthquake. 
Nearly 3.5 million people were impacted and almost 9000 people died.  A large 
aftershock (M 7.2) on May 12, 2015 resulted in further death and destruction. 
These were not unexpected events. Earthquakes had occurred within recent 
memory and there was a general awareness that Nepal was overdue for a 
damaging one. In 2009, the Government of Nepal (GON) had endorsed 
mainstreaming disaster risk reduction (DRR) in its National Strategy for Disaster 
Risk Management (NSDRM) and there were some efforts to institutionalise DRR 
within the central government. What became glaringly evident in the aftermath of 
the earthquake was that the work occurring was too little and too late. The 
earthquake occurred mid-way through the research period of this thesis; six 
months of fieldwork had concluded two weeks prior to the earthquake. The 
earthquake became a distressing affirmation of the need to critically interrogate 
the rhetoric behind global disaster policy prescriptions such as mainstreaming 
DRR and provided further legitimacy for the research topic under exploration. 
 
This introductory chapter provides a brief overview of the topic areas under 
examination and the research objectives that are investigated in the subsequent 
chapters. This chapter begins with a discussion of the research context and 
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rationale and then continues with a discussion of global processes that are 
fostering the disaster risk reduction agenda. The chapter concludes with a 
statement of the research objectives and questions that guided the research 
process and the structure of the chapters that follow.  
1.2 Research Context and Rationale 
 
As the frequency and magnitude of disasters continues to rise globally, the 
imperative to find appropriate policy solutions is paramount. Since the weak 
government capacity in many developing states limits their ability to implement 
strategies to mitigate against disasters, supranational organisations like the 
United Nations (UN) and the World Bank Group fill the void and set the policy 
agenda. In general, there is a lack of critical analysis of global policy prescription 
substance and content.  
 
To address this gap, this thesis examines mainstreaming DRR in the context of 
the Government of Nepal. Both components (i.e. mainstreaming + disaster risk 
reduction), originate from global development agendas and frameworks such as 
the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) and the Sendai Framework for Disaster 
Risk Reduction (SFDRR). Mainstreaming is a practitioner term that denotes 
bringing a fringe policy idea into everyday practice. Disaster risk reduction is a 
relatively new policy agenda that aims to minimize development (e.g. social, 
economic, built environment) losses from disasters. DRR is a recognition that 
disaster risk can either be intensified or reduced through development 
processes. It realigns focus away from disaster response and relief, which 
governments have used to managed the policy problem of disasters for 
decades. Thus, mainstreaming DRR is an attempt to bring the fringe policy 
agenda of DRR into the fold of everyday practice. Not only is it a significant 
change of policy direction, but because of the developmental nature of DRR, it 
also widens the number of stakeholders who need to take ownership of DRR.  
 
This drive for policy change is complicated by the weak and fragile status of the 
government. In Nepal, it is not just tectonic faults that create risk. As a least 
developed country, twenty-five per cent of the population live below the national 
poverty line (Asian Development Bank 2016 a: Online). There exists a complex 
web of economic, social, and political fault lines that, notwithstanding language 
barriers, are difficult as an outsider to fully comprehend. Caste and gender 
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inequality make daily life difficult for a majority of Nepali people. The origins of 
many of these fault lines are centuries old and are so deeply embedded in the 
fabric of modern culture that they cannot be easily changed. Everything in 
Nepal, including the bureaucracy, is wrapped up in a highly politicized and 
unstable political culture. The only assured thing to change empirically is the 
Government. In the three and a half years that this research spans there have 
been four prime ministers and subsequent changes of government. Only one of 
those prime ministers was directly elected. The majority of political change has 
occurred in the intervening election period and involved a great deal of political 
manoeuvring and bickering between political parties. This occurs at the expense 
of addressing fundamental development issues.  
 
This thesis is a study of how the global policy prescription of mainstreaming 
DRR plays out in Nepal’s complex governing environment. While the 
Government of Nepal (GON) has endorsed a strategy of mainstreaming DRR in 
2009, the 2015 earthquake impact and the government’s response to it, 
suggests something is very problematic in its implementation. As Handmer and 
Dovers write “public policies are positions taken and communicated by 
governments, in more or less detail— ‘avowals of intent’ that recognise a 
problem and state what will be done about it” (Handmer and Dovers 2013: 39). 
This thesis interrogates both the global policy prescription of mainstreaming 
DRR and its subsequent endorsement by the GON.  
1.3 Disaster Risk Reduction: A Global Policy Prescription 
 
This discussion now turns to look at the genesis of disaster risk reduction as a 
global policy prescription.1  Particular emphasis is placed on the origins of DRR 
as a UN policy prescription because it is through the UN Hyogo Framework for 
Action that the GON adopted mainstreaming DRR as a policy choice. Along with 
                                               
1 This discussion privileges the global DRR agenda to the exclusion of local 
heterogeneities, to accomplish a broader critique of the agenda. What must not be 
forgotten is that disaster risk reduction strategies have been employed by communities 
long before the establishment of the United Nations or the development of the term 
DRR. There is a small body of literature that highlights the local strategies used long 
before Bretton Woods institutions came into being (see Tran et al. 2009; Mercer et al. 
2010; Kelman et al. 2012). However, as will be discussed in subsequent chapters, it was 
not local knowledge that has stimulated DRR adoption in Nepal. Rather, it has largely 
been driven through the influence of donor agendas and financing.  
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the UN, DRR is widely endorsed by many organisations (e.g. IFRC 2013; 
LaTrobe et al. 2005 (Tearfund); Oxfam 2015). This discussion also 
contextualizes the drivers of DRR policy to understand how embedded DRR is 
in the global economic milieu and its implications for unique systems of 
governance such as found in Nepal.  
 
DRR grew from a growing body of disaster literature that reframed disasters not 
solely as a hazard induced event, but as a developmental social process that 
caused some people to be more at-risk than others (the disaster vulnerability 
literature is discussed in Chapter 3). DRR also grew from the growing evidence 
that disasters are increasing in both frequency and magnitude and thus required 
new ways of dealing with disasters. The Centre for Research on the 
Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) began collecting data in 1988 for its 
Emergency Events Database EM-DAT (CRED 2016 Online). Figure 1-1 was 
generated from EM-DAT and illustrates the rise in the number of disasters (not 
severity or magnitude) for all continents and for comparison Asia alone. The 
number of disaster events has increased since the early 1980s.   
 
Figure 1-1: EM-DAT Number of Disasters Worldwide 1900-2012 
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In pure economic terms disasters are costly events that wipe out development 
gains. In 2015, the total losses (insured/uninsured) from all disasters was ninety-
two billion USD (of which only thirty-seven billion was insured loss) (SwissRe 
2016: Online). Total losses from the 2015 Nepal earthquake are estimated to be 
ten billion USD, over half of Nepal’s nineteen billion USD economy (Al Jazeera 
2016: Online). Nepal’s GDP fell from 5.7% in 2014 to 2.3% in 2015 (Asian 
Development Bank 2016b: Online).  While the earthquake was not the only 
factor in this drop, it did precipitate confounding events—such as the rushed 
signing of a constitution that sparked protest and a 135 day Nepal-India border 
blockade. In less developed countries, like Nepal, the social and economic 
consequences of disaster have impacts on education, health and livelihood 
strategies that can last for generations.  For instance, over thirty-five thousand 
classrooms were destroyed in Nepal by the 2015 earthquake and aftershocks 
(UNICEF 2016: Online).  
 
It is highly questionable if current levels of funding for humanitarian aid is 
sustainable (Kellett and Sparks 2012: 1). Even in the United States, disaster 
response budgets are being strained. A Centre for American Progress report 
found that the US federal government spent $136 billion USD on disaster 
response between the years 2011-2013 (Weiss and Weidman 2013). The same 
report warns that government expenditure on domestic response and relief is 
forecasted to increase because of climate change.  
 
This trend brings us to the disaster risk reduction agenda. DRR is defined as: 
“The concept and practice of reducing disaster risks through systematic 
efforts to analyse and manage the causal factors of disasters, including 
through reduced exposure to hazards, lessened vulnerability of people 
and property, wise management of land and the environment, and 
improved preparedness for adverse events” (UNISDR 2009: Online). 
Although this is considered an authoritative definition, it raises more questions 
than it answers, which begins to hint at the complexity of DRR policy. For 
example, what sort of “systematic effort” is required to achieve DRR? Within an 
organisation who is responsible for the analysis and management of disaster 
causal factors? Although not stated explicitly in this definition, it is widely 
understood that DRR links development processes and disaster management 
(Collins 2009; Bradshaw 2013; Yasuyuki et al. 2017). It transforms the traditional 
disaster management agenda by broadening its scope to all relevant actors with 
a development agenda.  Traditional disaster management institutions in this 
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definition are hard to distinguish. In effect, DRR overrides established disaster 
management institutions, thereby creating a policy agenda with no institutional 
mechanisms for implementation compelling governments to draft new legislation 
and policies to deliver DRR. Chapter 2 will discuss this in more detail.  
1.3.1 United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction  
 
The main UN body designated to promote DRR is the UN International Strategy 
for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR). Throughout the 1970s the UN was mainly 
focused on disaster relief; it established the Office of the United Nations Disaster 
Relief Coordinator in 1979 (UNISDR 2016 a). However, the increasing 
magnitude and severity of disasters (see Figure 1-1) prompted many in the 
humanitarian response field to reconsider this approach.  
In response, the United Nations declared the 1990s the International Decade for 
Natural Disaster Reduction and in 1994 hosted the World Conference on 
Disaster Reduction held in Yokohama Japan. This produced the Yokohama 
Strategy and its Plan of Action (UNISDR 1994). The Yokohama Strategy 
affirmed that “each country has the sovereign responsibility to protect citizens 
from natural disasters”, stated that “disaster prevention is better than disaster 
response” (UNISDR 1994: 9), and linked economic processes with increased 
disaster vulnerability “some patterns of consumption, production and 
development have the potential for increasing the vulnerability to natural 
disasters, particularly of the poor and socially disadvantaged groups” (ibid: 9).  
 
This led to the establishment in 2000 of the United Nations International 
Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR), an “inter-agency task force and inter-
agency-secretariat for disaster reduction” (UNISDR 2016a: Online). It aims to 
promote “a major shift from the traditional emphasis on disaster response to 
disaster reduction, and in effect seeks to promote ‘a culture of prevention’” (ibid: 
Online). In 2005, another World Conference on Disaster Reduction was held in 
Kobe Japan. The results of the Yokohama Strategy were discussed and became 
the foundation of the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) (2005-2015). The HFA 
is recognised as the first international framework for DRR and encompassed five 
priority areas. It was a non-binding agreement signed by 168 nation-states, 
including Nepal. It expired in 2015 and was replaced by the Sendai Framework 
for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015-2030).  
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The UN is firmly entrenched in the global economic and political order (Frezzo 
2010). It is unlikely that any policy to come from the UN would challenge 
established economic norms. To this end, DRR can be viewed as a policy that 
does not attempt to reform the dominant economic order. Its clear pro-
development agenda is an indicator of this, which stipulates development can 
continue if it is tempered by a “systematic effort” (UNISDR Terminology 2009) to 
analyse and manage disaster vulnerability causal factors.  
1.4 Research Objectives and Questions 
 
This research examines the mainstreaming DRR agenda in Nepal with a view to 
better understand how global disaster policy prescriptions are incorporated in 
complex governing environs. There is a widespread global acceptance and 
adoption of the disaster risk reduction agenda. However, there are very few 
critical studies that situate DRR and its resulting policy prescriptions such as 
mainstreaming in its neoliberal context. This is perplexing because Middleton 
and O’Keefe (1998) and Wisner et al. (2004) clearly link political and economic 
systems as the root cause of disaster vulnerability. It follows then that the extent 
to which political and economic systems create and shape disaster policy ought 
to be scrutinized and critically challenged. The objectives of this thesis are:  
 
 To critically interrogate the concept of mainstreaming DRR and the 
drivers behind its promotion as a disaster policy prescription.  
 To examine the rhetoric and reality of mainstreaming DRR throughout all 
levels of government in Nepal.  
To achieve this, the following research questions are answered by this thesis: 
 
1. Is mainstreaming DRR at the central government level merely rhetoric or 
does it serve as a substantive policy agenda for change? 
2. What is enabling or preventing DRR policy change from occurring at the 
district and local levels? 
3. To what extent are the political parties in Nepal acting as policy brokers 
for DRR?  
4. Did the actors within the disaster policy subsystem in Nepal capitalize 
on the ‘window of opportunity’ created by the 2015 earthquake as an 
opportunity to change the disaster management policy paradigm 
towards that of DRR? 
To address these questions, eight months of qualitative fieldwork was carried 
out in Nepal. In total eighty-eight in depth interviews were carried out with 
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government staff and politicians at the central, district and local levels. The main 
research sites included a variety of different central ministry offices in 
Kathmandu, in the District Development Offices and various Village 
Development Committee (VDC) Offices in Lalitpur, Bardiya, and Solukhumbu 
districts, and at the local government levels in Lalitpur Sub-Metropolitan City and 
in Gulariya Municipality, Bardiya District.   
 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
 
Following this introduction, this thesis begins (Chapter 2) by broadly examining 
the origins of both mainstreaming and DRR. Chapter 3 then establishes the 
theoretical frameworks that were chosen to structure this research including 
disaster vulnerability and policy paradigm change. The literature review chapters 
(Chapters 2 and 3) are not only an overview of the dominant literature in the 
field, but also serve to structure a critique of the policy prescription of 
mainstreaming to address the first objective set out for this research. Since very 
little theoretical or conceptual literature on mainstreaming or DRR policy exists, 
it was necessary to use the literature review chapters for this purpose.  
 
Chapter 4 is an examination of Nepal. It presents an overview of the 
challenges—focusing on Nepal’s politics and government—that create a 
significant resistance to policy paradigm change. Chapter 5 is a detailed 
overview of the research methodology used to produce this work. This research 
then delves into the empirical findings generated from eight months of fieldwork. 
Chapter 6 focuses on whether mainstreaming DRR was rhetoric or stimulus for 
central government action. Chapter 7 explores the reality of the mainstreaming 
DRR agenda at the district and local levels. Finally, Chapter 8 explores the DRR 
agenda within the political parties.  Chapter 9 concludes with a discussion of the 
main findings and implications that come from this research.   
 9 
 
2 Mainstreaming DRR: A Policy Tool 
for Change? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter discusses the development of both disaster risk reduction and 
mainstreaming policy. Instead of viewing mainstreaming DRR as a singular and 
fused process (e.g. “mainstreaming DRR”), this chapter breaks each component 
apart (e.g. “mainstreaming” + “DRR”) and examines DRR and mainstreaming as 
two distinct processes. In doing so, it uncovers some significant challenges and 
unmet tensions that exist within each, which may prove to be a barrier to 
mainstreaming DRR in Nepal when examined in later chapters.  
 
The first topic under exploration in this chapter is the evolution of DRR as a 
policy alternative to the dominant disaster response focused policies that exist 
globally. It then examines mainstreaming as a solution proposed for changing 
the disaster policy environment. This chapter ends with a look at the existing 
literature related to mainstreaming gender and environment and concludes with 
an overview of the existing literature related to mainstreaming DRR. 
2.2 Civil Defence to Disaster Risk Reduction: Tensions 
and Unmet Challenges in Changing Disaster Policy 
 
This section surveys both the development of the dominant global policy 
approach of disaster response/relief and the promotion of DRR as an alternative 
policy option. It ought to be stressed that the focus of this discussion is on 
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modern/contemporary disaster management institutions that have arisen since 
the end of the Second World War. It begins with a brief look at global disaster 
response policy in the developing world and then examines its recent origins in 
the US, Europe, and other western nation-states. It concludes with a discussion 
of DRR and the implications of the proposed legislative and policy reforms on 
existing disaster management organisations.  
2.2.1 Response/Relief Disaster Policy in the Developing World 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, many developing nations have weak 
mechanisms to adequately respond in times of disaster and so rely on the 
support and policy innovations of supranational bodies such as the UN and 
World Bank. The limited disaster response capacity is typically augmented with 
an influx of international humanitarian organisations during times of disaster. 
This relief approach has become an industry unto itself that has come under 
increasing scrutiny (Elliott and Sullivan 2015). In 2014, total international 
humanitarian assistance amounted to 24 billion USD, of which “only 0.2% went 
directly to local and national NGOs and 3.1% to the governments of the affected 
states” (Development Initiatives 2015: Online). The problems facing the 
humanitarian sector are summarised in a 2016 Overseas Development Institute 
report: 
“…the formal humanitarian sector is suffering a crisis of legitimacy…. 
Efforts to recapture this legitimacy have focused on improving the 
mechanics of response and the system already in place, rather than 
tackling more fundamental assumptions, power dynamics and incentives. 
Despite a decade of system-wide reforms, the sector still falls short in the 
world’s most enduring crisis responses, and perceptions of humanitarian 
work in recent crises suggest that the formal, Western ‘system’ is not 
doing a good job in the eyes of the people it aims to help” (Bennett 2016: 
68).  
Substantial reform of this approach is clearly needed and yet as stated, change 
over the last decade has been slow to occur, which is attributable to a failure to 
address underlying issues related to “assumptions, power dynamics, and 
incentives” (ibid: 68). Another factor that needs consideration is that the 
‘western’ system of humanitarian relief has, as Cohen and Werker (2008) argue, 
increased the likelihood that recipient countries will underinvest in domestic 
government preparedness and response activities.  
 
It is impossible and unwise to generalise all developing world contexts, but even 
with the global response/relief infrastructure efforts have been made within 
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developing nation-states to institutionalise disaster response capabilities. In the 
case of Nepal, which is categorized as a least developed country by the UN (UN 
Committee for Development Policy 2016) and was the recipient of 4.1 billion 
USD in the aftermath of the 2015 earthquakes (MacAskill and Sharma 2015), 
efforts have been made since 1982 through the Natural Calamity Relief Act  
(GON 1982) to institutionalised disaster management within the central 
government. This centralised disaster management relies on using military and 
paramilitary resources to respond to disasters and is studied in greater detail in 
Chapter 6.  
2.2.2 History of Disaster Response in Developed World: Air Raid 
Precaution Volunteers during the Second World War 
 
This discussion next examines the evolution of disaster response policy in the 
developed world. The origin of government institutions that are used to respond 
in times of disaster in North America and western Europe begins in the Second 
World War. Given the risk of German bombing and the escalation of tensions, 
the Home Office of the United Kingdom passed legislation in 1938 that 
compelled local authorities to recruit and train brigades for air-raids (Maartens 
2015). These voluntary brigades encompassed volunteer ambulance drivers, 
decontamination units, first aid, and firefighting. They were an attempt to create 
a “citizen army” (Maartens 2015) through mobilizing community action and 
augmenting national defence capabilities for the impending war effort (Phillips et 
al. 2012). In the UK, an estimated 400,000 air raid precaution volunteers were 
mobilized (Maartens 2015). Six months after joining the war in 1941, the US 
established a similar home front, coordinated by the newly established Office of 
Civilian Defence (Gilder Lehrman Institute of American History Online). These 
voluntary brigades adopted a military ethos and organisation of top-down 
command and control. This era represents the first time that government 
organisations were established to carry out protective duties for citizens outside 
of the existing military, police, ambulance, and fire brigades and are widely 
regarded as the precursor of disaster management organisations (Quarantelli 
2000).  
 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, there was little doubt that military 
defence was a public good that ought to be provided by the state (Sandler and 
Cauley 1975). This state interventionist thinking (coinciding with Keynesian 
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economics discussed below) extended to public protection in times of 
emergency and disaster (Handmer and Dovers 2007). For instance, the belief in 
post-war France was that “being the owner of most of the infrastructures and 
services for energy, communication and transports, the state also had the 
responsibility for providing these vital needs to the population, in normal times 
as in times of crisis” (Bourcart 2015: 40).  
2.2.3 The Cold War and Civil Defence 
 
Shortly after the Second World War ended, a new enemy arose that led to the 
institutionalization of government departments responsible for civil protection 
during the Cold War. The languishing volunteer brigades of WWII were revived 
through legislation, increased funding, and the hiring of staff (Coppola 2007). 
Local volunteer brigades were repurposed for large scale evacuation of citizens 
in the event of a nuclear bomb attack. Philipps et al. (2012) suggests that in the 
US the ideal candidate for a local government civil defence job at this time was a 
retired military member. Since they were already receiving a military pension, it 
allowed local governments to keep salaries low and the jobs part-time. In 
addition, previous military experience, it was assumed, would result in better 
management during times of crisis (Philipps et. al. 2012).  
 
A more cynical analysis for the hiring of mostly part-time personnel is that local 
civil defence institutions were never intended to protect the public from nuclear 
events. The absurdity of volunteer brigades and part-time staff responding to the 
aftermath of a nuclear attack was not lost on senior policy makers at the time 
(Knowles 2007; Smith 2010). Smith (2010) argues that UK civil defence was a 
rouse to maintain public support for its Cold War deterrence strategies: 
“The debate centred around two opposing views of the role of civil 
defence: civil defence as an ‘insurance policy’ to protect the civilian 
population in the event of an attack, serving much the same purpose as it 
had during the Second World War, and civil defence as part of the strategy 
of deterrence, a strategy upon which Britain had become increasingly 
reliant since deciding to build its own hydrogen weapons. In the latter 
view, civil defence was a way of deterring attack by convincing the enemy 
that Britain was prepared to fight, and a method of maintaining public 
support for the deterrent by convincing the British people that nuclear war 
was survivable” (Smith 2010:158). 
The UK Home Office issued pamphlets to the public with advice on how to 
survive nuclear fall-out in order to maintain the pretext that nuclear fallout was 
survivable. One such pamphlet read: 
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“Radioactive dust on the body could be washed off with soap and water, 
particular attention being given to the nails and hair… If a washing 
machine were used for clothes, some of the radioactive particles might 
stay inside the machine. A bucket or tub would be better” (Her Majesty’s 
Stationery Office 1957 from Smith 2010: 149). 
Historian Eric Singer (2015) argues that civil defence (from 1957-1964) in the 
US transformed from a “pro-urban” policy that focused on community 
preservation after an attack to an “anti-urban” policy that promoted a quasi-
militarised state. His case study of Baltimore US, highlights that by the 1960s 
civil defence in the US “became fused with law enforcement and urban social 
control” (Singer 2015: 549). This alienated prominent advocates of the earlier 
“pro-urban” approach and ultimately led to the demise of civil defence in 
Baltimore. Similarly, Knowles (2007) discusses the failure of early civil (1951-
1960s) defence policies in another US city, Philadelphia. 
“Command and control was seen to be the way to react to a war, despite 
the fact that the citizens of Philadelphia did not see themselves at war. 
This imposition of a wartime command structure on a vibrant, living, 
peacetime city was a policy misstep that led to the dissolution of civil 
defence” (Knowles 2007: 229). 
The problem of civil defence policies is well documented in the history 
literature2. However, disaster and emergency scholars often gloss over the civil 
defence era, merely attributing it as the root of modern disaster government 
institutions (Phillips et al. 2012). While this is true, historical accounts emphasize 
civil defence’s unsettling use as a tool for advancing central government 
defence policies and for adopting a culture that was clearly out of sync with post-
war public opinion. In the UK, civil defence was used as a policy instrument in 
support of the government’s deterrence policy by building a case that nuclear 
war was survivable. In the US, it was used to reinforce national nuclear arms 
policy through manipulating public perceptions of the risk and by manufacturing 
fear. From these flawed institutions arose the next generation of emergency and 
disaster management. However, as discussed below its problematic history as 
civil defence has never really been reconciled.  
2.2.4 Civil Defence 2.0: Emergency and Disaster Management 
 
The increasing unlikelihood of nuclear fallout, the public distrust of civil defence, 
and the eventual end of the Cold War necessitated that these organisations 
                                               
2 e.g. for Canadian discussion see Burtch 2012; for West German discussion see Biess 
2009. 
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begin to transform themselves (Handmer and Dovers 2013). The legacy of civil 
defence on what became disaster and emergency management (herein referred 
to as disaster management) cannot be overstated3. The civil defence legal 
frameworks “remained in place and formed the basis for modern disaster and 
emergency management as we know it today” (Coppola 2007: 5). The 
institutions in place during the civil defence era to ‘combat’ nuclear attack was 
systematically transformed to ‘manage’ hazards. The term disaster 
management4 was adopted. Although the terminology was more suited for a 
civilian government atmosphere, the ethos of command and control for disaster 
management still echoed that of the civil defence era (Neal and Phillips 1995). 
Emergency management remained focused on disaster response and 
maintained a hiring bias for experienced first responders5.  
 
Military/security concerns continue to influence and define disaster 
management. Particularly in the US after 9/11, disaster management 
organisations were brought back into the defence fold of national policy6 
(Roberts 2006; Cigler 2009). The implications of this leads to what Tierney 
(2007) calls “‘stovepiping’, or the tendency for organisations and agencies to 
closely guard information, carry out their own specialized activities in isolation 
from one another, and to resist cross-agency collaboration” (Tierney 2007: 411). 
That disaster management institutions are quickly appropriated for security and 
defence remains a unique and somewhat troubling feature of disaster 
management institutions. 
 
In both the developed and developing world contexts there are strong forces 
behind a response focused policy approach to disasters.  
                                               
3 For example, many government organisations have retained the title of civil defence. 
For example, New Zealand’s central government ministry for disaster is called the 
Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management and Ireland refers to it as Civil 
Defence Ireland.   
4 Also known as civil protection (European Union), emergency management (US and 
Canada), and resilience (UK) 
5 These trends are starting to shift, particularly in the developed world, with an increased 
focus on professionalization within the field and more academic routes for entering the 
profession outside of the traditional first response routes (Oyola-Yemaiel and Wilson 
2005; Knox and Haupt 2015).  
6 After 9/11 FEMA lost its autonomy and was subsumed under the Department 
Homeland Security to decrease silos within the intelligence and response federal 
agencies. Instead, it pushed emergency management planning off the agenda and 
ultimately led to the catastrophic failure of Hurricane Katrina (Lucus-McEwen 2011).  
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1. There is the response/relief multimillion dollar disaster industry in 
place during times of disasters. One of the consequences of this 
is that governments do not adequately invest in domestic disaster 
preparedness.  
2. There is also a history of disaster management being a policy 
instrument of central government defence initiatives. The culture 
of defence and security has permeated disaster management 
institutions. 
As previously argued in the introductory chapter, maintaining a disaster 
response approach is no longer sustainable, especially with the increased 
magnitude and frequency of disasters globally. This presents a global policy 
conundrum for both donors and supranational organisations: how to shift 
disaster policy from response to one of disaster preparedness and reduction?   
2.2.5 The Shift to Disaster Risk Reduction 
 
Recognizing that substantive change is required in how disasters are managed 
led to the promotion of disaster risk reduction.  Although DRR was briefly 
defined in Chapter 1, a more comprehensive discussion of DRR and the related 
disaster risk management (DRM) is discussed here. One way to distinguish 
between the two terms is to categorizes them as, a) DRR is the “policy 
objective” and b) DRM is the “implementation” (PreventionWeb 2017: Online). 
This is a useful, because on its own DRR is too broad of a concept to be 
implemented.  
 
DRR is the policy objective of identifying, anticipating, and reducing risk 
(PreventionWeb 2017). Having grown out of the disaster vulnerability literature 
(discussed in Chapter 3),  the objective of DRR is to address both present-day 
and future risks. It is understood that existing political, social, cultural and 
economic factors exacerbate risks for billions of people worldwide. DRR policy 
must address existing risks in a “systematic way” (UNISDR 2009) that also 
accounts for likely future risks. For example, if a policy does not account for 
likely future scenarios brought about by climate change, then any development 
gains have the potential to be lost. Traditionally, disasters have been viewed as 
an outside threat to development (Global Assessement Report 2015). DRR an 
advancement on this understanding, i.e. poorly planned and implemented 
development is itself a contributor to disaster risk. To this end, because so many 
sectors contribute to “development”, DRR is a very broad policy objective that 
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must be internalised and owned by many sectors that have not traditionally been 
considered a part of disaster management.  
 
Disaster risk management is a programme of implementation. It encompasses a 
wide range of activities that comprehensively cover each component of the 
disaster cycle (i.e. preparedness, mitigation, response, recovery). Accordingly, 
these activities involve (Global Assessment Report 2015): 
1. Risk Identification 
2. Mitigation 
3. Transfer  
4. Preparedness 
5. Emergency Response 
6. Rehabilitation 
7. Reconstruction  
 
That DRM is all encompassing—meaning that it includes both pre and post 
disaster activities—puts the policy objective of DRR at risk if the two terms are 
mistakenly used interchangeably. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the 
disaster response approach to dealing with disasters is the dominant approach. 
For this reason, the term DRM is used sparingly throughout this research. The 
focus is on the policy objective of linking development and risk reduction and 
thus DRR is preferred.    
 
In 2005, with the signing of the Hyogo Framework for Action by 168 nation-
states (Nepal included), DRR came into being as a non-binding framework with 
little to no mechanisms for implementation. To address this shortfall, Priority 
Action One of the HFA makes establishing supportive intuitional environments a 
main objective. The key activities of Priority Action One are listed below in Table 
2-1.  
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Table 2-1. HFA Priority Action One 
Key 
Activity  
 
1.i.a Support the creation and strengthening of national integrated 
disaster risk reduction mechanisms, such as multi-sectoral national 
platforms, with designated responsibilities at the national through to 
the local levels to facilitate coordination across sectors. National 
platforms should also facilitate coordination across sectors, including 
by maintaining a broad based dialogue at national and regional 
levels for promoting awareness among the relevant sectors. 
1.i.b Integrate risk reduction, as appropriate, into development policies 
and planning at all levels of government, including in poverty 
reduction strategies and sectors and multi-sector policies and plans. 
1.i.c Adopt, or modify where necessary, legislation to support disaster risk 
reduction, including regulations and mechanisms that encourage 
compliance and that promote incentives for undertaking risk 
reduction and mitigation activities.  
1.i.d. Recognise the importance and specificity of local risk patterns and 
trends, decentralise responsibilities and resources for disaster risk 
reduction to relevant sub-national or local authorities, as appropriate. 
 (source: UNISDR 2005). 
 
Although the term mainstreaming is not used in Table 2-1, it is used explicitly 
used elsewhere in the HFA. For example, “mainstream and integrate disaster 
risk reduction within and across all sectors and review and promote the 
coherence and further development, as appropriate, of national and local 
frameworks of laws, regulations and public policies…” (UNISDR 2005: 14). Both 
the terms integration and mainstreaming are fleshed out in more detail below 
(sections 2.4.2 and 2.5.2). 
 
Where and how the established disaster management organisations fit into this 
new policy agenda is unclear. To stimulate change, the DRR agenda appears to 
override existing disaster management institutions and by doing so levies a 
critique of their past functioning. It may be argued that this does not matter in 
many developing country contexts because established disaster management 
institutions are either weak or non-existent. However, as will be seen in 
subsequent chapters, even in institutions where disaster management 
implementation is lacking the desire to maintain the disaster response status 
quo is a serious barrier to change.  
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2.3 Mainstreaming Policy: A Neoliberal Tool for Change 
 
The rest of this chapter is focused on a global policy solution aimed at 
stimulating significant policy change within organisations: mainstreaming policy. 
This section outlines the evolution and development of mainstreaming policy as 
a solution for complex policies such as DRR, situating it squarely within the 
dominant global economic regime, neoliberalism.  
2.3.1 Before Neoliberalism: Keynesian and Developmental 
Economics 
 
Before discussing the current economic paradigm of neoliberalism and its 
relationship with policy mainstreaming, it is necessary to provide a brief 
explanation of what came before and what prompted the resultant shift to a 
neoliberal paradigm. Keynesian economic theory was the leading global tenet of 
the post-World War era. With memories still fresh of the Great Depression 
(widely believed to have been caused by laissez-faire economic policy), and the 
realities of physical and social reconstruction of war-torn Europe, the 
interventionist economic theories of British economist John Maynard Keynes 
prevailed in western capitalist nation-states.  In response to the Great 
Depression, Keynesian economic theory advocated government spending (an 
interventionist strategy) rather than an austerity and savings approach of 
classical liberalism. As Keynes stated “[f]or the engine which drives enterprise is 
not thrift, but profit” (Keynes 1971).  
 
Peet (2003) summarizes how Keynesian theory was translated into government 
policy during this era, “[p]ost-war liberalism used state intervention, exercised 
through various levels of planning and public ownership, in its social democratic 
versions, and fiscal and monetary policy in its liberal-democratic versions to 
stabilize economies and redistribute income through welfare programmes, 
unemployment compensation, the subsidization of education and the free 
provision of social services” (Peet 2003: 6). A hallmark of this period was the 
expansion of government bureaucracies to “promote growth and stability in the 
economy” (Choudhury 1994: 46).  
 
In the developing world, Keynesian theory was translated into 
developmentalism, which favoured strong government involvement in the 
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markets mainly through import-substitution strategies. It aimed to create strong 
domestic markets by placing high tax on imports and subsidizing domestic 
industry. It was used as a political tool and strongly promoted by the US and 
Bretton Woods Institutions so that the transitioning economies of post-
independent states would be integrated into the capitalist sphere of influence 
rather than communist.  
 
However, both Keynesian and developmentalism showed signs of disintegration 
by the 1970s. Developing economies were under pressure from 
underemployment, rising inflation, balance of payment challenges, and currency 
overvaluation (Peck 2004). The import-substitution strategies central to 
developmentalism did not lead to the necessary industrial growth needed to 
sustain long-term economic progress, leading many developing nation-states to 
borrow heavily.  Western capitalist economies were at the same time reeling 
from stagflation (slow growth, high inflation) and increased labour unrest. Oil 
prices rose throughout the decade ending access to cheap oil. To stop rising 
inflation, the US raised its interest rates, which had a cascading effect on 
interest rates in the developing world.  Developing nations could no longer make 
payments on variable rate loans, causing many to default. Keynesian fiscal 
policy was deemed unable to solve this and the other problems in the global 
economy (Hartwick and Peet 2003). In fact, it was implicated as a root cause of 
slow economic growth, as high unemployment was triggering larger social 
welfare spending in the public sector. 
2.3.2 Neoliberalism and its Epochs 
 
To understand how neoliberalism relates to mainstreaming policy requires a look 
at the evolution of neoliberalism. In the thirty plus years of neoliberalism, there 
are two discernible epochs that Peck and Tickell have termed “roll-back 
neoliberalism” and “roll-out neoliberalism” (Peck and Tickell 2002). Both are 
discussed below; it is in the “roll-out neoliberalism” epoch where the concept of 
mainstreaming evolves and becomes popularised.   
 
Returning attention to the above mentioned economic problems of the 1970s 
and growing academic dissent from the likes of Friedman (1960; 1977), created 
the conditions for a revival of laissez faire economics resulting in a swift 
pendulum swing away from post-war Keynesian interventionism to 
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neoliberalism7 in the mid-1970s.  The premise of neoliberalism is that the 
market, when freed and unencumbered from state interference, is the best 
allocator of wealth distribution and generator of unfettered economic growth. 
Some describe neoliberalism as a form of ‘hyper-capitalism’ (Piven 2015).  
 
The first epoch of neoliberalism occurred under Thatcher and Reagan in the late 
1970s and early 1980s. This was an era that dogmatically followed classical 
liberal economic theory. In the name of reform, structural adjustment 
programmes became conditional to development loans granted to developing 
economies to ‘shock’ them into stimulating economic growth. These measures 
included selling off publically owned assets, promoting export trade and foreign 
direct investment, liberalising markets, reducing the size of government and 
drastically cutting welfare spending.   
 
Not just a developing world phenomenon, Rhodes (1994) studying the UK public 
service declared the “hollowing out of the state” (Rhodes 1994: 138). 
Neoliberalism had transformed British state executive power by eroding it from 
above (e.g. “international interdependence”), below (e.g. “marketization”), and 
sideways (e.g. “parastatal bodies”). This era of “roll-back neoliberalism” was 
“preoccupied with the active destruction” (Peck and Tickell 2002: 384) of the 
vestiges of Keynesian state apparatus. The “hollowing-out” of government 
created voids in service provision that were filled with both private and non-
governmental organisations. What is important to note here is that government 
bureaucracies were greatly reduced and severely fragmented (Rhodes 1994).   
 
By the 1990s, it was evident that the neoliberal agenda, especially concerning 
structural adjustment, was in fact increasing levels of poverty especially for the 
‘poorest of the poor’ by reducing their ability to access markets (Konadu-
Agyemang 2000; Leal 2007). The promised marketization of social service 
provision had not materialised (Schleiter and Statham 2002; Maynard et al. 
2012). This and growing public dissent (e.g. the growth of the anti-globalisation 
                                               
7 Neoliberalism is both a conceptual tool used for labelling a dominant global ideology [a 
“common sense of the times” (Peck and Tickell 2002: 381)], and an economic agenda 
with an arsenal of policy instruments. For the purposes of this thesis, both are relevant. 
As a concept, neoliberalism denotes a “shorthand to describe any logic of organisation 
in which the market has a significant role…” (Venugopal 2015: 172). The suite of 
neoliberal policy instruments includes state downsizing, deregulation, free trade, 
reduction of public social welfare spending, austerity, and privatization. 
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movement) led to Bretton Woods institutions like the World Bank Group to 
devise a reformulated version of neoliberalism.  
 
The second epoch of “roll-out neoliberalism” is where we find the root of policy 
mainstreaming. The new iteration of neoliberalism focused “on the purposeful 
construction and consolidation of neoliberalised state forms, modes of 
governance, and regulatory restructuring…” (Peck and Tickell 2002: 384). The 
belief was that the first neoliberal epoch had failed because the conditions had 
not been right. Paradoxically, this required more state interventions in order to 
correct these imperfections. A “moderate and tempered” (Bayliss et al. 2011: 1) 
neoliberalism appeared. In order to understand why mainstreaming is 
associated with the “roll-out neoliberalism” it is important to now discuss 
neoliberalism in the public sector.  
2.3.3 New Public Management 
 
The public sector underwent significant neoliberal reforms in order that it “fit the 
new spirit of capitalism” (Diefenbach 2009: 894). Sweeping public sector reform 
emerged in the late 1970s to integrate neoliberal discourse into the public-sector 
sphere. This slate of reforms was later termed New Public Management by 
Hood (1991). NPM reforms were widely disseminated globally in both developed 
and developing nation-states (Cohen 2016). Like neoliberalism, there are also 
two discernible epochs in NPM that coincided with the neoliberal shifts.  
 
Osbourne and Gaebler (1993) argued that governments ought to be ‘steering 
rather than rowing’. NPM privileges market allocation of services rather than 
government allocation, and aims to transform the public sector using private 
sector management approaches. These are widely recognized in the literature to 
include government budget cuts, decentralisation, privatization, contracting out 
of services, and adopting business management practise such as performance 
management and incentive use, and clear separation of policy making from the 
administration (Gruening 2001; Cohen 2016).  
 
The size of the bureaucracy, which in the post-war period had grown, was 
attacked as a grossly inefficient way of delivering services. Sarker points to 
three main NPM critiques of the post-war Weberian-style bureaucracy: a bias 
towards excessive provision of public goods because of representative 
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democratic political systems, state agents not having personal incentives to 
carry out functions efficiently, and the public sector creates spaces and 
opportunities for ‘rent-seeking’ behaviours (Sarker 2005: 251).  
 
Although the spirit of NPM—to reduce waste and improve efficiencies in 
bureaucracies—cannot be faulted, its implementation was applied with a 
zealotry that decimated government services relied on most heavily by the 
disadvantaged (Lustig 1995). NPM adoption raises key concerns regarding local 
level community participation and democratic accountabilities both in developed 
(Davis and Geddes 2000) and developing nation-state contexts (Andrews 2007).  
 
Another key aspect found in the first iteration of NPM—in neoliberalism’s “roll-
back” epoch—is specialisation. It was believed specialisation of work streams 
would build capacity by aligning the bureaucracy “within separate, semi-
autonomous organisations” (Christensen and Laegreid 2013: 556). 
Specialisation is the antithesis to the sort of cross-sector integration of current 
mainstreaming rhetoric and is discussed in more detail below. 
 
2.3.4 Post-New Public Management  
 
Alongside neoliberal “roll-out” reform in the 1990s, NPM also underwent a 
reform process to “reduce the negative impact of NPM reforms” (Andersson and 
Liff 2012: 836). The proponents of NPM underestimated the complexity of 
delivering government services (Kinder 2012). Of note, was the adverse effect of 
NPMs specialisation mentioned above. Christensen and Laegreid (2013) argue 
that specialisation, “led to proliferation and fragmentation of the government 
apparatus and reduced the capacity to handle ‘wicked issues8’ that transcend 
organisational boundaries and administrative levels” (Christensen and Laegreid 
2013: 556).  The post-NPM reforms aimed to increase governmental 
coordination ability both horizontally and vertically within the administration. 
They also aimed to make government function in an age of austerity and to be 
                                               
8 The use of the term ‘wicked’ is commonly found in the policy literatures- e.g. wicked 
issues, wicked policy, wicked problem. Here the use of wicked does not mean evil, but 
rather an issue that is “highly resistant to resolution” (Australian Public Service 
Commission 2016 Online). Candel and Biesbroek (2016) add: “…in addition to cross-
scale dynamics, these problems involve high degrees of ambiguity, controversy, 
uncertainty, and deadlocked interaction patterns” (Candel and Biesbroek 2016: 212). 
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able to manage the complexity of policy issues (termed ‘wicked’ issues). It was 
acknowledged that “there was a mismatch between the problem structures and 
the organisation structure, so that major tasks now cut across organisational 
boundaries” (Christensen and Laegreid, 2013: 557). The existing siloed and 
departmentalised bureaucratic structures arising from specialisation (i.e. first 
neoliberal epoch) did not suit the management of complex wicked problems.  In 
addition to this, Cohen (2016) adds that the post- 9/11 security environment 
made policy makers fearful and fostered a cultural policy climate aimed at 
“control, coordination, and centralisation” (Cohen 2016: 22). What evolved from 
post-NPM is a neo-Weberian notion of government functionality.   
 
It is in this post-NPM era of trying to fix government fragmentalisation that policy 
mainstreaming rose to prominence through supranational organisations such as 
the World Bank and UN as a solution for national governments to better manage 
complex policies. Complex wicked policies such as sustainable development 
(the Rio Agenda 21 call for wide policy integration) and gender in 1995 (Beijing 
Platform for Action called for gender mainstreaming) were prescribed. Both 
mainstreaming and integration are discussed in detail below. However, what 
should be noted is that all the hallmarks of post-NPM discussed above are 
reflected in the current conception of mainstreaming/integration. That is, 
mainstreaming is a centralised top down mechanism aimed at fixing both vertical 
and horizontal fragmentalisation. It delegates wicked policy to many other 
sectors without increasing organisational capacity. It pushes national 
governments to do more with less.  
2.4 Problematizing Mainstreaming Policy 
 
This section raises two concerns found in the literature that relate to 
mainstreaming policy. First, it problematizes mainstreaming’s close association 
with neoliberal policy by discussing the evidence from the literature that 
neoliberalism is increasing global disaster risk. The second concern presented 
here argues that the term mainstreaming has evolved as a neoliberal ‘buzzword’ 
intended to reinforce neoliberal agendas. The problems associated with using a 
buzzword as a shorthand for a complex policy endeavour are discussed.   
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2.4.1 Disaster Risk and Neoliberalism 
 
The literature has clearly established a link between neoliberal economic policy 
and increased disaster risk. To begin with, privatization of government services 
and critical infrastructure once under government control has transformed the 
disaster governance landscape. The question remains “whether governments 
should retain responsibility for disaster risks or whether risks should be shared 
between governments and markets” (Tierney 2012: 352). In the last decade, 
there has been a rise in the promotion of public-private-partnerships in relation 
to disaster management (Auzzir et al. 2014).  Bourcart best summarises this 
change, in his work concerning France’s shift to private utility ownership: 
“… successive French governments have progressively privatised these 
infrastructures and transformed them into large companies with specific 
obligations of service delivery. In the case of man-made or natural 
disasters, these private companies now have the duty to insure the 
continuity of their activity and to recover as quickly as possible, in order to 
maintain the satisfaction of the people’s needs. In the face of disaster, the 
state has lost an important part of its crisis intervention capacity, and 
would rather take on the role of coordinator for these different vital service 
providers. Civil defence is therefore moving from an issue of territorial 
integrity (protection of the state, public infrastructures, the citizens and 
their belongings, etc.) to an issue of logistics, business continuity and vital 
networks and infrastructure preservation” (Bourcart 2015: 40). 
In the context of disaster management, the selling off of government utilities 
changes the level of government control in times of disaster to keep essential 
services running (Bourcart 2015). Additionally, Hood and Jackson (1991) argue 
that NPM is a ‘recipe for disaster’ as the pressure in the private sector to reduce 
costs puts maintenance at risk and ultimately increases the risks associated with 
technical hazards:  
“If prospective back-up facilities are a vulnerable target for the NPM cost-
cutter with eyes firmly fixed on the short-term bottom line, maintenance is 
another soft target, and here again private sector practice often shows the 
way to save money in the short term. Particularly in the poll-centred policy-
making system which suppresses influence of people with experience 
within the bureaucratic system, maintenance activity is likely to be seen as 
unexciting and unproductive, yet such activity is often crucial to the safe 
management of hazardous technology” (Hood and Jackson 1991: 22). 
Another consequence of neoliberalism on disaster institutions concerns the 
“hollowing out of the state” (Rhodes 1994). Prudham (2004) provides a strong 
empirical case linking a neoliberal policy agenda with the creation of the 
Walkerton Ontario e-coli contaminated water crisis in 2000. Walkerton is a small 
rural town located in the Canadian province of Ontario. In 1995, Ontario elected 
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a conservative government that implemented a slate of public sector reforms; 
Prudham equates these reforms with Peck and Tickell’s “rollback neoliberalism” 
discussed earlier. He argues, “[i]n the case of Walkerton, it is precisely the 
combination of neoliberal reforms with a highly particular biophysical 
environment and the actions of environmental managers that turned a ‘normal’ 
accident waiting to happen into a specific one with tragic consequences” 
(Prudham 2004: 344). His analysis points to government cutbacks of oversight 
bodies and forced privatization of water testing combined with a lack of 
attendant legislation/regulations to guide oversight of the water testing as 
contributing factors to the disaster.   
 
The intersection of disaster and neoliberalism is the premise of Klein’s (2008) 
publication The Shock Doctrine. This work is important since it popularized the 
disaster-neoliberal connection that would have otherwise remained hidden in 
fringe academic literature. Klein argues that disaster events are appropriated in 
order to undemocratically implement ‘free market’ (neoliberal) policies at a time 
when the public is distracted by the on-going disaster response and recovery. 
Klein labels this as ‘disaster capitalism’ (Klein 2008). These policies do nothing 
to aid recovery processes, instead they further weaken and erode the 
foundations of the nation-state. For example, Klein documents the privatization 
of Sri Lankan beaches that occurred soon after the 2005 tsunami in order for the 
beaches to become a “boutique tourism destination” (ibid: 467). This forced the 
local fishing communities off what had previously been communal beaches. 
Critics of Klein’s work argue that The Shock Doctrine does not fit in the 
academic cannon because of its oversimplification and sometimes exaggeration 
of the issues (Stiglitz 2007). Nonetheless, the same critic (Nobel Prize winning 
economist Joseph Stiglitz) also wrote in a New York Times Book Review that:  
“…the case against these policies [the policies of ‘free market 
fundamentalism’ as he terms them] is even stronger than the one Klein 
makes. They were never based on solid empirical and theoretical 
foundations, and even as many of these policies were being pushed, 
academic economists were explaining the limitations of markets—for 
instance, whenever information is imperfect, which is to say always” 
(Stiglitz 2007, Online). 
 
Perez and Cannella (2011) explore ‘disaster capitalism’ in relation to early 
childhood education centres in Louisiana in the post-Hurricane Katrina recovery 
environment. In keeping with Klein’s work, the authors found that, “[c]hildhood 
public services such as education and care were dismantled and taken over by 
 26 
 
the state of Louisiana… or by private agencies that were given corporate 
contracts to control resources” (Perez and Cannella 2011: 47). They argue that 
the commodification of early child educational services produces injustices when 
students are viewed as “human capital” and parents as “consumers” (Perez and 
Cannella 2011: 56). This leads to furthering inequalities as poorer households 
are unable to buy their children the best educational opportunities.  
 
The effects of neoliberalism on mitigation and risk reduction has also been 
discussed. For example, one common research theme in the disaster-neoliberal 
nexus is to examine the effect of neoliberalism on the government regulatory 
environment, the knock-off effects of de-regulation on the building industry, and 
the construction of unsafe housing. Deregulation and non-compliance of building 
codes is perhaps the area where the causal effect of neoliberal policy on 
disaster risk is most visible. Examples of this research are discussed below. 
 
Wisner et. al (2004) use Jamaica as a case-study to highlight the linkage 
between the economy as a dynamic pressure and its role in increased risk 
generated by unsafe building stock. In the 1980s, Jamaica’s large foreign debt 
prompted its government to attract foreign capital by raising interest rates. 
Interest rates rose to 20 per cent and “home mortgage rates ran between 14 and 
25 per cent” (ibid: 78). At the same time, the government “enforced rent control 
and levied an import duty on construction materials” (ibid: 78). High mortgage 
interest rates and a cap on rental rates meant homeowners neglected to fix and 
maintain their properties. The high interest rates also led builders to cut corners 
on safety factors to gain a profit. The cumulative effect of this was damage to 
over 100,000 lower income homes during Hurricane Gilbert (ibid: 78). The 
authors suggest that: 
“The experience of Jamaica during the past 20 years illustrates the 
linkages that exist between the global economy, national economic 
policies and vulnerability. The impact of ‘structural adjustment’ on 
vulnerability went far beyond the issue of building maintenance. Because 
of the high cost of finance, builders tried to keep the cost of construction 
as low as possible so some small profit could be made. Again, safety 
suffered” (Wisner et al. 2004: 79).  
Neoliberalism is again implicated in increased risk by Green (2005) who points 
to the liberalisation of Turkey’s economy as a factor in increased earthquake 
fatalities due to unsafe building construction. After a coup d’état in the early 
1980s, Turkey’s new Prime Minister liberalised the Turkish economy- public land 
was privatized and legally sold, while deregulation occurred to encourage 
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entrepreneurship. This resulted in a construction boom and the emergence of 
many construction firms. In the wake of liberalisation, corruption ‘blossomed’ 
(Green 2005). Green writes: 
“This culture of laissez faire in which it was possible to build wherever and 
whatever one liked, with no adequate regulatory control, was to grow more 
prevalent over the next 15 years. A notable finding of the post-earthquake 
engineering teams was that a disproportionate number of newly built 
structures failed in the 1999 disasters. This finding suggests a direct link 
between liberalization and deregulation strategies employed by the 
Ozal regime in the 1980s and the poor-quality housing stock which 
flourished from that period” (Green 2005: 530; emphasis added).  
 
Providing a much broader view of neoliberal policy and increased disaster risk, 
Wisner (2001) discusses the implications for El Salvador’s public administration 
in absorbing lessons gained from Hurricane Mitch. He speculates that El 
Salvador’s “dogmatic commitment to neoliberal economic principles” has 
negatively affected the national level state’s ability “to implement prevention and 
mitigation strategies” (Wisner 2001: 252). El Salvador was minimally damaged 
in Hurricane Mitch and yet participated fully in recovery meetings and lessons-
learned activities (Wisner 2001). Wisner argues that neoliberal policy eroded the 
capacity of the government to absorb the lessons drawn from these activities. 
For instance, a key recommendation to come from Hurricane Mitch was the 
importance of access to primary health and hospital services in rural and poor 
urban areas to minimise the risks of water-borne diseases. However, the 
government of El Salvador was demonstrably uncommitted to public healthcare, 
and appeared to favour privatizing it as they did with the water supply (Wisner 
2001). Additionally, he points to the neoliberal policy of decentralisation without 
the attendant funding or resources, as producing significant local level capacity 
problems in dealing with disaster risks.  
2.4.2 Mainstreaming as a Neoliberal ‘Buzzword’ 
 
Considering the above, mainstreaming’s close association with neoliberal policy 
needs to be considered. One phenomenon of neoliberalism is the way that 
language, particularly “development speak” (Cornwall and Eade 2010) is tailored 
to reinforce the neoliberal economic agenda. Because of the influence that 
major global governance institutions—such as the World Bank and the UN—
have in funding and setting development objectives, it is through these 
institutions where the language of development is either created or co-opted and 
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then widely disseminated (Cornwall and Eade 2010). An oft cited example of this 
occurrence is in the usage of the term sustainable development and/or 
sustainability (Scoones 2010). Elliott (2016) argues that the complex issue of 
climate change cannot be addressed through concepts such as sustainable 
development and sustainability because these terms simply reinforce the 
“…neoliberal conception of economic growth: it [i.e. sustainability] is a vital and 
core concept of neoliberalism itself” (Elliott 2016: 9).  
 
The concept of mainstreaming evolved and was popularized through the 
supranational organisations discussed above. It is argued here that 
mainstreaming has all the markers of a neoliberal ‘buzzword’. Collins (2000) 
defines a buzzword as “a grammar based upon commands and imperatives [that 
have] been developed which will not, and cannot, countenance dissent” (Collins 
2000: 386). Critical attention is deflected because buzzwords offer a 
“readymade view of the world” (ibid: 386).  
 
The impact that buzzwords have on policy development is elaborated by 
Loughlin (2002), who writes from a health policy perspective. He argues that 
modern public management is constructed upon the “rhetorical force of certain 
words” (Loughlin 2002: 231), which in the terminology of development includes 
terms like ‘capacity building,’ ‘good governance’, and ‘participatory development’ 
(Leal 2010). Loughlin also argues that in the health sector, “policies are formed 
by a process that privileges rhetoric over reality” (Loughlin 2002: 231). Here is 
the first time that the term rhetoric9 is used. As indicated by the main title of this 
research, rhetoric is a central and important concept. Loughlin’s concern with 
rhetoric undermining the reality of the policy making environment is shared by 
the central questions guiding this research.  
 
Another tactic of neoliberal discourse is to co-opt existing radical development 
terminology with the aim of “fundamental pacification of social dissent” (Elliott 
2016: 91). For example, Leal (2010) discusses how terminology that originated 
                                               
9 The term rhetoric has several definitions. It is used here as a synonym of hyperbole or 
as Partington defines it, “Rhetoric of course has yet another sense, equivalent to 
‘grandiloquence’ or the use of high-sounding language. This meaning presumably 
derives from the scholarly (and pseudo-scholarly) associations that rhetoric acquired 
after the codification of its persuasive techniques and language tropes or figures. 
Rhetoric, in this sense, is an ‘over the fence’ word, that is to say, it is used to describe 
what others do, is only applied to an outsider group, and is often roughly equivalent to 
‘bluster’…” (Partington 2003: 213). 
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in Marxist Participatory Action Research (PAR) that was aimed at the 
“transformation of the cultural, political and economic structures which 
reproduce poverty and marginalization” (Leal 2010: 91) were appropriated by 
the World Bank. Because of growing dissent to structural adjustment, the PAR 
language became a tool to justify the reduction of the state: 
“[b]y employing the language of ‘empowerment’, ‘self-reliance’, and 
‘participation’, the Bank assumed a populist appearance reminiscent of 
PAR. The new rhetoric assumed a pseudo-political stance in its 
suggestion that the ‘crisis of governance’ in many countries is due to the 
‘appropriation of the machinery of government by the elite to serve their 
own interests’, and went so far as to state that a ‘deep political malaise 
stymies action in most countries’. At a first glance, one might naively infer 
that the logical implication is to call for people to be empowered to 
overturn the current and oppressive state of affairs through increased 
political participation. However, the actual intent is somewhat different. By 
having identified the nasty state as the culprit, the World Bank was not 
advocating a popular government, but rather creating a populist 
justification for the removal of the state from the economy and its 
substitution by the market” (Leal 2010: 93).  
 
Another indicator of mainstreaming fitting the criteria of a neoliberal buzzword is 
that the term lacks a substantial definition. In the following quote from the grey 
literature, the authors rely on metaphor to define mainstreaming: 
“[Mainstreaming] obviously derives from the metaphor of a small, isolated 
flow of water being drawn into the mainstream of a river where it will 
expand to flow smoothly without loss or diversion. Therefore 
‘mainstreaming risk reduction’ describes a process to fully incorporate 
disaster risk reduction into relief and development policy and practice. It 
means radically expanding and enhancing disaster risk reduction so that it 
becomes normal practice, fully institutionalised within an agency’ relief and 
development agenda” (La Trobe and Davis 2005: 16). 
 
Picciotto (2002), writing as a World Bank Group evaluation specialist, provides 
the only peer reviewed article found that attempts to fully define mainstreaming 
and again relies on riverine imagery. Picciotto suggests that “mainstreaming 
brings to the surface the turmoil of the deep” (ibid: 323) and argues that 
mainstreaming is an inherently political and difficult process because of its 
efforts to bring about change. He states, “[i]n the development assistance 
business, mainstreaming means the widespread adoption of a new policy, a new 
approach to the delivery of public services or a new method of program 
management, taking full account of the country context” (Picciotto 2002: 329). In 
his work, change is the essential feature of policy mainstreaming and 
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mainstreaming is a tool for realigning developing economies into global 
processes and thus changing the policy environment.  
“In today’s volatile economic environment, frequent mainstreaming of new 
concepts and lessons by the society is a necessity. To retain their 
effectiveness, policies, programs and organizations need to be adjusted 
periodically. For example, as the global economic environment changes, 
public policies and programs must reposition their boundaries, merge with 
other public initiatives or restructure their goals and instruments. 
Facilitating this process is the major task of World Bank assistance to 
developing countries” (Picciotto 2002: 324). 
 
Picciotto’s contribution indicates the inherently political nature of the work of 
policy mainstreaming both internally/domestically and externally through global 
processes. His work generated as a World Bank evaluation specialist, further 
demonstrates the close alignment that mainstreaming has with the neoliberal 
post-NPM policy agenda. Finally, Picciotto articulates the instrumental nature of 
mainstreaming as a tool for change. Mainstreaming is the conduit through which 
World Bank endorsed reforms are intended to be supported.    
 
In short, the term mainstreaming is a neoliberal buzzword. The rhetoric of 
mainstreaming is intended to denote an effort to change the policy landscape 
and to address complex wicked policy. However, since it has been classified as 
a buzzword, its genuineness as a policy change tool begs the following 
question; how is a policy prescription, best defined by a riverine metaphor, used 
by the Government of Nepal to achieve DRR policy integration? Additionally, 
mainstreaming bears all the hallmarks of a post-NPM policy tool. Its close 
relationship with neoliberalism ought to raise concern in anyone familiar with the 
disaster vulnerability literature (discussed in Chapter 3).  
2.5 Lessons from Mainstreaming Complex Policies: 
Gender, Environment, and DRR 
 
This final section examines literature from gender mainstreaming, environmental 
policy integration (EPI), and mainstreaming DRR to glean a clearer 
understanding of the policy process that is under the microscope. Gender 
mainstreaming was selected because of the rich vein of research found in 
feminist scholarship that offers both practical and conceptual insights into the 
process of policy mainstreaming. Environmental policy integration was selected 
also because of its vast body of literature and its close association with DRR. 
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DRR mainstreaming is included to point to gaps in the existing literature. All 
three of these complex policies share a similar route to mainstreaming 
promotion through either the UN and/or the EU endorsing 
mainstreaming/integration in practice (e.g. environmental policy integration (EPI) 
literature is largely resultant from the EU enshrining EPI into law, the gender 
mainstreaming literature was in response to the Beijing Platform for Action 1995, 
and mainstreaming DRR through the HFA 2005).  
2.5.1 Gender Mainstreaming 
 
Gender is perhaps the policy area to be most associated with mainstreaming. 
The global attempt at gender mainstreaming is illustrative of the conceptual and 
practical problems associated with the post- NPM mainstreaming agenda and 
has many lessons for mainstreaming DRR. Gender mainstreaming was one of 
the first complex policy areas to be promoted by the United Nations in1995 (van 
Eerdewijk et al. 2014). The Platform for Action resultant from the 1995 UN 
Beijing Fourth World Conference urged:  
“…governments and other actors promote an active and visible policy of 
mainstreaming a gender perspective into all policies and programmes, so 
that, before decisions are taken, an analysis is made of the effects on 
women and men, respectively” (United Nations 1995: 27). 
 
Given the attention to gender mainstreaming by feminist studies it would appear 
that gender mainstreaming was an applied solution, underpinned by a vast body 
of feminist literature and conceptualisation. However, this was not the case; 
“[r]ather than emerging out of or being embedded in a philosophy about gender 
inequality as a structural phenomenon, [gender mainstreaming] tends to stem 
from policy-making exigencies or current styles of fashion” (Daly 2005: 440). 
This relates to mainstreaming’s popularization in the 1990s as a neoliberal 
policy solution for dealing with complex wicked policies.  
 
Gender mainstreaming rapidly gained ascendency worldwide on an 
unprecedented scale (True and Mintrom 2001), with many supranational bodies 
such as the UN, World Bank, EU and many nation-states adopting its approach. 
The reason given for its widespread adoption even in nation-states where 
gender equality is low, is because it presented no real threat or challenge to 
extant neoliberal processes.  For example, Bacchi and Eveline (2003) find 
congruent characteristics between neoliberalism and mainstreaming: 
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“Dominant forms of mainstreaming are clearly congruent with this self-
managed model of governance. They put in place processes of 
accountability and self-surveillance over the performance of public 
officials. Despite the rhetoric of devolution and self-management they 
strengthen the political arm of government through underfunded 
expectations that public servants will do more for less, and through 
subsequent controls over competitive and ad hoc distribution of resources” 
(Bacchi and Eveline 2003: 103-104). 
 
Herein lies the tension, neoliberalism “has had a debilitating and gender-specific 
impact on the lives of diverse groups of women, an outcome patently at odds 
with the intent to remedy gender-based disadvantage that stands as the 
cornerstone of gender mainstreaming initiatives” (Teghtsoonian 2004: 268). As 
Rao and Kelleher argue ten years after the Beijing Platform for Action the 
gender mainstreaming agenda is “falling through the cracks” (Rao and Kelleher 
2005: 59). Overall, feminist literature points to many fault-lines in the gender 
mainstreaming agenda (Daly 2005; Lombardo and Meier 2006). The reductionist 
rhetoric of mainstreaming gender has resulted in technocratic approaches that 
include tool kits and guidelines. Creating technocrats rather than feminists, 
mainstreaming has depoliticised the complex-policy providing no challenge to 
the existing structural power imbalances (Payne 2011).  
2.5.2 Environmental Policy Integration 
 
Although the field of disasters has preferred the practitioner term 
‘mainstreaming’, policy integration is a similar concept used in the environmental 
and climate change literature. Environmental policy integration (EPI) has been 
written about extensively and has an academic gravitas that mainstreaming 
lacks. The academic attention has come from the push to integrate 
environmental concerns into other disparate sectors through the UN sponsored 
1992 Earth Summit’s Rio Declaration and Agenda 21. Much of the EPI literature 
focuses on integration in a European context. This body of work was 
precipitated by the need for clarity because of the legal aspects of EPI in the 
European Union where EPI has been enshrined in numerous state legislations 
and in the European Treaty (Jordan and Lenschow 2010).   
 
The first academic discussion of policy integration is found in Underdal’s 1980 
widely cited work on marine policy integration. One of the few discussions to 
consider policy integration as a process as well as an output (Persson 2004), 
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Underdal’s discussion provides a useful conceptual underpinning of policy 
integration: 
“To ‘integrate’ means to unify, to put parts together into a whole. 
Integrated policy, then, means a policy where the constituent elements are 
brought together and made subjects to a single, unifying conception. More 
specifically, I suggest that to qualify as integrated a policy must meet three 
basic requirements, viz comprehensiveness, aggregation and consistency” 
(Underdal 1980: 159). 
Underdal’s discussion of policy integration involves three stages, which he 
terms, “comprehensiveness to the input stage; aggregation to the processing of 
inputs; and consistency to outputs” (Underdal 1980: 159; Persson 2004: 11). By 
comprehensiveness, Underdal considers the scope of the policy integration 
including: time (long term planning), space (extension of geographic area), 
actors, and proportion of issues. Aggregation refers to a broad evaluation of the 
costs and benefits of the integrated policy rather than an evaluation of policy 
alternatives from the perspective of each actor/sector; “one important implication 
of this is that the integration of policy is not purely a technical exercise; it implies 
weighing interests and setting priorities” (Underdal 1980: 161).  Finally, 
consistency refers to the standardisation of the policy and whether the 
integrated policy is ‘in harmony’ both in its vertical (i.e. unity between policy 
levels) and horizontal (i.e. unity across executive agencies) dimensions.  
Although comprehensive, Underdal’s work has been criticised as too dependent 
on the rationality of the policy process (Persson 2004).  
 
The dominant conceptualisation of policy integration is that it has both a 
horizontal (cross-government) and vertical (sectoral) structural component. 
Lafferty and Hovden (2003) embedded this in their discussion of EPI in the 
‘government landscape’.  
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Figure 2-1. Environmental Policy Integration 
 
(Source: Lafferty and Hovden 2003:14) 
 
Vertical environmental policy integration (VEPI) refers to a ministerial sector 
responsibly (e.g. health, industry, education, etc.) integrating environmental 
objectives in its plans, policies and initiatives.  VEPI aims to merge 
“environmental objectives with …sectoral objectives to form an environmentally 
prudent decision-making premise in its work” (Lafferty and Hovden 2003: 12).  
Horizontal environmental policy integration (HEPI) is the role of a central high 
level authority (e.g. cabinet, government body, commission) to ensure the 
coordination and prioritisation of environmental concerns across the sectors.  
Nunan et al. (2012) adhere to the vertical and horizontal arrangements, but 
argue Lafferty and Hovden’s model is representative of a mature realisation of 
government EPI. In nation-states that are just establishing EPI, Nunan et al. 
argue a more realistic model is one where VEPI is situated in the political apex 
(such as Prime Minister Office or Cabinet), which then drives/compels EPI 
throughout sectors. The HEPI then is the environment agency or other 
government body that possess less power but is tasked with cross-sector policy 
coordination.  
 
Environmental policy has historically been on the lower end of the policy 
hierarchy (Lafferty and Hovden 2003). Thus, to integrate environmental 
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considerations into other non-environment related sectors there is a need to 
raise its profile against other policy agendas. Lafferty and Hovden (2003) argue 
that given the limitations of the carrying capacity of nature, EPI must be given 
‘principled priority’ over other non-environmental sectors.  However, they argue 
that even if EPI has ‘principled priority’ choices should be arrived at 
democratically and not always will environmental concerns be given priority in 
policy decisions. This leads to the issue of ‘trade-offs’ and the negotiations that 
ensue when integrating environmental concerns into other sectors (Dyrhauge 
2014). Within the EPI literature is a preoccupation with balancing the reality of 
economic growth with the consequences of environmental degradation. If this 
negotiation process is not managed correctly this can lead to policy 
fragmentation (Chucku 201010). In spite of this body of research, the results of 
EPI have been less than expected. As Dupont (2015: Online) writes, “EPI never 
lived up to its potential, with measures fizzling out and business-as-usual 
continuing among compartmentalised policy departments”.  
2.5.3 Mainstreaming DRR: Existing Literature and Research Gaps  
 
The lack of academic literature on mainstreaming DRR both makes this 
discussion brief and easily identifies the gap in the literature that this research 
fills. Pearce (2003) suggests that the integration of disaster management and 
community planning is required in an effort to shift focus away from disaster 
response to disaster mitigation. She points to differences in ideology between 
the two disciplines as a barrier to integration but does not address the 
mechanisms or the policy implications of integrating disaster management into 
community planning.  
 
Alexander discusses mainstreaming DRM into the built environment which he 
defines as “…making [disaster risk management] an integral part of governance, 
public administration and the general maintenance of security” (Alexander 2008: 
20). He suggests that the knowledge already exists in “construction, 
organisations, management and health care” to integrate DRM into the built 
environment, but what are lacking are ways to “apply existing knowledge 
efficiently and effectively” (Alexander 2008, 22).  
 
                                               
10 Writing from a climate change perspective. 
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Writing from the perspective of international aid organisations, Wamsler (2006) 
argues for mainstreaming DRR into urban planning and housing and suggests 
that both the marginality of DRR and urban planning within aid organisations 
and the “incompatibility” between the two professional disciplines complicates 
the mainstreaming agenda. Twigg and Steiner (2002) examine this from the 
perspective of organisational learning in NGOs. They found several barriers to 
mainstreaming, including “…in NGOs working in both relief and development, 
institutional and cultural tension between emergency and development 
departments is evident, fuelled by lack of clarity about the mandates of the 
emergency teams” (Twigg and Steiner 2002: 475). The authors rhetorically 
question whether the separation of distinct DM and development departments in 
NGOs helps or hinders the mainstreaming of DRR into operations. 
 
Finally, Handmer and Dovers (2013) in the book Handbook of Disaster Policies 
and Institutions discuss mainstreaming disaster management policy throughout 
government. Theirs is the strongest contribution to the discussion on 
mainstreaming and warrants attention:  
“There is a continuum between the institutional choices of placing 
something in the more direct political control of a line department, with the 
risk of reaction to short-term imperatives only, versus the independence 
and greater longevity of a potentially unresponsive statutory authority. 
Similarly, there is a continuum between strong mechanisms for (vertical 
and/or horizontal) whole of government coordination, with a risk of 
dissipating efforts through the coordination processes, versus the possibly 
clearer purpose and development of control and capacity in specific 
agencies, but with less coordination” (Handmer and Dovers 2013: 166). 
It is suggested here that a policy may become dissipated in the process of 
vertical and horizontal mainstreaming. This remains conjecture, as there is little 
empirical evidence to substantiate whether or not mainstreaming DRR policies 
throughout a government would cause the agenda to be weakened or 
strengthened. The spectre of this occurring may further contribute to the 
dominant disaster management organisation resisting policy change that may 
weaken disaster prioritization within existing organisations. As seen with the 
global experience of gender mainstreaming this might be correct. Through the 
process of mainstreaming, gender became a technocratic exercise that lost the 
political motivation of structurally realigning gender relations and power 
imbalances.  
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None of the above literature takes a negative stance towards the concept of 
DRR/DRM integration and mainstreaming. This indicates a general consensus 
that the concept of integrating DRR/DRM throughout an organisation is 
necessary and valid. However, two main themes emerge from the limited 
research that exists. First, the literature points to the cultural components of 
traditional disaster management organisations as a barrier to mainstreaming. 
Terms such as “incompatibility” (Wamsler 2006) and “institutional and cultural 
tensions,” (Twigg and Steiner 2002) stand out and corroborate the argument 
made in the first half of the chapter that disaster management’s quasi-
paramilitary ethos is a barrier to changing the policy environment to the 
development focused DRR.  Additionally, disaster management as a policy 
issue remains marginal within most organisations, which makes integrating it 
into another policy sector especially difficult (Wamsler 2006). The second theme 
that emerges is that of the lack of understanding of the concept of 
mainstreaming and how it should be implemented. As in the case of Pearce 
(2003), the literature discusses mainstreaming as an end goal but does not 
examine the process to achieve mainstreaming. Alexander (2008) notes that the 
missing link is how to “effectively and efficiently” integrate DRM into the built 
sector. Most importantly, it is unknown what the consequences are of fully 
mainstreaming DRR throughout institutions, or if that is even possible (Handmer 
and Dovers 2013).  
 
From the above discussion, it is clear to see that this research fills a significant 
gap in the existing literature through its critical assessment of both the concept 
of mainstreaming and the how the resultant process unfolds in a complex 
governing environment such as Nepal. No other existing literature exists that 
looks at mainstreaming DRR from the perspective of policy paradigm change (to 
be discussed in Chapter 3) and thus this research is an original contribution to 
knowledge. 
2.6 Chapter Summary 
 
Mainstreaming DRR is intended to be an applied policy solution, but as this 
chapter has identified, both mainstreaming and DRR are riddled with tensions 
and unmet challenges that suggest implementation will be difficult. On one hand, 
there is mainstreaming’s uncomfortable association with neoliberalism as a 
mechanism intended to correct the faulty application of first-wave neoliberal 
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public administration. Because of the clear link between neoliberalism and 
increased disaster risk, any policy tool that comes from neoliberalism ought to 
be scrutinized. On the other hand, there is DRR which is a relatively new policy 
agenda. Its lineage as an offshoot of disaster management is problematic. The 
field of disaster management has itself never been fully conceptualized. For 
several decades, disaster management was a policy instrument of central 
government defence agendas. Over time, disaster management has become 
institutionalised within governments. The legacy of its defence and security 
origins has conditioned disaster management to have a culture that is 
antithetical to both mainstreaming and DRR’s developmental policy agendas.   
 
On concluding this chapter, one thing stands out clearly: at the heart of 
mainstreaming DRR is an effort to stimulate significant policy change. This 
chapter began with an examination of the drive to change established disaster 
management policy to that of disaster risk reduction. It then explored a policy 
tool (i.e. mainstreaming) aimed to stimulate this policy change throughout 
organisations but found it to be highly problematic and wanting. Nonetheless, 
change is a theme that is shared by both mainstreaming and DRR. Because of 
this conclusion, the next chapter delves deeper into the theme of change within 
the disaster vulnerability literature and discusses existing theories and 
frameworks of policy paradigm change.  
 
Another conclusion to come from this chapter is that there are two approaches 
to changing policy through mainstreaming- a technocratic approach and a 
political approach. The technocratic approach has been the favoured global 
approach for gender and environmental policy integration with minimal success. 
No examples were found of a political approach to mainstreaming that sought to 
address the underlying issues of inequality. Given that neoliberal policy 
dissuades dissent and reform, a political approach is unlikely to be the global 
prescription for DRR. The next chapter will illustrate how problematic the 
prospect of not addressing underlying roots causes that drive disaster risk can 
be.   
 39 
 
3 Theories and Frameworks for 
Understanding Mainstreaming DRR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to further elaborate on the theme of policy change 
uncovered in the previous chapter, which argued that changing the policy 
landscape is the underlying factor behind the promotion of both mainstreaming 
and DRR. This chapter starts with a broad overview of disaster vulnerability 
literature. The vulnerability literature is foundational because it is here that the 
critique of neoliberalism (and by extension post-NPM policies discussed in 
Chapter 2) as a driver of increased risk originated. The vulnerability literature 
also establishes the need for cross-sector DRR approaches and calls for radical 
change to social, political, and economic realms in order to reduce disaster risk. 
The second half of the chapter examines the policy change literature. From this 
body of literature, a framework is developed to guide the analysis and 
discussion of the empirical evidence from Nepal. 
 
Before proceeding, it is necessary to briefly introduce and define a key concept 
used throughout this chapter, that of the policy paradigm. Hall (1993) writing 
about policy change, describes a policy paradigm as:  
 
“…a framework of ideas and standards that specifies not only the goals of 
policy and the kind of instruments that can be used to attain them, but also 
the very nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing. Like a 
Gestalt, this framework is embedded in the very terminology through 
which policy makers communicate about their work, and it is influential 
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precisely because so much of it is taken for granted and unamenable to 
scrutiny as a whole. I am going to call this interpretive framework a policy 
paradigm” (Hall 1993: 279). 
 
In this chapter, the concept of a paradigm is applied both to research and policy 
agendas. It is conceptually useful because it defines the parameters of the 
different discourses that surround disaster policy. It also denotes the totality of a 
research or policy agenda, which hints at the difficulty that lies in changing a 
paradigm. 
3.2 Disaster Vulnerability Literature 
 
This section investigates the disaster literature with particular attention to the 
disaster vulnerability literature. It begins with a brief overview of the historical 
evolution of disaster studies, because without doing so, it is difficult to 
comprehend how radical of a departure the vulnerability literature was (and 
continues to be) from the response centred disaster management outlined in 
Chapter 2. 
 
Most commonly, disasters were conceptualised as ‘acts of god,’ meaning little 
could be done from a policy perspective to prevent or prepare for one (Handmer 
and Dovers 2013) resulting in low political accountability for disaster events 
(Olson 2000). That said, there are glimpses of an alternate view of disasters that 
did not discount human agency. For example, one is found in a debate between 
Voltaire and Rousseau during the 18th century Enlightenment era . The debate 
occurred over a series of letters, of which the 1755 Lisbon Earthquake featured. 
It is Rousseau’s reflections on the earthquake that show he was not comfortable 
with assigning blame solely on God for the heavy loss of life and destruction. He 
writes in his letter to Voltaire:  
“Without departing from you subject of Lisbon, admit, for example, that 
nature did not construct twenty thousand houses of six to seven stories 
there, and that if the inhabitants of this great city had been more equally 
spread out and more lightly lodged, the damage would have been much 
less and perhaps of no account” (quoted in Dynes 1999: 10). 
 
Dynes (1999) suggests Rousseau represented the beginning of a “social 
science view” of disasters. 
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However, it was not until the 20th century that disasters began to be 
systematically studied and understood as events where human agency could 
change disaster outcomes. Since then, the literature has been preoccupied with 
how disasters change and transform the political, social and environmental 
realms. 
 
Written just over a decade apart, both Prince (1920) and Carr’s (1932) work on 
disasters is illustrative of an emerging disaster social science approach. Prince’s 
Catastrophe and Social Change (1920) is considered the first comprehensive 
disaster study to be undertaken (Scanlon 1988; Dynes and Quarantelli 1992). 
Prince wrote Catastrophe and Social Change as his dissertation and based it on 
the 1917 Halifax Explosion11, an event that he had a first-hand experience of, 
living and working in Halifax Nova Scotia at the time of the disaster. He 
conducted a two-year longitudinal study using interviews, documents and 
observation (Phillips 2014). As suggestive of its title, the dissertation was 
concerned with the transformative effects of the explosion on Halifax society. 
Some of his writing resonates true (particularly when read with the 2015 Nepal 
earthquake in mind) almost a hundred years later; “the point is, catastrophe 
always means social change. There is not always progress. It is well to guard 
against confusion here” (Prince 1920, cited in Scanlon 1988: 223). Another 
important contribution to early disaster studies was made in 1932, by a 
sociologist by the name of Carr opined: 
“So long as the ship rides out the storm, so long as the city resists the 
earth-shocks, so long as the levees hold, there is no disaster. It is the 
collapse of the cultural protections that constitute the disaster proper” 
(Carr 1932, cited in Dombrowsky 1998 p. 18)  
Almost two hundred years after Rousseau, Carr again raises the spectre of 
human development, or as he terms it, “the collapse of the cultural protections” 
as the cause of disasters.  
 
Researchers in the fields of social psychology and sociology were preoccupied 
with the theme of change. This stream of research was interested in what, if any, 
changes occurred in crowd behaviour and other social interactions in a disaster 
                                               
11 During the World War I and II, Halifax harbour was a strategic point in North America 
for mustering supply vessels to support the war effort in Britain. The Halifax Explosion 
was the result of the crash of a munitions ship with another vessel in Halifax harbour in 
1917. It resulted in the largest explosion prior to Hiroshima, killing close to 2000 people 
and left 6000 people homeless (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation Online). 
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environment (Perry 2006). Government funding opportunities resultant from the 
Cold War spurred this research agenda. Policy makers were eager to know how 
people would behave during a nuclear attack. Since nuclear war was not a 
viable research site to study the phenomena, disaster sites caused by flooding 
and other hazards were studied instead. Early research played a role in 
illuminating many disaster myths concerning people’s anti-social behaviours in 
times of emergency (Fritz and Marks 1954; Dynes and Quarantelli 1968). It was 
also in this era when several disaster research institutes were established, 
particularly in the U.S (Phillips 2014). The early study of disasters was 
pioneered and heavily influenced by western scholarship, a trend that continues 
to this day. 
 
Meanwhile, the study of disasters became a sub-field of Geography with a 
particular focus on hazards. In this perspective, a disaster is an “extreme event 
that arises when a hazard agent intersects with a social system” (Perry 2006: 9). 
The main focus of study is the hazard, for example earthquake, flood, or 
landslide and its intersection with human settlements. The hazard-disaster 
distinction was easily confounded and they became almost synonymous with 
each other (Wisner 2016).  
 
Gilbert F. White, an American geographer, wrote extensively on flood plain 
management and is considered the founder of this approach (see also work by 
White’s PhD students- Burton and Kates 1964; White, Burton, Kates 1978). 
White was greatly influenced by Harlan Barrows’ work on human ecology. 
Barrows describes the objectives of human ecology thusly, “[g]eography will aim 
to make clear the relationships existing between natural environments and the 
distribution and activities of man” (Barrows 1923: 3). Barrows’ human ecology is 
clearly echoed in Gilbert White’s 1945 PhD dissertation: 
“Floods are ‘acts of God,’ but flood losses are largely acts of man. Human 
encroachment upon the flood plains of rivers accounts for the high annual 
total of flood losses” (White 1945 from Kates 2011: 8). 
The idea conveyed is that humans are able to influence disaster outcomes. 
Much of White’s work focused on addressing policy concerns such as 
sustainable flood plain use, and flood plain mitigation such as levees and 
channelization. White established a precedent for disaster research to speak 
directly to on-going policy challenges. For example, his work was influential on 
the formulation of US floodplain policies like the Unified National Program for 
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Floodplain Management (Kates 2011). This conceptualisation of hazards-
disasters meant that disasters could be managed by “… applying scientific 
knowledge of the hazard events in ways that allowed prediction, warning and 
preparedness” (Wisner 2016 Online).  
 
White and his protégées established a research paradigm that is known as the 
natural hazards paradigm.  The hazards paradigm encouraged a framework 
upon which management of disasters came through technological and social 
engineered solutions (Wisner 2016) which corresponded to the practice of 
disaster/emergency management discussed in Chapter 2. The natural hazards 
research was easily translated into policy solutions. It achieved a ‘narrowing of 
vision’ through centralised ordering of nature (Scott 1998). It fostered 
development and thus posed no challenge to the prevailing capitalist economic 
and political ideologies.  While the natural hazards paradigm would continue to 
inform policy and practice, the academic literature took a significant leap away 
from the hazards paradigm in the late 1970s. This new academic paradigm, 
called the vulnerability paradigm, is the focus of the next section. It is in that 
literature where disaster theory presents a strong critique of the capitalist (and 
by extension neoliberal) agenda as a driver of disaster risk.   
3.2.1 The Vulnerability Paradigm Shift  
 
In the mid-1970s, disaster scholarship presented a powerful and complex 
alternative to the existing hazard paradigm. Researchers such as O’Keefe et al. 
(1976) and Cuny (1983) argued against hazards being the sole causal 
mechanisms of disaster. They deconstructed the notion of ‘natural’ disaster and 
in doing so disasters were reconceptualised as social constructs. As Quarantelli 
opined, “a disaster is not a physical happening, it is a social event” (Quarantelli 
1992: 1). Vulnerability research also challenged the embedded structural forces 
that contribute to the production of vulnerability.  
 
Behind the work of the disaster vulnerability theorists was an undercurrent of 
neo-Marxism found in “the infusion of, in the 1970s, of cultural and human 
ecology with considerations of political economy” (Escobar 1999: 2). Research 
challenged traditional apolitical environmental analysis by combining ecology 
with the Marxist inspired political economy (Peet and Watts 1996). A growing 
recognition emerged that local environmental conditions are linked to larger 
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political and economic processes. The close association between political 
ecology and disaster vulnerability is found in the scholarship of Piers Blaikie. In 
1985, Blaikie authored The Political Economy of Soil Erosion in Developing 
Countries. It is considered to be a foundational text of a political ecology 
approach. Blaikie would later be the lead author (along with Ben Wisner, who 
co-authored with O’Keefe 1976) of the first edition of At-Risk: Natural Hazards, 
Peoples Vulnerability and Disasters, a seminal publication in the disaster 
vulnerability approach. 
 
The disaster vulnerability approach, and its neo-Marxist conceptualization, was 
stimulated from observing the “explicitly inequitable social impact” of disaster 
such as the 1976 Guatemala “class quake” (Wisner et al. 2004: 9) where 
damage was clearly demarcated in the areas of slum and informal settlements. 
Buildings in the more affluent city centre were only minimally damaged (Lewis 
1999). Throughout the 1990s, the vulnerability approach slowly gained ground 
as a disaster research paradigm (Wisner 2016). At a micro-level, researchers 
focused on the complex interplay of vulnerability determinants—such as gender 
(Morrow and Enarson 2000), health (Lindsay 2003), age (Ngo 2001), and 
poverty (Fothergill and Peek 2004)—on increasing disaster risk. At the macro-
level, the role of political-economic processes on an individual and community’s 
ability to cope with disaster became the focus of inquiry. Disasters were no 
longer solely external environmental threats but were intensified by factors such 
as institutional failures and poor governance (Ahrens and Rudolph 2006).  
 
A central tenet of the disaster vulnerability literature is that global economic and 
political ideologies are a root cause of disaster vulnerability, as illustrated by the 
Pressure and Release Model (Wisner et al. 2012) shown in Figure 3-1. This is a 
radical proposition that if taken to its full conclusion means that neoliberalism 
needs to be upended and replaced (with what is uncertain) in order for disaster 
risk to be minimized. Empirical studies that linked neoliberalism with increased 
disaster risk were outlined in Chapter 2 and certainly support this contention. 
 45 
 
Figure 3-1. The Progression of Vulnerability 
 
(source: Wisner et al. 2012: 23) 
 
The emphasis on vulnerability conceptually realigned disaster management from 
an event driven (hazard) phenomena to a complex process driven (development) 
phenomena (Manyena et al. 2013). The problem of disasters became an 
uncharted wicked policy problem and it is at this juncture where the gulf between 
the response focused practitioner and the vulnerability focused academic grew. 
Addressing the vulnerability literature through policy/practice entails addressing 
complex and political issues of inequity. Wisner (2001) provides an example of 
this policy-research divide in his discussion of El Salvador: 
“Given the highly politicised and controversial nature of land-tenure in El 
Salvador, little was done in the post-Mitch period to resettle vulnerable 
people on safer land. Instead, emphasis was laid on building new dams 
and levees, and on attempts to develop flood warning and evacuation 
systems” (Wisner 2001: 257). 
 
Instead of addressing the root cause of vulnerability (lack of land-tenure and its 
systematic roots in inequality) the approach taken in the El Salvador example 
was more in line with the existing hazards/disaster management approach to 
devise technical rather than political solutions. 
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It is from the vulnerability paradigm that the policy prescription of disaster risk 
reduction originates. DRR’s emphasis on integrating development with disaster 
risk reduction is in keeping with the process driven perspective of disaster 
vulnerability. Knowing that the global neoliberal policy environment favours 
conservative and non-political agendas, careful attention needs to be paid to 
what happens to this radical interpretation of disaster risk in the policy 
prescription of DRR. A brief overview of DRR programming suggests the radical 
is lost in the policy implementation. For example, emphasis has been placed on 
sympathetic neoliberal risk reduction schemes such as insurance mechanisms 
especially in the developed world (FEMA 2017; GOV.UK 2017; Michel-Kerjan 
and Kunreuthe 2011) and on public-private partnerships (UNISDR 2016b; World 
Economic Forum 2016) rather than on realigning the political and financial 
drivers of risk. Lewis and Kelman (2012) indicate that the discourse that 
surrounds a disaster event tends to avoid addressing root causes: 
“Information supplied has to do with what, where and how big disasters 
have been, rather than focusing on why or to whom. The realities of the 
status quo tend to remain unexplored, obscure, and insufficiently 
penetrated” (Lewis and Kelman 2012: 3, emphasis in original).  
 
Explicit in the vulnerability literature is the need for systemic change and 
transformation of neoliberal political/economic structures and institutions in order 
to reduce disaster vulnerability. Given that the neoliberal policy environment 
dissuades dissent, it is not surprising that the radical elements of the 
vulnerability paradigm is lost in implementation. This also helps to explain why 
policy mainstreaming has become a policy prescription for DRR. Given its 
buzzword status, mainstreaming is unlikely to activate the radical political and 
economic changes suggested by the vulnerability literature.  
3.2.2 The Missing Political Science Discourse in Disasters and 
Development 
 
The advent of the vulnerability research paradigm conceptually opened up 
space for disaster researchers to explore the politics surrounding disasters (e.g. 
Middleton and O’Keefe 1998; Kelman 2011). As mentioned, disaster studies had 
been the purview of sociology and geography, and in keeping with their research 
focus, much had been made of the economic, social, and physical aspects of 
disaster politics. Pelling and Dill (2010) outline the Geographer’s conception of 
disaster politics: 
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“Disaster politics analysis focuses on the interaction of social and political 
actors and framing institutions in preparing for and responding to extreme 
natural events, and suggests that the disaster events and their 
management are part of unfolding political histories” (Pelling and Dill 2010: 
21). 
Recent scholarship on disasters has begun to explore the broader disaster 
governance terrains of disasters and risk reduction (see Tierney 2012; Jones 
et.al. 2014 for their discussion of DRR governance in Nepal; and Jones et al.  
2016 on Bihar and Nepal). Missing in the literature are comparative political 
studies that give specific attention to public administration and policy of disaster 
management and disaster risk reduction. One reason given for this is the 
common (although mistaken) understanding of disasters being failures of 
infrastructure and thus belonging to the field of engineering rather than political 
science (Olson 2000).  Pelling and Dill further add that “the discomfort caused to 
the humanitarian community by a political or developmental reading of disaster 
risk reduction and response, for good strategic reasons, has also helped to 
move the gaze of disaster analysis away from politics and towards the 
economic, social and physical impacts of disasters” (Pelling and Dill 2010: 34). 
Consequently, there is very little understanding of the specific governmental 
politics surrounding disaster management and DRR. What does exist reads like 
an elixir to those who seek to understand how and why DRR policies can 
succeed in a government context.  
 
Olson (2000), a political scientist, suggests several ‘points of departure’ for a 
political inquiry into disasters. He writes, “In any disaster, government officials 
are confronted with the need to not only manage the situation but also explain it” 
(Olson 2000: 266, emphasis in original). In light of the growing recognition that 
political leaders need to be held accountable for failures in mitigation/DRR 
activities (e.g. building regulation and code failures), he postulates that issue 
suppression, non-decision making and agenda control are all factors that 
prohibit action. Issue suppression and agenda control relate to the process of 
getting policy issues onto the political agenda and are highly related to the policy 
paradigm change literature discussed below. Non-decision making is defined as: 
“… a means by which demands for change in the existing allocation of 
benefits and privileges in the community can be suffocated before they are 
even voiced; or kept covert; or killed before they gain access to the 
relevant decision making arena; or, failing all these things, maimed or 
destroyed in the decision implementing stage of the policy process” 
(Bachrach and Baratz 1970 in Olson 2000: 274-275). 
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Political analysis is not only lacking in the disaster literature, but also in the 
development literature (Leftwich 2005). The emphasis in development has been 
placed on “technical innovation and improvement through better governance, 
public sector management, institution-building, capacity enhancement” (ibid 
2005: 193). Leftwich argues that these initiatives “are ‘the technicist illusion’ 
because these efforts do not seriously impact upon the social and economic 
structures and forces shaping the tides of politics and in turn shaping the 
character of the state” (ibid 2005: 193). This argument echo’s what Bennet 
(2016) said in Chapter 2 concerning the lack of substantive change within the 
humanitarian sector being thwarted by a focus on the mechanics of aid rather 
than the underlying systemic and political issues. In both disaster studies and 
development, the lack of political analysis of the implementing institutions and 
policies represents a real gap in knowledge. Without a better understanding, it is 
hard to see how implementation will improve. 
3.2.3 Development Discourse 
 
So far this discussion has focused on the history of disaster management theory 
and practice. Since DRR bridges both disaster management with development, 
it is necessary to examine the progression of development discourse. The 
modern conception of ‘development’ coalesced in the aftermath of World War 
Two and the onset of the Cold War. Central to the mainstream concept of 
development is the idea of modernization and growing economies. The 
dominant economic theories that underpinned the development discourse of the 
time, Keynesian and Neoliberalism, have previously been discussed in section 
2.3.2.  
 
Rostow’s book The Stages of Economic Growth: An Anti-Communist Manifesto 
(1960)  conceptualized development occurring in a linear progression that 
required instituting various mechanisms that would then allow a struggling 
economy to ‘take flight’. It assumed that applying the same rationality and 
progress found in developed economies could be directly applied to 
“underdeveloped” economies. Explicit in this work, was a political imperative to 
counter communism. Development was a means to an end to sway newly 
independent former colonies to be allied with the West. Rostow’s view of 
development was critiqued as teleological and overly simplistic. In practice, 
applying western models of development did not lead to economic development.  
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A competing model of development soon came out of Latin America, called 
dependency theory. Dependency theory posits that there is a core and 
periphery. The core comprises of wealthy industrialized states that exploit poor 
‘underdeveloped’ periphery states. This relationship is skewed with a balance of 
power that maintains the status quo. The inequality between the periphery and 
core is “a deep-seated historical process, rooted in the internationalization of 
capitalism” (Ferraro 2008: Online). A noticeable difference between the Stages 
of Growth and dependency theory is that Rostow took poverty to be the starting 
point of his theory, whereas, dependency theorists viewed poverty as an 
endpoint. Underdevelopment and poverty are the end result of a “colonialism, 
slavery, and resource extraction”  (Reid-Henry 2012: Online).  
 
Neoliberalism and its ideology of ‘trade not aid’ and structural adjustment has 
dominated the global approach to development since the late 1970s. 
Neoliberalism and its effects on developing states was discussed in detail 
(2.3.2), so is only briefly mentioned here. A counterpoint to neoliberal 
development discourse is Post-Development theory (see Esteva and Escobar 
2017; Gudynas 2016). Ziai (2017) summarizes some core arguments held by 
post-developmentalists: 
 
1. The term ‘underdevelopment’ was devised as “a political campaign to 
maintain or increases western influence in Africa, Asia and Latin 
America… in the context of the Cold War and processes of 
decolonization…” (3). 
2. The concept of development is vague and unclear. It has been applied 
“to just about any measure officially intended to improve people’s lives, 
from building roads to economic reforms…its contours are blurred and it 
has become a shapeless, amoeba-like concept…” (3). 
3. The idea of development is itself a construction of power. “Knowledge 
about ‘development’ therefore always implies a claim on how other 
(‘underdeveloped’) people should live and how their lives can be 
improved, and thus a justification of intervention (knowledge as power)” 
(3). 
4. The classification of a majority of people as ‘underdeveloped’ 
establishes a clear hierarchy with Western culture being hegemonic and 
“other societies as deficient” (3).  
5. Finally, “increasing numbers of people in the South, disappointed by the 
promises and exclude from the project of ‘development’ resist 
Westernization, reject this economic worldview, engage in 
alternatives…” (4).  
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The trajectory of development discourse remained separate from the disaster 
discourse until the disaster vulnerability literature joined the two up. However, 
the disaster vulnerability work remains on the fringe of development theory, 
although they point to similar root causes for both disaster vulnerability and 
poverty and both share neo-Marxist identification. Both research paradigms 
critique dominant political and economic systems and see them to be working 
against efforts to resolve issues related to development and disasters. Like 
dependency theory, both vulnerability and post-developmentalists view present 
conditions as the result of long standing historical patterns.  From the brief 
description of post-development theory, it is easy to formulate a post-
development critique of top-down mainstreaming DRR as a hegemonic attempt 
to increase western neoliberalism influence in less developed countries. Another 
similarity between the disaster and development discourses is a preference for 
tidy linear and rationalistic policy approaches. Although discredited, the 
conceptual idea of Rostow’s stages approach to development is still salient. If 
only it was that easy to stimulate development to “take-flight” with the right policy 
inputs.   
3.2.4 The Importance of the Vulnerability Paradigm 
 
The vulnerability literature is about change and radical transformation. This 
paradigm is the keystone that bridges all aspects of this thesis: it presents a 
critique of neoliberal governance, it calls for a significant reframing of the way 
disaster policies are conceived, and it links disaster with development 
processes. It took the radical reinterpretation of disasters through the 
vulnerability literature in order for the conceptual space to open for disasters to 
be viewed as political events. Vulnerability blew apart the traditional and 
somewhat ‘tidy’ approach of understanding disasters and brought attention to 
the processes and causation of disaster vulnerability. This is the root of DRR 
and helps to explain the global push to integrate DRR throughout development 
sectors. Translating the vulnerability literature into concrete action has proven to 
be a challenge. It is hoped that the following section will help to clarify the 
challenges associated with changing paradigms.  
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3.3 Changing Policy Paradigms 
 
This section explores the policy paradigm change literature in order to develop a 
more substantive framework for analysis of the rhetoric and reality around 
mainstreaming DRR in Nepal. The theme of policy change has been found 
throughout the reviewed literature:  
 the shift from disaster management to DRR is a significant change in 
disaster policy;  
 the principal role of mainstreaming is to foster change in the policy 
environment;  
 and the vulnerability literature, which contributed intellectually to the DRR 
agenda, argues for radical economic, social and political change.  
Thus far, a principal argument that has come from the literature review chapters 
is that the rhetoric of mainstreaming DRR is about changing the policy 
landscape, but neoliberal discourse actively discourages any challenge to the 
neoliberal agenda. At this juncture, it would be possible to conduct fieldwork in 
Nepal with the knowledge that the concept of mainstreaming is a neoliberal 
buzzword and possibly of limited value in facilitating significant change. 
However, a deeper understanding of the process of change was desired, so 
although mainstreaming remains the policy area of focus, the processes that 
constrain progress are unpacked using theory and frameworks from the policy 
change literature.  
 
The literature discussed in this section spans a continuum from the theoretical  
to a concrete set of indicators of policy integration. Firstly, Hall’s (1993) “Policy 
Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic Policymaking 
in Britain” is discussed at length because it provides an excellent theoretical 
underpinning of the process of policy change. Secondly, Jenkins-Smith and 
Sabatier’s (1993) Advocacy Coalition Framework is discussed. This work 
provides a framework to help visually distinguish and map the actors and 
determinants of policy change.  Finally, the discussion ends with Candel and 
Biesbroek’s (2016) paper entitled “Towards a processual understanding of policy 
integration”, which bridges both policy change and policy integration. This work 
identifies the indicators that ought to accompany policy integration. This 
literature was selected because each of these bodies of work relate to each 
other and build upon each other (e.g. Candel and Biesbroek are greatly 
influenced by Hall’s earlier work). The collection of the three bodies of work offer 
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theory, framework, and indicators upon which the fieldwork can later be 
analysed. 
3.3.1 Hall: Ideas, Social Learning, and Paradigm Policy Change 
 
Hall’s (1993) work on the role of ideas (social learning) on policy paradigm 
change is discussed at length here because it contributes to a theoretical rather 
than technical understanding of the underlying processes of policy change. 
Hall’s work has influenced much of the subsequent literature on policy change- 
some of which is introduced in this section to further contextualize the 
discussion.  
 
Hall’s research follows from a new institutionalism approach to understanding 
political behaviour and development. New institutionalism emerged in the late 
20th century as an alternative to the behavioural and pluralist approaches that 
had dominated the field of political science in the post-war period.  Before the 
new institutionalist approach, the state’s primary role was to act “as an arena for 
social conflict” (Bennett and Howlett 1992: 276) and thus policy making was a 
form of conflict resolution (Heclo 1974). Proponents of new institutionalism 
questioned the passivity of the state and started to look at the influence of 
bureaucrats and policy experts in directing state action. As explained by 
Berman: 
“In contrast to the reigning theories in the field at the time, a group of 
scholars began arguing that the state and its affiliated political institutions 
were not merely a transmission belt for, or an instrument of, underlying 
socioeconomic forces, but instead could exert an independent impact on 
political outcomes” (Berman 2013: 218). 
Scholars like Hall, argued that the state acts independently from “societal forces 
and conflicts” (Bennett and Howlett 1992), therefore, it is ideas rather than 
conflict that are central to contemporary theories of policy change (Heclo 1974). 
Hogan and Howlett (2014) write “… ideas are important, underlying processes of 
policy change and stability, and a key to appreciating patterns and processes of 
policy dynamics” (Hogan and Howlett 2014: 6). 
  
Ideas are generated and formed through social learning. Hall defines social 
learning as:  
“Learning is conventionally said to occur when individuals assimilate new 
information, including that based on experience, and apply it to their 
subsequent actions. Therefore, we can define social learning as a 
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deliberate attempt to adjust the goals or techniques of policy in response 
to past experience and new information. Learning is indicated when policy 
changes as the result of such a process” (Hall 1993: 278). 
For Hall, learning is demonstrable when behaviour (i.e. policy) has changed. 
Other scholars offer a more nuanced view of social learning. For example, 
Pelling and High (2005) argue that social learning can also be gleaned from 
subtle internal changes:  
“…that is, as humans, we can learn in relation to different modes of 
interacting with the world: emotional and conceptual as well as physical. 
Our learning corresponds to difference in the way that we act (consciously 
or unconsciously) within these modes, which in turn arise in response to 
our on going experience” (Pelling and High 2005: 6).  
Social learning originated in the field of behavioural psychology and was 
advanced in the 1970s notably by Bandura (1971). One of the tenets of the 
theory is that learning is not only behavioural, but it is also a cognitive process 
that takes place within a social environment (Bandura 1971). It has been 
adapted by management theory to explain how organisations learn, which helps 
to illustrate how social learning may influence policy development within a 
government bureaucracy. Wenger (2000) explains that organisations learn 
when:  
1. the social “competence” within communities of practice12 (that is 
developed over time and required for membership into the community of 
practice) within an organisation starts to drift away from,  
2. the personal “experience” of members within a community of practice. 
As Wenger states, “whenever the two [competence and experience] are in close 
tension and either starts pulling the other, learning takes place” (ibid: 227). 
Social learning theory is found in disaster management literature (O’Brien et al. 
2010), and in the field of climate change adaptation (Pelling and High 2005; 
Pelling et al. 2008; O’Brien and O’Keefe 2013).  
 
Returning to the policy change literature reviewed in this chapter, Hall states that 
the agents of social learning consists of governmental actors (notably senior 
bureaucrats and policy experts) and external influences such as political parties, 
and interest groups (Hall 1998). He also argues that there is a two-way 
                                               
12 Wegner offers the following definition of communities of practice: “Since the beginning 
of history, human beings have formed communities that share cultural practices 
reflecting their collective learning: from a tribe around a cave fire, to a medieval guild… 
Participating in these ‘communities of practice’ is essential for our learning. It is at the 
very core of what makes us human beings capable of meaningful knowledge” (Wegner 
2000: 229) 
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communication between “the state and society” (Hall 1998 in Bennett and 
Howlett 1992: 281) that also contributes to the formation of ideas. In the ACF 
framework that is discussed later, these actors can be state or non-state actors 
such as journalists, interest groups, or researchers who play a role in 
disseminating policy ideas (Sabatier 1998).  
 
Hall disaggregates the processes leading to policy change into three subtypes: 
first, second, and third order change. Each order is resultant from the process of 
social learning (see Table 3-1).  
 
Table 3-1. Order of Policy Change 
Orders of 
Change 
Hall’s (1993: 278-279) Definition  Baumgartner (2013: 242) 
Definition  
First “…the process whereby instrument 
settings are changed in the light of 
experience and new knowledge, 
while the overall goals and 
instruments of policy remain the 
same, a process of first order change 
in policy” (Hall 1993: 278). 
“…routine adjustments to 
known policy instruments,” 
Second “…when the instruments of policy as 
well as their settings are altered in 
response to past experience even 
though the overall goals of policy 
remain the same, might be said to 
reflect a process of second order 
change (Hall1993: 279).  
“changes in the policy 
instruments themselves used 
to achieve shared policy 
goals,” 
Third “…wholesale changes in policy occur 
relatively rarely, but when they do 
occur as a result of reflection on past 
experience, we can describe them as 
instances of third order changes” 
(Hall 1993: 279). 
“shifts in the goals 
themselves” 
 (Sources: Hall 1993; Baumgartner 2013) 
 
Baumgartner (2013) credits Hall with providing “an excellent understanding of 
why policies change so little most of the time but can sometimes change so 
dramatically” (Baumgartner 2013: 242). Accordingly, first and second order 
changes are more common than third order change; it is widely recognized in 
the literature that adjusting policy instruments is much easier than shifting whole 
agendas or goals (Hall 1993; Candel and Biesbroek 2016). Another key finding 
from the literature is that first and second order change is usually brought about 
solely by policy experts in that domain, whereas, “the involvement of broader 
social and political forces is needed for paradigmatic change” (Rayner 2014: 68; 
see also Berman 2013).  
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The rest of this discussion now examines some of the reasons given by Hall and 
the wider policy change literature as to why the process of third order change is 
so rarely achieved. A main catalyst behind creating the conditions for change is 
the degree to which the status quo is discredited (Hall 1993; Baumgartner 
2013). Discretization may be a difficult feat to achieve since the dominant 
paradigm will work against such efforts. As Stewart argues:  
“In the context of bureaucratic politics, a dominant paradigm underpins 
organisational power by forcing policy discourse into a particular frame, 
which privileges some values over others, and forces participants to 
‘speak the same language’” (Stewart 2006: 191). 
This is reminiscent of Picciotto’s earlier discussion in Chapter 2 of the politics of 
policy mainstreaming stirring up the “turmoil of the deep”. Policy change requires 
“a strong and convincing case to change such existing elements” (Candel and 
Biesbroek 2016: 215).  
 
Another difficulty lies in the salience of past policies; “one of the principal factors 
affecting policy at time-1 is policy at time-0” (Hall 1993: 277). Candel and 
Biesbroek (2016) suggest this is a result of locked in effect resultant from path 
dependency.  Locked-in effect is the result of policy makers rarely having a 
blank slate from which to develop new policies. In general, new policies are 
merely reformulations of past policies, which have the result of maintaining the 
same policy style and preventing policy innovation. Locked-in effect is caused by 
path dependency in that “past policy decisions act to circumscribe or foreclose 
parts of policy space” (Kay 2006: 29). This explains why the policy climate is 
typically conservative and risk averse (Candel and Biesbroek 2016); “the cost of 
reconfiguring public polices and domains in which they are embedded are 
enormous” (Biggs and Helms 2007: 540). All of this further perpetuates 
maintenance of the status quo.  
 
Hall also suggests, “the movement from one paradigm to another is likely to be 
preceded by significant shifts in the locus of authority over policy” (Hall 1993: 
280). He explains that politicians receive conflicting policy accounts from various 
experts on the matter. It is up to the politician to decide who among the policy 
experts has the most authority and there is likely to be competition between 
policy communities in order to gain the most influence. Finally, Hall states that 
“third order change is likely to involve the accumulation of abnormalities, 
experimentation with new forms of policy, and policy failures that precipitate a 
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shift in the locus of authority over policy and initiate a wider contest between 
competing paradigms” (Hall 1993: 280).  
 
Hall’s social learning approach to policy change is relevant for several reasons. 
In contrast to the evidence-based policy agenda (discussed in Chapter 5 
Methodology) that privileges quantitative analysis, Hall takes a decidedly 
constructivist stance in asserting the centrality of ideas and social learning to the 
policy change process. Additionally, Hall’s work encompasses a ‘state-structural’ 
approach (as opposed to ‘state-centric’) that accords external state influences—
such as political parties and lobby groups—influence in paradigm policy change. 
As will be discussed in later chapters, Nepal’s governmental institutions operate 
heavily under the influence of outside interests- especially those of international 
donors.  
3.3.2 Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier: Advocacy Coalition Framework 
 
Another important contribution from the policy change literature is the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework (ACF). It was originally developed by Jenkins-Smith and 
Sabatier as a “conceptually integrated” framework of the policy process 
(Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1993). It is discussed here because of its ability to 
visually capture the complexity and politics of the policy change process. It also 
provides a framework for sorting out the different actors within the disaster policy 
subsystem in Nepal.  
 
The ACF addressed fundamental problems with the way the policy cycle was 
traditionally understood and analysed. The traditional conceptualisation of the 
policy cycle encompassed a circular set of policy stages that included: agenda 
setting, policy formation, policy adoption, policy implementation, and policy 
evaluation (Figure 3-2).  
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Figure 3-2. Traditional Policy Cycle 
 
Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1993) noted that this approach is over simplistic 
and does not indicate causality or address the forces that drive the policy 
process from one stage to the next. They critiqued its “built-in legalistic, top 
down focus”, which ignored the inputs that community level bureaucrats, and 
“restricted the view of ‘policy’ to a specific piece of legislation” (ibid: 177). Finally, 
they found that the “temporal unit of analysis is often inappropriate” (ibid: 177).  
Instead the ACF (Figure 3-3) contends that “policy evolution usually involves 
multiple, interacting cycles initiated by actors at different levels of government, 
as various formulations of problems and solutions are conceived, partially 
tested, and reformulated by a range of competing elites against a background of 
change in exogenous events and related policy areas” (ibid: 178). The 
framework captures the overall complexity of the policy environment and has 
been used as an analytical tool in several developing country contexts (see 
Marfo and Mckeown 2013; Villamor 2006; Henry et al. 2014).  
1. Agenda 
Setting
2. Policy 
Formation
3. Policy 
Adoption
4. Policy 
Implementation
5. Policy 
Evaluation
 58 
 
Figure 3-3. Advocacy Coalition Framework. 
 
(source: Cairney 2007: Online) 
 
An important feature of the ACF is the policy subsystem, which denotes the 
space in which groups of actors (represented as coalitions) compete for policy 
dominance. Most policy subsystems have a limited number of coalitions that can 
range in number from one to typically no more than four. Coalitions are formed 
through groups of actors who share similar and deeply held policy beliefs. 
Members in coalitions can range from government actors, policy experts, 
researchers, interest groups, or journalists. The policy subsystem is relatively 
stable. This is because most members within the coalition hold deep core beliefs 
that are hard to change (Fischer 2003). To this end, social learning generally 
does not occur within the coalition itself. Hall’s third order policy change is 
typically generated when external shocks (i.e. oil crisis, war, banking collapse) 
shift public opinions and upend deep-core policy beliefs (Pelling and High 2005).  
 
Binding coalitions together in the ACF are policy brokers. The policy brokers 
mediate between the competing coalitions and ultimately make the final decision 
on policy direction, thus policy brokers are typically members of the political or 
executive level of government. Their “dominant concern is with keeping the level 
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of political conflict within acceptable limits and with reaching some ‘reasonable’ 
solution to the problem” (Sabatier 1998: 141).  
There are four premises that underpin the ACF model that are summarized in 
Table 3-2. 
Table 3-2. Advocacy Coalition Framework Premises 
Premise Explanation 
1. Policy change needs to be 
examined over a decade 
or more. 
“The literature on policy implementation 
also points to the need for time frames of a 
decade or more, to complete at least one 
formulation/implementation/reformulation 
cycle and to obtain a reasonably accurate 
portrait of success and failure” (Jenkins-
Smith and Sabatier 1993: 179). 
2. The best way to analyse 
policy change over a long 
time span is through policy 
subsystems  
Subsystems are, “those actors from a 
variety of public and private organisations 
who are actively concerned with a policy 
issue… and who regularly seek to influence 
public policy in that domain” (Jenkins-Smith 
and Sabatier 1993: 179). 
3. Sub-systems must include 
an intergovernmental 
dimension. 
“To examine policy change only at the 
national level will, in most instances, be 
seriously misleading. Policy innovations 
may occur first at a subnational level”. For 
example “American cities…had viable 
stationary air pollution source controls 20 
years before any significant federal 
involvement” (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 
1993: 179). 
4. Public polices can be 
conceptualized as belief 
systems. 
Public policies “involve value priorities, 
perceptions of important causal 
relationships, perceptions of the state of the 
world (including the magnitude of the 
problem), perceptions of the efficacy of 
policy instruments, etc.” (Jenkins-Smith and 
Sabatier 1993: 179). 
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There are three types of beliefs that 
influence policy: 
 “Deep Core beliefs: underlying 
personal philosophy 
 Policy core beliefs: fundamental 
policy positions 
 Secondary aspects: these relate to 
funding, delivery and 
implementation of policy goals and 
the information gathered to support 
the process”  
 
 
(Source: Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1993; Cairney 2012) 
 
 
The ACF provides several key components that are used in later chapters for 
the analysis of mainstreaming DRR in Nepal. In particular, its attention to 
subsystems within which competing coalitions struggle for policy dominance 
provides a conceptual frame of reference in order to identify the actors (e.g. the 
members within various coalitions and the policy brokers) who are involved in 
the disaster policy subsystem. Its intergovernmental emphasis prompts a policy 
analysis that considers also the role that local level actors can play in the policy 
process.  Finally, its emphasis on the key role external shocks play in changing 
policy paradigms is also factored in to analysis13.  
 
Building on Hall’s work, the ACF helps to visually represent the complexity of 
policy change. One weakness of the ACF is that it does not address the role that  
cross-sector integration/mainstreaming can play in changing policy. For that, this 
discussion now turns to the analytical framework created by Candel and 
Biesbroek (2016). 
 
                                               
13 Because the earthquake occurred mid-way through the research process, it is 
considered as an external shock and its role in shifting the policy paradigm is later 
examined.  
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3.3.3 Candel and Biesbroek (2016): Policy Change and Integration 
 
The final piece of literature reviewed by Candel and Biesbroek’s (2016) is both 
timely and useful because it unites the policy change and policy integration 
literatures. The authors have developed a heuristic tool to “synthesize 
fragmented accounts of policy integration into a single, more refined framework” 
(ibid: 224). In Chapter 2, during the discussion of EPI literature (particularly that 
of Underdal (1980) and his emphasis on both process and output) it was noted 
that “existing typologies have been mainly used to evaluate progress toward EPI 
… rather than approaching integration as an inherently dynamic concept in 
itself” (ibid: 213). To remedy this, the authors take a decidedly processual 
approach to understanding the dynamics of policy integration as seen in their 
starting theoretical principles (Table 3-3). Their processual approach fits well 
with the sequential aspect of this research, since the data collection period was 
conducted while mainstreaming DRR was in process and had yet to be 
achieved. It ought to help clarify whether or not the Government of Nepal’s 
usage of mainstreaming DRR is merely rhetoric or if it is a substantive policy 
agenda.  
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Table 3-3. Theoretical Principles of Processual Framework of Policy 
Integration 
Starting Theoretical Principles Explanation 
“the dimensions of integration do not 
necessarily move in a concerted 
manner.” 
“Virtually all integration processes will 
show differentiation in the advancing of 
dimensions, which may increase or 
decrease at various paces and even in 
opposite directions” (Candel and 
Biesbroek 2016: 215). 
“integration is as much about positive 
(i.e. more integration) as it is about 
disintegration.” 
The authors highlight several instances 
where integration had been occurring, but 
was discontinued for a variety of reasons 
including: 
Integration regime goes out of fashion. 
Other policies deemed more important. 
Integrative efforts had served their 
purpose. 
Friction between supporting actors and 
institutions. 
Collaborative fatigue. 
Political actors replace existing 
paradigms. 
Changes of government.  
 
“mutual dependencies exist and 
interactions take place between 
dimensions.” 
 
The authors propose two hypothesis 
related to this principle.  
 
Hypothesis One echo’s Hall (1993): “…the 
advancement of policy goals and policy 
instruments toward enhanced or 
weakened policy integration is informed 
by and follows on shifts in the 
configuration of subsystems and 
associated prevalent cognitive and 
normative beliefs about the nature of the 
problem and its governance” (ibid: 216). 
 
Hypothesis Two: “… whereas a change of 
dominant societal and political frames 
provides the opportunity for new 
subsystems to get involved in the 
governance of a particular cross-cutting 
issue, the reversed logic may also result 
in a change or adoption of beliefs…. 
Similarly, the success of a policy 
integration instrument may lead to 
fundamentally rethinking the dominant 
policy frame of (how to tackle) the cross 
cutting issue” (ibid: 216).  
“policy integration should be considered 
a process of policy and institutional 
change and design in which actors play 
a pivotal role”.  
“Agency-centered mechanisms help to 
explain why and how dimensions of 
integration change toward enhanced or 
weakened policy integration. The most 
notable agency-centred mechanisms of 
policy integration identified so far include 
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well known mechanisms of social 
learning… coalition building… and policy 
entrepreneurship” (ibid 2016: 218). 
(Source: Candel and Biesbroek 2016) 
 
The framework itself has four components: policy frame, subsystem 
involvement, policy goals and policy instruments. The authors use a basic and 
rough indicator approach to show the level of policy integration for each 
dimension (i.e. low  high policy integration). Each of the four dimensions are 
discussed in more detail below.  
3.3.3.1 The Policy Frame 
 
A policy frame is commonly used in the policy literature to refer to how a 
particular policy problem is defined within a society. Candel and Biesbroek 
definition is narrower in that it is concerned with whether a specific policy 
problem is viewed as a cross-cutting problem within the governance system: 
“In particular, this dimension is about whether a cross-cutting problem is 
recognized as such and, if so, to what extent it is thought to be requiring a 
holistic governance approach. Importantly, the policy frame here entails 
the problem definition and governance understanding that is dominant 
among the governance systems macro political venues and decision-
makers” (ibid: 218). 
The authors acknowledge that this cross-sector framing is embedded within a 
larger frame which may or may not engender support for such approaches. This 
larger frame is impacted by focusing events, policy entrepreneurship14, and 
whether the administrative culture is supportive of integrative approaches.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
14 A policy entrepreneur is defined as, “[e]ntrepreneurs may be elected politicians, 
leaders of interest groups or merely unofficial spokespeople for particular causes. They 
are people with the knowledge, power, tenacity and luck to be able to exploit windows of 
opportunity and heightened levels of attention to policy problems to promote their ‘pet 
solutions’ to policymakers” (Cairney 2012: 271). 
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Figure 3-4. Manifestations of Policy Frame 
Policy Frame 
 
  
Low integration                                                     High integration  
     
 
Policy Frame 
 
 
 
 
The problem is 
defined in 
narrow terms 
within the 
governance 
system; the 
cross cutting 
nature of the 
problem is not 
recognized and 
the problem is 
considered to 
fall within the 
boundaries of 
the specific 
subsystem. 
Efforts of other 
subsystems 
are not 
understood to 
be part of the 
governance of 
the problem.  
There is no 
push for 
integration. 
 
 
There is 
awareness that 
the policy 
outputs of 
different 
subsystems 
shape policy 
outcomes as 
well as an 
emerging notion 
of externalities 
and do-no-
harm. The 
problem is still 
predominately 
perceived of as 
falling within the 
boundaries of a 
particular 
subsystem.  
There is no 
strong push for 
integration 
 
As a result of 
increasing 
awareness of 
the cross-
cutting nature of 
the problem, an 
understanding 
that the 
governance of 
the problem 
should not be 
restricted to a 
single domain 
has emerged as 
well as 
associated 
notions of 
coordination 
and coherence. 
 
General 
recognition that 
the problem is 
and should not 
solely be 
governed by 
subsystems, 
but by the 
governance 
system as a 
whole. 
Subsystems 
are desired to 
work according 
to a shared, 
‘holistic’ 
approach, 
which is 
particularly 
recognized 
within 
procedural 
instruments 
that span 
subsystems 
(see Policy 
Instruments) 
(Source: Candel and Biesbroek 2016) 
3.3.3.2 Subsystem Involvement 
 
The next dimension is that of subsystem involvement. Echoing the ACF, “this 
dimension captures the range of actors and institutions involved in the 
governance of a particular cross-cutting policy problem” (ibid: 218). They use 
two determinants to assess subsystem involvement: the level of involvement 
and the density of interactions. Subsystem engagement “is thus determined by 
the extent to which subsystems consider a particular issue to be of their concern 
as well as the recognition of the issues cross-cutting nature and governance 
implications thereof” (ibid: 219). The second indicator of density of interactions is 
measured by the frequency and depth of subsystem interactions with each 
other.  
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Figure 3-5. Manifestations of Subsystem Involvement. 
Subsystem Involvement 
 
  
Low integration                                                               High integration 
      
 
Subsystem 
Involvement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One dominant 
subsystem, 
which governs 
the issue 
independently. 
Formally, no 
other 
subsystems are 
involved, 
although they 
may be in terms 
of substantial, 
non-intentional 
policymaking 
 
Subsystems 
recognize the 
failure of the 
dominant 
subsystem to 
manage the 
problem and 
externalities, 
which results 
in the 
emergence of 
concerns 
about the 
problem in one 
or more 
additional 
subsystems 
 
Awareness of 
the problem’s 
cross-cutting 
nature spreads 
across 
subsystems, 
as a result of 
which two or 
more 
subsystems 
have formal 
responsibility 
for dealing with 
the problem. 
 
All possibly 
relevant 
subsystems 
have developed 
ideas about 
their role in the 
governance of 
the problem. 
The number of 
subsystems that 
are formally 
involved is 
equal to or 
higher than at 
previous 
manifestations, 
but 
complemented 
with a less 
engaged set of 
alternative 
subsystems  
 
 
Density of 
Interactions 
 
No interactions 
 
Infrequent 
informal 
exchange with 
dominant 
subsystem 
 
More regular 
and formal 
exchange of 
information 
and 
coordination, 
possibly 
through 
coordinative 
instruments at 
system-level 
 
High level of 
interaction 
between 
formally 
involved 
subsystems, 
that maintain 
infrequent 
interactions with 
a less engaged 
set of 
subsystems. 
(Source: Candel and Biesbroek 2016: 221) 
3.3.3.3 Policy Goals 
 
The authors define policy goal as “the explicit adoption of a specific concern 
within the policies and strategies of a governance system, including the 
subsystems, with the aim of addressing the concern” (ibid: 220). Policy goals are 
strongly shaped by the interests of those within the policy subsystem, and are 
often laden by path-dependency, “since once pursued, they attract a range of 
actors who commit various types of resources (‘sunk-costs’) to that end” (World 
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Bank and OECD 2013, Online). Ideally, the goal of DRR is found in a wide range 
of policies within various sectors. Also of importance is the level of coherence 
between the sector DRR policies.  Candel and Biesbroek argue: 
“Coherence can be achieved and measured within a policy domain, but for 
cross-cutting policy problems it is particularly relevant how the goals of 
various domains and associated subsystems relate to each other. In other 
words, coherence relates to whether a governance system’s policies 
contribute jointly to—or at least do not undermine—specific objectives” 
(ibid: 221). 
 
Figure 3-6. Manifestations of Policy Goals 
Policy Goals 
  
Low integration                                                                      High integration 
 
 
Range of 
policies in 
which 
problem is 
embedded 
 
Concerns 
only 
embedded 
within the 
goals of a 
dominant 
subsystem 
 
Concerns 
adopted in 
policy goals 
of one or 
more 
additional 
subsystems 
 
Possible 
further 
diversification 
across policy 
goals of 
additional 
subsystems 
 
Concerns 
embedded 
within all 
potentially 
relevant 
policy goals 
 
Policy 
coherence 
 
Very low or 
no coherence. 
Occurs when 
cross-cutting 
nature is not 
recognized, or 
when 
subsystems 
are highly 
autonomous 
in setting 
(sectoral) 
goals 
 
 
Because of 
the rising 
awareness of 
externalities 
and mutual 
concerns 
subsystems 
may address 
these to some 
extent in their 
goals 
 
Coordinated 
sectoral goals, 
which are 
judged in the 
light of 
coherence. 
Subsystems 
attempt to 
develop 
synergies. 
 
Shared policy 
goals 
embedded 
within an 
overarching 
strategy  
(Source: Candel and Biesbroek 2016: 222) 
3.3.3.4 Policy Instruments 
 
The fourth and final dimension is that of policy instruments. Policy instruments 
are tools used by governments to achieve chosen outcomes (Cairney 2015). 
Here the authors consider the role of both substantive and procedural 
instruments within the overall governance and subsystems. Substantive 
instruments relate to ‘command and control’ type instruments such as grants, 
regulatory bodies, licences, etc. (Howlett 2000).  On the other hand, procedural 
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instruments are used by governments to change particular behaviour or to 
“directly affect the nature, types, quantitates and distribution of the goods and 
services provided in society” (Howlett 2000: 415). 
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Figure 3-7. Manifestations of Policy Instruments 
Policy Instruments 
  
Low integration                                                                    High integration 
 
 
Range of 
subsystems’ 
policies that 
contain 
policy 
instruments 
 
Problem 
only 
addressed 
by the 
substantive 
and/or 
procedural 
instruments 
of a 
dominant 
subsystem 
 
As a result 
of increased 
awareness 
of 
externalities 
one or more 
additional 
subsystems 
(partially) 
adapt their 
instruments 
to mitigate 
negative 
effects 
 
Possible 
further 
diversification 
of 
instruments 
addressing 
the problem 
across 
subsystems 
 
Instruments 
embedded 
within all 
potentially 
relevant 
subsystems 
and associated 
policies 
 
Procedural 
instruments 
at system-
level 
 
No relevant 
procedural 
instruments 
at system-
level 
 
Some 
procedural 
information 
sharing 
instruments 
at system-
level 
 
Increasing 
number of 
system-level 
procedural 
instruments 
that facilitate 
subsystems 
to jointly 
address the 
problem 
 
Broad range of 
procedural 
instruments at 
system-level, 
including 
boundary-
spanning 
structures that 
coordinate, 
steer and 
monitor 
subsystems’ 
efforts 
 
Consistency 
 
 
 
 
 
No 
consistency. 
Sets of 
instruments 
are purely 
sectoral and 
result from 
processes of 
policy 
layering. 
 
Subsystem 
consider 
externalities 
of sectoral 
instrument 
mixes in 
light of 
internal and 
inter-
sectoral 
consistency 
 
Subsystems 
seek to jointly 
address the 
problem by 
adjusting and 
attuning their 
instruments. 
Consistency 
becomes an 
explicit aim 
 
Full 
reconsideration 
of subsystem 
instrument 
mixes, resulting 
in a 
comprehensive, 
cross-
subsystem 
instrument mix 
that is designed 
to meet a set of 
coherent goals. 
(Source: Candel and Biesbroek 2016) 
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Candel and Biesbroek’s work aligns with this research through its emphasis on 
the processual aspect of integration and policy change. It serves as a basic 
measuring tool for assessing the progress level (with a scale of low to high) of 
the mechanisms of integration. It is unlikely to help explain why these 
mechanisms may be lacking in the Nepal context because this work focuses on 
the technical rather than political aspects of policy integration. This is a 
significant drawback but its deficit will be made up by incorporating the insights 
on why third order change is so rarely achieved from Hall and Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith’s work. While this work is by no means perfect (the 
“manifestation” tables are not as functional nor as streamlined as they could be), 
it does represent the most contemporary policy integration framework found in 
the literature.  
3.3.4 Disaster as a Focusing Event for Changing Paradigms 
 
Finally, since this research is about changing policy paradigms and the 2015 
Nepal earthquake occurred during the data collection period, it would be remiss 
to not acknowledge the existing body of literature that examines disaster events 
as a mechanism of change. This was also discussed in the ACF that external 
shocks are key policy change. The idea of change through disaster/focal events 
comes from Baumgartner and Jones (1991, 1993) work on punctuated 
equilibriums and policy change. Although their work was not focused on 
disasters, the authors theorize why long periods of policy stability suddenly are 
punctuated by dramatic policy change (Jensen 2011). Similarly, a disaster is 
considered a focusing event that may serve as the proverbial ‘window of 
opportunity’ that Kingdon (1995) coined in relation to policy studies, but others 
have used in disaster specific research (Siriwardhana 2010; Birkmann et al. 
2010; Manyena 2013).  
 
For example, Manyena (2013) explores this in relation to DRR in Zimbabwe by 
assessing whether a cholera epidemic served as a ‘window of opportunity’ for 
Hyogo Framework for Action implementation. He concludes that the cholera 
disaster did not quicken HFA implementation and based his conclusions on 
practitioner/HFA considerations such as lack of legal and institutional 
frameworks, lack of resources, and limited political will.  
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Pelling and Dill (2010) offer a substantive discussion of disasters and political 
change. They discuss disasters as tipping-points, which they define as “critical 
historical moments or broader influences on systems (internal and external) that 
determine the direction and significance of change” (ibid: 22). Their work 
focuses on how disasters can instigate political regime changes, not policy 
change. They offer a framework for understanding tipping-points that uses social 
contract theory and the negotiation of rights in the post-disaster environment. 
The authors suggest that a disaster opens “political space for the contestation or 
concentration of political power and the underlying distributions of rights 
between citizens and citizens and the state” (ibid: 34). It is in the instances when 
rights are “claimed or denied” that act as a catalyst for change. Their application 
of social contract theory needs to be applied to more post-disaster contexts in 
order to evaluate its efficacy as a tool for analysis.  
 
Whether the 2015 Nepal Earthquake is a window of opportunity for stimulating 
DRR advancement throughout the Government of Nepal remains to be seen 
and will be examined throughout Chapters 6-8. However, the existing body of 
literature on the subject, as well as the ACF, suggests that it might. 
3.4 Chapter Summary 
 
Change is a theme that has permeated almost all aspects of this literature 
review beginning in Chapter 2 and continuing throughout this chapter. Here, it 
was found in the vulnerability literature, which highlighted how vulnerability to 
disasters is exacerbated under the current capitalist political and economic 
regimes. The response to the vulnerability literature was to reframe disasters as 
a development problem- hence DRR. This required a significant change in the 
disaster policy environment. However, change has been slow and extremely 
difficult to achieve. The vulnerability literature has been around for forty years, 
and yet still the dominant disaster policy remains disaster response and relief.  
 
As seen in Chapter 2, real change can threaten the dominant economic and 
political orders. So the idea of change has been wrapped up in a rhetoric that 
suggests substantive change but actually is of little substance. That is why the 
second half of this chapter explored three key texts from the policy change 
literature. Because the idea of mainstreaming is unlikely to be useful as an 
analytic tool in the field, this chapter gained insights from the policy change 
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literature. There is now a much better sense of what significant third order 
change through mainstreaming DRR requires. This literature is synthesised in 
Table 3-4 and sets the theoretical, visual, and indicators that will be used for 
assessing fieldwork data.  
 
Table 3-4. Synthesis of Policy Paradigm Change Literature 
Hall- Theory of Paradigm Policy 
Change 
 
 Achieving mainstreaming DRR 
is a third order of change 
 Policy change through social 
learning theory 
 
Key Guiding Principles from the 
Literature: 
 
 
 
 Policy change needs to be 
examined over a decade or 
more. 
 
 There is an intergovernmental 
dimension to policy change. 
 
 Policy integration does not 
happen in a concerted manner. 
 
 Individuals play a pivotal role in 
policy change. 
 
 
 
ACF- Visual Representation of Policy 
Change Process During Fieldwork 
 
 Policy subsystem 
 Coalitions in competition 
 All important policy brokers 
 External Shocks  Third order 
change 
 
Candel and Biesbroek Processual 
Indicators of Policy Integration: 
 Policy Frame 
 Policy Goals 
 Policy Instruments 
 Subsystem Involvement 
 
 
The terminology from the frameworks and theories discussed in this chapter are 
used throughout the upcoming empirical chapters (Chapters 6-8). It is not until 
the final discussion chapter (Chapter 9) that the above theory and frameworks 
are used in full to pull the various strands of this research together and to 
provide a clearer picture of the mainstreaming DRR agenda in Nepal.  
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4 Nepal: Government, Politics, and 
Disasters 
 
 
Figure 4-1. Editorial Cartoon "Challenging Climbs of Nepal" 
 
(Source: Koterba 2015 licensed for use) 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The above political cartoon, by American cartoonist Jeffrey Koterba, appeared 
shortly after the 2015 earthquake and depicts the seemingly insurmountable 
challenge of reconciling Nepal’s political turmoil and economic disarray with its 
‘natural’ disasters, all of which are greater than the highest mountain peak in the 
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world. This chapter follows suit and continues to interrogate the mainstreaming 
DRR agenda in Nepal. It reviews the challenges—focusing on Nepal’s politics 
and government—that make integrating DRR difficult and that creates significant 
resistance to mainstreaming and policy change. This chapter also presents an 
overview of Nepal’s hazards, geography, and briefly introduces the fieldwork 
locations.  
 
The political situation in Nepal is complex and dynamic and over the three-and-
a-half-year period of research many significant events occurred. In the process 
of researching policy mainstreaming Nepal experienced:  
 four changes of government; 
 a damaging earthquake on April 25th 2015 that killed approximately 
9,000 people, and a subsequent aftershock that caused further damage 
on May 12th 2016; 
 a highly contested Constitution that was passed by the Constituent 
Assembly in September 20th, 2015 after 8 years of political deadlock; 
 from September 2015- February 2016, the Nepal-India border was 
blockaded. Goods were not allowed to enter Nepal causing significant 
shortages of food, medication, cooking fuel, petrol, and earthquake 
recovery supplies. 
 
It is in this context of ever-present upheaval and change that this research is 
situated.  This chapter begins with an overview of Nepal’s geography and 
hazard profile. It next examines a few indicators of Nepal’s current social, 
political and economic development.  Finally, the chapter concludes with an 
overview of Nepal’s government administration and discusses various modern 
government administrative challenges. 
4.2 Geography and Hazards  
 
This section provides a brief discussion of Nepal’s physical and political 
geography and its associated hazards. The Himalayan mountain range runs 
along Nepal’s northern border and forms the backbone of Nepal’s physical 
geography. Because of this, Nepal’s altitude is one of extremes varying from 70 
metres up to 8,848 metres.  Its average north-south distance is 140 km, 
whereas, its east-west length is approximately 800 km. Nepal is divided into five 
physiograpical regions: Tarai Plain, Chure Hills (also known as the Siwalik Hills), 
Hill, Middle Mountain, and High Mountain (Table 4-1).  Each of these 
physiograpical regions are represented across the three districts where fieldwork 
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took place (Bardiya, Lalitpur, Solukhumbu). Accordingly, each region has a 
varied and often fragile ecosystem.  Although Nepal is a relatively small country, 
it has a diverse climatic conditions that range from tropical in the south Tarai 
region to alpine in the mid and high mountains (Dixit 2011: Online).  
 
Table 4-1. Physiographic Regions of Nepal 
Region Elevations Area Geographic Setting Field work Site 
Tarai <900m  33% The Tarai region lies in the 
southernmost part of the 
country. Land slopes 
gently southward and 
supports most of the 
country’s agriculture. 
 
Bardiya District 
Siwalik  
(Chure Hills) 
900-1200m 8% The Siwalik zone is located 
south of the middle 
mountain. It forms the first 
and lowermost ridges of 
the Himalayan Mountain 
system with cultivated 
valleys and plains. 
 
Bardiya District 
Middle Hills 1200-
3000m 
30% The Middle Mountain area 
comprises the country’s 
central belt. This region is 
composed of networks of 
ridges and incised valleys. 
 
Lalitpur District 
High 
Mountains 
3000-
5000m 
20% The High Mountains are 
characterized by a series 
of ridges and mountain 
tops which are dissected 
by deep valleys and 
gorges incised to 
elevations around 1000 m 
asl. 
 
Solukhumbu District 
High 
Himalayas 
>5000m  9% The High Himalaya from 
Nepal’s highest peaks and 
is largely covered by snow 
and ice throughout the 
year. 
 
Solukhumbu District 
 (Source: adapted from Bricker et al. 2014) 
4.2.1 Hazards 
 
Nepal’s geophysical context contributes to its ranking as one of the most hazard 
prone nation-states on the earth. Nepal ranked 11th for earthquake risk and 30th 
for flood risk in a UNDP (2004) report. Table 4-2 outlines a list of the hazards 
that the Government of Nepal has identified in each region.  This section 
selectively elaborates on only a few of these hazards such as earthquakes, 
landslides, and floods (riverine and glacial lake outburst floods).  
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The Himalayas are considered geologically to be a young mountain range 
(dating from 55,000 years ago) and therefore the rock is weaker and prone to 
erosion and landslide events (Gallessich 2003: Online). The processes that 
contribute to the formation of the Himalayans are also the tectonic forces that 
create the risk of earthquakes. Figure 4-2 illustrates the area at risk from an 
earthquake with a 500-year return period. Notice that the majority of Nepal is at 
very high or high risk. 
Figure 4-2. Nepal Earthquake Hazard Risk 500 Year Return 
 
(Source: ADPC 2010: 33) 
As mentioned earlier, Nepal is situated between the political borders of China 
and India and located on top of their geologic crustal plates. As the Indian plate 
moves northward it subducts under the Eurasian Plate (China) that is moving 
southwards.  
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Figure 4-3. Plate Tectonics and Himalayan Uplift 
 
(Source: USGS 2014: Online) 
 
As the Indian Plate subducts under the Eurasian plate, it carries the Eurasian 
plate backwards. This causes the upper Eurasian plate to buckle, which has the 
effect of ‘growing’ the Himalayan Mountains at an annual rate of approximately 
two centimetres (Oskin 2015). When parts of the plates become ‘unlocked’ the 
resulting earthquake inevitably causes the Himalayans to lose altitude as the 
Eurasian plate rebounds forward. For instance, after the 2015 Gorkha 
earthquake, the Himalayans dropped approximately 0.7-1.5 meters as the 
pressure between the plates was released (Oskin 2015).  
 
From a hazards perspective events that take place at higher altitudes can have 
significant consequences at lower ones. The Himalayas create the headwaters 
for the primary rivers that flow south through the low-lying Tarai region 
tributaries of the Ganges in Northern India. For example, as a result of intense 
rainfall a landslide occurred in 2014 in the hill/mountain region of Sindhupalchok 
district. The landslide (often referred to as the Juri landslide) flowed across the 
Sunkoshi river creating a new lake and dam. A secondary hazard was created 
and it was feared that a break in the dam would have severe consequences on 
downstream Tarai communities and beyond into India. This was remediated by 
the GON by the construction of channels and controlled blasts to reduce the 
water pressure behind the dam.  
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Landslides are a frequent and deadly hazard in Nepal, particularly during the 
monsoon season that lasts from June-September. Landslides can be triggered 
by other hazards such as an earthquake or heavy rainfall. or they can be 
triggered by development activities such as deforestation and rudimentary road 
construction.  
Table 4-2. Government of Nepal Hazard List 
Types of Hazards Affected Region 
Earthquake 
 
All of Nepal is a high-hazard earthquake zone 
Flood 
 
Tarai, Middle Hills 
Landslide and landslide 
dam breaks 
 
Hills, Mountains 
Debris Flow 
 
Hills and Mountain,  
Glacier Lake Outburst  
 
Floods 
 
Mountains and Hills 
Avalanche 
 
Higher Mountains 
Fire (forest) 
 
Hills and Tarai (forest belt of Siwalik Hills) 
Drought 
 
All over country 
Windstorms 
 
All over country 
Hailstorms 
 
Hills 
Lightening 
 
All over country 
Epidemics 
 
All over country 
Fire (settlements) 
 
All over country 
Accidents 
 
Urban areas, along road network 
Industrial/Technological 
Hazards 
 
Urban/industrial areas 
 
Soil Erosion Hills 
(Source: GON 2015: 6) 
 
Another hazard found in Nepal’s mountainous region is increased water 
volumes in the glacial lakes from glacial melt. The glaciers are retreating at a 
rapid rate of 30 m/year (Karki et. al 2009). The increased water is putting more 
pressure on existing moraine-lake dams and at times causing them to burst, an 
event known as glacial lake outburst flooding (GLOF). The consequence of a 
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glacier lake outburst has devastating effects on downstream communities as 
there are no early warning systems in place. 
 
Flooding is a hazard that is experienced most frequently in the Tarai region. The 
four largest rivers in Nepal (Mahakli, Karnali, Gandak and Kosi) account for two 
thirds of the 224 000 million cubic meters of run-off (Paisley 2002). Flooding has 
a particular cross-border political dynamic with India. As a consequence, Nepal’s 
water resources and flood hazards are highly influenced by India. For example, 
in 1954 the two governments signed the Kosi Agreement. The Kosi river runs 
north to south, originating in Nepal’s eastern mountains and flowing into Bihar 
State in India. The Kosi barrage, located on the Nepal-Indian border is shown in 
Figure 4-4.  Paisley explains the Kosi Agreement: 
“The primary purpose of the Kosi Agreement is to enable India to build 
control structures in Nepal that provide flood control to Bihar State in India. 
The Kosi Development Project that out of the Kosi Agreement was 
planned, designed and constructed by India” (Paisley 2000: 292). 
 
The Kosi Agreement also highlights the disparity that exists within Nepal-India 
relations and environmental management. Paisley further elaborates: 
“The Kosi Agreement has had a mixed reception in Nepal. On the one 
hand, it confirms Nepal’s right to substantial future developments in the 
Kosi River basin, even though Nepal is yet to exercise those rights. On the 
other hand, it has been suggested that Nepal may have so far derived 
relatively little benefit from the agreement. More specifically, it has been 
suggested that the expected benefits to Nepal from the Chatra canal have 
not materialised, and the westward shifting of the Kosi has damaged land 
and agricultural crops in the Sapatari district of Nepal. Also the promised 
powerhouse of 20 megawatt capacity using the canal head could not be 
made operational” (Paisley 2000: 292).   
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Figure 4-4. Kosi Barrage at Nepal-India Border 
 
(Source: the author) 
4.2.1.1 Climate Change 
 
It is widely agreed that Nepal is disproportionately experiencing the effects of a 
warming climate (Karki et al. 2009; International Panel on Climate Change 2014) 
despite contributing very little greenhouse gas emissions because of its low level 
of industrial development (Devokta et al. 2011). Climate change is intensifying 
the frequency and magnitude of hydrologic disasters and adversely affecting 
agricultural production (Devokta et al. 2011; Krishnamurthy et al. 2013). For 
instance, climate change is speeding up the glacial melt in the high mountains, 
causing increased flood risk at lower levels. Additionally, climate change is 
changing the annual monsoon patterns. Rainfall during the monsoon is 
becoming increasingly erratic with heavier and shorter rainfall durations. The 
ground is unable to absorb rainfall at such intensity which is resulting in 
catastrophic flooding.   
4.2.1.2 Hazards Bias 
 
Finally, it is important to note that the way hazards are prioritized in Nepal is 
itself a construction of the prevailing global political economy. Research 
conducted by Aryal (2012) in Nepal concludes that “small scale, local disasters 
have a greater cumulative impact in terms of causalities than large-scale, 
 80 
 
national disasters” (Aryal 2012: 147). To determine this, Aryal conducted a 
review of Nepali newspaper reports of disasters between the dates of 1900-
2005. This is important because it reveals the bias that exists within Nepal that 
tends to privilege the large-scale, urban, and sudden impact hazards like 
earthquakes. This bias is linked with and perpetuated by the prevailing global 
disaster response/relief industry that was discussed in Chapter 2. The off-shoot 
of this a resulting bias towards urban infrastructure risk reduction strategies. The 
2015 earthquake also revealed a bias in the way hazards are planned for. What 
was anticipated was large urban destruction in the Kathmandu Valley. However, 
the earthquake resulted in a mostly rural disaster that the GON was woefully 
unprepared to respond to.  
4.2.2 Introducing the Fieldwork Sites: Solukhumbu, Lalitpur, 
Bardiya Districts 
 
Figure 4-5 shows the districts of Nepal with the three fieldwork locations 
  
(Source: GON 2015a) 
 
Solukhumbu is a district that encompassed both the high mountain and high 
Himalayan regions of Nepal. It has a population of 105,886 (Central Bureau of 
Figure 4-5. District Map of Nepal 
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Statistics 2011a). Solukhumbu’s northern boundary borders Tibet/China.  Mount 
Everest lies in the northern half of the district with the district headquarters, 
Salleri is located in the southern half at a relatively low attitude of 2207m.       
Figure 4-6. Salleri, Solukhumbu District 
 
(Source : the author) 
 
Solukhumbu is a rural district. In 2014, the district headquarter, Salleri-VDC, was 
amalgamated with two other neighbouring VDCs to create a municipality. At the 
time of fieldwork, the municipality was still in the planning stages. The district 
had not experienced a large district-wide disaster in recent memory, although 
through interviews it was clear that smaller disasters (e.g. fire, landslides) 
frequently impacted local communities. Very few INGOs/NGOs had DM/DRR 
interventions there. The 2015 earthquakes caused extensive damage to the 
western region of Solukhumbu district. The NGO ACTED, estimates that 40% of 
the population had their houses destroyed by the earthquake (ACTED 2015). 
The earthquake also caused a large avalanche on Mount Everest resulting in 18 
deaths and 71 injuries.   
 
The second fieldwork site is located within Kathmandu Valley. Lalitpur district is 
the most developed of the three fieldwork sites and has a population of 468 132 
(Central Bureau of Statistics 2011b). Within its jurisdiction is a mix of Village 
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Development Committees (many of which were in the process of amalgamation 
to become municipalities) and Lalitpur Sub-Metropolitan City, Nepal’s third 
largest municipality (pop. 220,802).  The district is at-risk from a variety of 
hazards that included earthquake, flooding, forest and settlement fires, and 
landslides.  
 
Figure 4-7. Vulnerable Building in LSMC Shored Prior to Earthquake 
 
(Source: the author) 
 
Of the three districts, Lalitpur experienced the most damage and loss of life from 
the 2015 earthquakes. In total, the earthquake damaged 25,508 private 
structures (17,444 fully damaged and 9054 partially damaged) (Housing 
Recovery and Reconstruction Platform 2016: Online).  
 
Finally, Bardiya district is located in the south-western Tarai region of Nepal. Its 
southern boundary borders India.  Total district population is comparable with 
Lalitpur District at 426,576 (Central Bureau of Statistics 2011c). The district 
headquarters is located in Gulariya Municipality (pop. 11,220) (Central Bureau of 
Statistics 2011c). The majority of Bardiya is flat Tarai jungle/plains with the 
Siwalik/Chure Hills forming along its northern border. Located in the district is 
Bardiya National Park, the largest protected area on the Tarai encompassing an 
area of 968 km2. 
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Figure 4-8. Bardiya National Park 
 
(Source: the author) 
 
Bardiya has many hazards, including flooding, wild animal attacks, settlement 
fires and earthquakes. The district was not affected by the 2015 earthquake. 
However, in August 2014 three days of intense monsoon rains resulted in 
widespread flooding throughout most of Bardiya and neighbouring districts. A 
report on the recovery described the flood event in these words: 
“In 24 hours, nearly 500mm of rain fell across the plain and foothills. 
Rivers rose rapidly in the middle of the night. Flooding was perhaps a one-
in-thousand-year event and exceeded the previous largest flood by nearly 
a meter. Downstream flooding was intense. Floodwaters flowed over 
banks, broke embankments, and flooded irrigation canals. Floodwaters 
came from unexpected directions, inundating previously safe areas and 
taking residents by surprise” (MacClune et al. 2015: 4). 
Fieldwork took place in March 2015 and temporary camps were still in use by 
those who had lost their homes from the 2014 floods (see Figure 4-9).  
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(Source: the author) 
4.2.3 Nepal’s Political Geography 
 
 
Nepal is a landlocked country that shares borders with Tibet and China in the 
mountainous north and India in its low laying and fertile plains to the south. Its 
close proximity to two large and developing economic powers, effects Nepal’s 
political identity and makes the impoverished nation-state intrinsically valuable to 
global powers like the US (Khadka 2000). As Bell writes, contemporary 
Kathmandu “is a nest of spies” (Bell 2014: 359).  
 
India in particular has a strong influence on Nepal’s culture and politics. Like 
India, the majority of Nepali people are Hindu15.  India’s involvement in Nepal’s 
political machinations are long standing and barely hidden. A superb example of 
Indian influence was witnessed over the period of study. On September 20th 
2015 Nepal signed its Constitution that was enacted after eight years of political 
deadlock. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs made it clear that the Indian 
government was unhappy with the Constitution passed (Ojha 2015) and 
                                               
15 According to the last census conducted in Nepal in 2011, a majority of people are 
Hindu- Hindu 81.3%, Buddhist 9%, Muslim 4.4%, Kirant 3.1%, Christian 1.4% (Central 
Bureau of Statistics 2011d: 4). 
Figure 4-9. Temporary Camp for 2014 Karnali Flood 
Survivors 
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publically suggested seven reforms be made (Kumar 2015). In Kathmandu, this 
sparked outward hostility towards what was perceived as India’s meddling in 
Nepali affairs.  Nepal’s strongly nationalistic Prime Minister of the time, K.P. Oli, 
leveraged the negative public opinion, further escalating tensions between the 
two countries.  
 
Meanwhile, the Constitution angered many who live along the Nepal-India open 
border who felt it did not entrench their right for “political and economic 
representation in proportion to their population” (Khalid 2016: Online). The 
Madhesis, are an ethnic group that makes up one third of Nepal’s population but 
are underrepresented in centralised decision-making venues. The open border 
between India and Nepal means that there is a cultural transfusion generated by 
cross border marriages, travel, education and work (Upreti 2008). The Madhesis 
in particular share many common cultural traits with their Indian neighbours, 
which has always been viewed with suspicion by the Kathmandu elite (Bell 
2015; Khalid 2016). In response to the Constitution, the Madhesis and other 
southern ethnic groups protested.  
 
These protests cumulated into a four month ‘unofficial’ border blockade along 
the Nepal-India border. The border blockade caused significant shortages of 
essential goods like petrol, medicines, food, and materials needed for 
earthquake recovery. India is widely believed to be behind the blockade, thus 
aligning its support for the Madhesis protests (Plesch 2015). While India has 
denied outright responsibility for the blockade, it did stop all truckloads from the 
Indian Oil Corporation and took no actions to alleviate border tensions. The 
reasons for this are speculative but they seem likely to revolve around India’s 
strategic and security interests. One analysis suggests that India’s involvement 
in Tarai politics is rooted in minimizing China’s influence.  
“Indian foreign policy is strategically in favour of developing Terai-Madhes 
as an ‘inner buffer’ as it believes that the Himalayas have been penetrated 
by China through the proposed rail links from Lhasa to Kathmandu and 
its ‘One Belt One Road’ strategy…. India’s focus is to protect its core 
constituency within Nepal, the Terai-Madhes region, by developing a pro-
Indian province in Nepal (Karki 2015: Online). 
 
The blockade resulted in both human right violations—as the GON used undue 
force to quell protesters (Human Rights Watch 2015)—and international law 
violation since the Indian Government prohibited essential trade to landlocked 
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Nepal (Pandey 2015). In spite of their diplomatic presence in Nepal, the 
international community was mostly silent on the matter, which is indicative of 
Nepal’s minimal geo-political/economic importance in the global order.  
This example is illustrative of many on-going tensions both with India and with 
Nepal’s domestic politics. It also highlights the extent of Nepal’s economic 
reliance on India.  India is Nepal’s largest trading partner. In 2013-2014, Nepal’s 
exports to India were 605 million USD, whereas, India’s imports into Nepal were 
valued at 4.81 billion USD (Ministry of External Affairs 2015: Online). Also, 
Indian firms are the largest contributors of foreign direct investment in Nepal, 
accounting for 38.3% of all investments (ibid: Online).   
4.3 Social and Infrastructure Development Indicators 
 
Nepal has a population of 28.1 million (UNDP HDI 2015). It is a least developed 
country (LDC), with a Human Development Index (HDI- 0.548) ranking 149 out 
of 188 countries. Nepali society is socially stratified through its adherence to 
Hindu notions of caste. When inequality factors are taken into account Nepal’s 
HDI score drops by 26.8% per cent to 0.401 (UNDP 2015). This is one marker 
that demonstrates the role that inequality plays in preventing human 
development progress. It is important to understand that Nepal is not a 
homogenous society, despite 250 years of attempting to create a centralized 
and unified state. Nepal is a “multiethnic, multicultural, multilingual, multi-
religious” (Serchan 2012: 87). For example, there are 123 different languages 
spoken throughout Nepal.  
 
Daily life is a struggle for most. The 2015 Human Development Index puts the 
percentage of working poor (at PPP $2 USD a day) at 49.5%. Whereas, 23.7% 
are living below the income poverty line ($1.25 USD a day). When this level of 
poverty is compounded with the effects of a disaster on livelihoods and basic 
infrastructure, the results are grim news stories of the 2015 earthquake survivors 
who died from winter exposure (Shrestha 2016) and vulnerable children being 
trafficked because of the loss of their families (Jones 2015).  
 
Just under sixty per cent of the overall adult population are literate. This average 
belies the large gap in literacy among males and females. Male literacy is 71.6% 
and female literacy is 44.5% (GON 2012). The education sector is one HDI 
component that has made gains. In 1981, the adult literacy rate was 23% 
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(Mathema 2007). However, access to education and quality of education remain 
problems (Bhatta 2008; Ghimire 2015). Nepal first developed a New Education 
System Plan in 1971, which was the first time in Nepal’s history that education 
was made widely available (Bhatta 2008). There is a belief in education being 
available to all (Bhatta 2008). However, many students drop out in the primary 
grades for a variety of reasons which may include malnutrition and lack of 
potable water making it hard for students to concentrate, families unable to 
afford school fees, children needing to work at home, etc.  The quality of state 
education students receive is also poor as indicated by the 50 to 70% failure 
rates in compulsory School Leaving Certificate exams (Bhatta 2008).  
 
In rural areas poverty is acute. The rate of poverty in rural communities jumps 
considerably from the 23.7% national average. In the less developed western 
regions of the country, the poverty rates stand at 45% and 46% (International 
Fund for Agricultural Development 2016). Agriculture and subsistence 
agriculture accounts for 76% of total household livelihoods (note that only 52% 
of agricultural households are literate) (Central Bureau of Statistics 2012). 
Approximately 70% of farm households have land holdings of less than 1 
hectare “and many depend on plots that are too small to meet their subsistence 
requirements (International Fund for Agricultural Development 2016). The 
majority of farming is done using basic equipment. Only 1% of farm households 
own a tractor or power tiller and most do not use improved high-yield seeds 
(Central Bureau of Statistics 2012). Agriculture accounts for over one third of 
Nepal’s GDP. 
 
Another important contemporary factor that has shaped Nepal’s social political 
and economic sphere are the number of young people who have left Nepal to 
find work elsewhere, and contribute to Nepal households by sending 
remittances. In 2014, 520,000 labour permits were issued for Nepali’s who 
planned to work abroad (International Labour Organisation 2016). The World 
Bank estimates that remittances made up 32.2% of Nepal’s GDP in 2015. The 
large outmigration of young and able-bodied men and women in the 20 to 40-
year age range has significant political implications, as they are absent and 
unlikely to vote in elections. As stated by the International Labour Organisation, 
the migrant worker phenomena have created some unique vulnerabilities: 
“Nepali migrant workers make an enormous development contribution to 
their home country but also to the destination countries where they fill 
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labour market niches by doing jobs that nationals are unable or unwilling 
to fill. But their contributions do not lessen their vulnerability to labour 
exploitation and abuse. Studies of recruitment processes and working 
conditions for low-skilled migrants consistently reveal indicators of abuse 
commonly associated with exploitation including forced labour and 
trafficking” (International Labour Organisation 2016: Online). 
Pattisson (2016) reported that at least forty-four Nepali migrants died during the 
summer of 2014 while working in Qatar. The fact that so many Nepali people are 
forced to leave their country for work, only to be exploited and abused abroad, is 
both a reflection of the compliancy of a host of actors (e.g. multinational 
corporations, governments, manpower agents) when it comes to labour under 
the current neoliberal economies (Pattisson 2016) and a reflection of the dire 
conditions in Nepal.   
 
One example of Nepal’s undeveloped physical infrastructure is its road system. 
Nepal is a country where distance is sometimes still measured by hours of 
walking on foot rather than drive times and kilometres (Campbell 2010). Many 
places in the difficult terrain of the hills and mountains, remain isolated and only 
accessible by foot, disconnected from broader transport and economic 
networks. The majority of rural roads constructed are basic “low technology” 
rural roads (Petley et al. 2007: 37). Providing access to rural and isolated 
communities has been actively pursued with donor money such as the Asian 
Development Bank. In 1985, the total road length in Nepal was 6000 km (World 
Bank 2013) whereas, by 2015 the road length stands at over 80,000 km 
(Himalayan Times 2015). In 2006, fourteen district headquarters (out of seventy-
five) had no direct access by roads. By 2013, this number had been reduced to 
two district headquarters (GON 2013). Haphazard road building is resulting in 
increased slope instability and landslides (Petley et al. 2007) especially in fragile 
hill/mountain districts. In 2014 the previously mentioned Juri landslide destroyed 
five kilometres of the Araniko Highway and created an artificial dam across a 
tributary of the Koshi River resulting in a risk of potentially catastrophic flooding 
downstream16.  The construction of roads is providing better access to 
government centres and services and markets; however, due to the haphazard 
nature of road construction, roads are also contributing to the increased risk of 
landslides.  
  
                                               
16 For most riverine systems in Nepal, ‘downstream’ includes Northern India.  
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Table 4-3. Nepal's Development Indicators 
Indicator  Source 
General 
Population 28.1 million (total) UNDP HDI 2015 
GDP growth (annual 5%) 5.4% (2014) 
3.4% (2015) 
World Bank 
Poverty Data 
2016 
GNI per capita (USD) $730 2015  
GON Budget Allocation 2014/15 Rs 495,185,306,000  GON 2014b 
Foreign Grants/Loans 2014/15 Grant-  Rs 73,385,924,000 
Loan- Rs 49,528,770,000 
GON 2014b 
% of seats held by women in 
parliament 
29.5 % UNDP HDI 2015 
Corruption  Ranked 131 out of 168 and 
given a score of 27/100 
Transparency 
International 
Urban Population- 2015 18.6% UNDP HDI 2015 
Internet users (% of population) 15.4 % UNDP HDI 2015 
Health 
Life Expectancy at Birth 69.6 years 
71.1 (females) 
68.2 (males) 
UNDP HDI 2015 
Public Health Expenditure (% of 
GDP) 
6% UNDP HDI 2015 
Education 
Adult literacy rate 57.4% UNDP HDI 2015 
Public Education Expenditure (% of 
GDP) 
4.7 % UNDP HDI 2015 
Population with at least some 
secondary education (% ages 25 
and older) 
17.7% (female) 
38.2 (male) 
UNDP HDI 2015 
(Source: various- indicated in table) 
 
All of the above indicators of Nepal’s extremely low development ought to be 
considered with disaster vulnerability in mind. The following quotation is 
especially relevant in light of the poverty and inequalities experienced in Nepal: 
“Vulnerable populations are those most at-risk, not simply because they 
are exposed to a hazard, but as a result of a marginality that makes of 
their life a ‘permanent emergency’” (Bankoff 2001: 25). 
In light of the social indicators discussed above, it is clear that in contemporary 
Nepal many people are in a state of ‘permanent emergency’ that exacerbates 
their vulnerability to disasters.  
 
It is hard to reconcile Nepal’s poor development status when it is the recipient of 
approximately one billion USD in annual foreign assistance (Bell 2014).  Nepal’s 
poor ranking on the corruption index by Transparency International of 131 helps 
to clarify this conundrum (Table 4-3).  Nepal’s public institutions are marred by 
an extractive culture of corruption and rent-seeking, which is fuelled by donor 
money. As Bell (2014) writes:  
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“The defining characteristic and raison d’etre of the political economy are 
the practice of patronage for the purpose of resource extraction: through 
the sale of offices and political favours, bureaucratic graft, commissions on 
public contracts, lucrative but unproductive donor programmes, politically 
protected business cartels, or any other opportunity for rent seeking” (Bell 
2014: 338). 
Corruption is widespread in all facets of Nepali government administration (e.g. 
political party, bureaucracy). Corruption is a significant issue in regard to 
mainstreaming DRR for several reasons: as long as it is widespread and 
entrenched in government processes it remains a barrier for changing policies 
and sparking innovation, and it robs the community of funding that could be 
invested in disaster risk reduction.  
 
Corruption’s impact on Nepal society was best illustrated over the course of this 
research by the case of load-shedding in Kathmandu Valley, although examples 
can easily be drawn from other sectors such as education or health. Kathmandu 
valley residents, businesses and tourists were accustomed to living without 
power for up to fifteen hours a day. Hotels and those who could afford it would 
keep the lights on through generators, solar power, and power inverters. The 
public was told that electricity had to be rationed because there was not enough 
in the grid. Instead, officials at the Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) were 
receiving “bribes to allow industries to have dedicated feeders… power started 
going to those who paid, and load-shedding got much worse” (Shrestha 2016: 
Online). Recent reforms to cut out the systemic corruption has resulted in the 
resumption of twenty-four hours of electricity to homes in Kathmandu Valley. 
Credit for this has been given to Kulman Ghising, the newly politically appointed 
head of the NEA. As explained in a Nepali Times exposé on the issue: 
“Kulman Ghising was appointed by the former guerrilla leader of the 
Maoist-Centre, Janardan Sharma, when he became Minister for Energy in 
the present coalition. Sharma has the green light from Prime Minister 
Pushpa Kamal Dahal to remove load shedding to show performance and 
improve the party’s credibility. Sharma has publicly accused the previous 
management of NEA of “leaking” electricity, and even set up a committee 
to investigate it” (Shrestha 2016: Online).  
As seen in the above quote, the dismantling of NEA’s corruption required the 
backing of the Prime Minister (Maoist) who viewed it as a way to build public 
support for his party, while serving as Prime Minister with a limited term in a 
coalition government. According to the Nepali Times, Ghising’s action of ending 
the practice of ‘leaking electricity’ has disturbed a ‘hornet’s nest.’ In this case, 
NEA trade union bosses are pushing for Ghising’s removal now that their 
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funding source and those of their political affiliates (in Nepal, trade unions are 
extensions of political parties) have been dismantled. This illustrates the difficult 
and possibly dangerous task that individual’s face in dismantling the systemic 
corruption that pervades Nepalese institutions. It also illustrates the challenge of 
changing policy when elites are profiting from the status quo. In this case, the 
countries capital region went without electricity in order for political elites to 
profit.   
 
It is safe to say that the root of Nepal’s poor developmental performance is 
linked with its weak and corrupt governance. Unfortunately, the historical roots 
of this can be traced right back to Nepal’s unification in 1768, which means it is 
extremely difficult culture to change.  This is examined in the next section. 
4.4 Nepal’s Bureaucracy and Administration 
 
This section outlines the government’s administrative structure and seeks to 
better understand why Nepal’s governmental institutions are not dealing with the 
pressing social, environmental, and economic concerns discussed in the above 
section. This section begins with Nepal’s state founding in 1768 and ends with a 
discussion of modern administration in Nepal and the challenges present. 
4.4.1 Unification and Shah Rule 1768-1846 
 
Nepal’s unification into the state it is known as today, with centralized 
administration, begins with Prithvi Narayan Shah’s invasion of Kathmandu 
Valley in 1768 AD. Prior to this, the territory that now makes up Nepal’s political 
borders was divided into many separate kingdoms. Prithvi was the ruling king of 
Gorkha, a hill kingdom lacking in wealth and power. Prior to the invasion, 
Kathmandu Valley was divided into three kingdoms (Kathmandu, Lalitpur and 
Bhaktapur) each ruled by a Newari Malla king. The valley was strategically 
located on the primary trade route between India, Tibet and China17; the existing 
three kingdoms had consequently grown into the wealthiest kingdoms in the 
region (Shakya 2013).  
 
                                               
17 A treaty established in the 17th century created a monopoly for this route as the only 
trade route to be used for trade into Tibet. 
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After conquering Kathmandu Valley, Prithvi declared Kathmandu to be the 
capital of his empire (Shakya 2013). As a ruler, he faced little opposition from 
the majority Newar population of Kathmandu Valley. His expansionist agenda 
had created new trade opportunities for the Newari people who continued to 
profit under their Gorkha ruler (Shakya 2013). Prithvi then set his sights on 
controlling the three ancient kingdoms of the Tarai region (Makwanpur, Vijaypur, 
and Chaudandi), a resource rich area that borders India. He accomplished this 
by 1774 AD.  
 
Hailed a nationalist hero, Prithvi united distinct geographical territories under 
one centralized feudal system of administration. However, this dominant 
historical narrative of nationalism is a contested one. Prithvi did not rule over a 
homogenous population, instead he unified territories with a “diversity of 
language, cultures, traditions, and ethnic characteristics” (Shrestha 2005:122). 
By establishing Kathmandu as the capital, giving preference to hill high-caste 
members, and by subjugating ancient Tarai kingdoms, Prithvi set in motion the 
skewed power imbalances between the central and periphery regions of Nepal 
that continue to cause tension to this day.   
 
It is from this period of unifying conquest that the seeds and legacy of Nepal’s 
administration were established. Prithvi died before he could fully establish 
governing institutions, but in the process of conquest he established the 
foundations of a centralised bureaucracy. An autocratic ruler, he believed that 
the king was the best administer of justice (Shakya 2013). His concern to keep 
British colonizers out of Nepal, led to an administrative culture of protectionism 
and isolationism (Shakya 2013). Prithvi reinforced the Hindu notions of caste18.  
The primary mechanism of governing was through land allocation. As stated 
previously, the majority of agricultural households have only a small plot of land 
to farm. The reason for this lies in Nepal’s history of land ownership. Table 4-4 
outlines the different components of the land granting system called the pajani 
system. All land rights were conferred by the state (the state being synonymous 
with the king); land was the state’s ‘primary asset’ (Shakya 2013). In the 
absence of a strong cash based economy, land was used as payment for 
                                               
18 The earliest record of Nepal’s caste system dates from the 14th century Kathmandu 
Valley, which outlined a Newari Malla king’s determination of rank, hierarch and tasks for 
sixty-four different groups (Bennett et al. 2008:1). The caste system was a labour 
allocation system. 
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military and state services. All members of the upper class and close associates 
of the king were beholden to him in order to obtain a land grant (Shakya 2013). 
As such, there was no long-term security for those with land grants, their access 
to the land could be revoked if they did not raise enough revenue.  
 
Table 4-4. Traditional System of Land Granting 
Scheme Definition Strengths/Weakness 
Pajani System Pre-dating Prithvi, the 
pajani was a system for 
appointing government 
officials. An annual 
ceremony was held to 
appoint or dismiss officials 
based on how well their 
land grant was performing 
(revenues) and based on 
their loyalty to the king.   
Put all control in the king’s 
hands. King often neglected to 
follow the rules as stated.  
Birtas  Land grants given by king 
to individuals (titled 
Birtawal’s) who retained 
rights to earn income from 
taxes and administrative 
fees. Individuals could be 
granted land in exchange 
for troops and materials for 
expanding empire 
Effective way of renting out state 
owned land and productivity.  
Jagir Short term land grants 
given to individuals (titled 
Jagirdar’s) for military 
service in lieu of cash 
salaries. 
Kept the states expansionism 
continuing while running 
government at deficit. Solved 
the states weak cash economy, 
and kept land in productivity.  
Guthi Land grants given to 
temples and monasteries.  
 
Rakam Land grants given to 
craftsmen and skilled 
labour in lieu of cash 
 
(Source: the author, adapted from Shakya 2013) 
 
Prithvi’s early reliance on land grants was not only unsustainable in the long run, 
it also established the roots of many problems found in the modern bureaucracy. 
The pajani system fostered a competitive environment amongst the nobility, 
“lacking any guarantee of continued rights to the land, nobles preferred to wage 
war or attend at court to impress the king, rather than develop a viable political 
relationship with the population and their territories” (Shakya 2013: 16).  
 
Motivation for the nobility to improve productivity of their land was also 
weakened through the caste system. Higher castes members of the nobility, like 
Brahmin and Chhettri, left work—outside of religious activities or military 
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service—to those of lower castes (Shakya 2013) as work was considered 
unseemly. This is considered the root of why rent-seeking behaviour is common 
in Nepal’s contemporary administrative culture, “[t]he pattern of elite members of 
society showing an aversion to work, remaining content with doing nothing other 
than collecting rent and being socially praised for such inactivity, is what I call 
here rent-seeking mentality” (Shakya 2013: 17). 
 
In addition to creating competition between the nobility, the systems of land 
granting outlined in Table 4-4 created a skewed relationship between the 
landless subjects and the state. The pajani system was effectively a mechanism 
designed to exert control over the people, it was not used to serve them (Asia 
Foundation 2012: 66). Those given land grants (the Birtawal and Jagirdar) 
became the intermediary rulers between the state and the peasantry and to 
increase profits they exploited the peasantry through taxation (Shakya 2013). 
Since most Birtawal and Jagirdar’s spent most of their time next to the king in 
Kathmandu and not on their lands, the peasants had little direct access to voice 
their concerns to the state.  
 
Prithvi and his successive Shah rulers were unable to institutionalise strong 
governance or sound economic policies. The state’s land based economy soon 
eroded and the Shah king empire eventually failed after wars with China in 1792 
and against the British East India Company, which led to the loss of large tracts 
of arable lands (Shakya 2013). In only a brief discussion, the origin of Nepal’s 
current political and administrative dysfunction is found. The caste system 
certainly played a big role in promoting inequality, as did the establishment of 
the capital in Kathmandu, the conquest of ancient territories, the highly 
centralised administrative culture, competitiveness between elites vying for the 
king’s attention, and a culture of valuing land over all other assets are all the 
legacy of Prithvi.  
4.4.2 The Ranas: 1846-1951 
 
After the failure of the expansionist Shah empire, a brief of period of political 
manoeuvring and backstabbing occurred until Jung Bahadur Kunwar outdid 
them all in 1846 by orchestrating a massacre of fifty prominent members of the 
nobility and military class. Jung took power as a Prime Minister, maintained the 
royal family for symbolic purposes but removed all their powers, and gave 
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himself the surname of ‘Rana’. This established a century of Rana family 
dynastic rule. During this era, very few strides were made to modernize the 
bureaucracy or Nepal society. Jung maintained the pajani system as a way to 
privilege his family and those close to him. In order to maintain control over the 
people, the Ranas maintained an isolationist stance to keep outside influences 
from challenging/changing the mind-set of the people they controlled. To this 
end they also limited school attendance. This had an offshoot effect of Nepal 
students from higher income families attending school in India. It was from these 
children the seeds of rebellion against the Ranas would grow. The Nepali 
Congress party (see Chapter 8) was formed in India and was a product of the 
displaced and disenfranchised.   
 
Another aspect of Rana rule, was their Kathmandu centric focus. To this day the 
Rana legacy can be seen throughout Kathmandu in the large palaces 
constructed by the Rana’s. Singha Durbar (Figure 4-10), the compound were 
most Ministry offices are located, was once a grandiose 1000 room Rana 
palace. The consequence of this was an alienation from the rest of the country. 
As Shakya explains: 
“The Ranas also focused on amassing personal wealth and assets in 
Kathmandu Valley, thereby alienating themselves from the rest of Nepal, 
as Nepal and Kathmandu became synonymous. The people outside 
Kathmandu Valley referred to Kathmandu as Nepal and this perception of 
a Kathmandu-centric Nepal would not change for decades to come” 
(Shakya 2013:27).     
 
Both the Shahs and the Ranas exploited Nepal for their own benefit and 
provided very little in the way of government services. The bureaucracy only 
existed to serve the rulers, and was itself an institution occupied by the elite.  
Whelpton states the bureaucracy was comprised “of the elite group of perhaps 
200 families which monopolized government employment under the Ranas” 
(Whelpton 2005: 81). It was this cronyism and their opulent lifestyle at the 
expense of Nepal’s development that led to the end of the Rana dynasty in the 
early 1950s. 
4.4.3 The Birth of Political Parties and the Partyless Panchayat 
System  
 
The intellectual seeds that led to the peaceful Rana overthrow were sown mainly 
through the formation of the Nepali Congress Party in India.  Because of the 
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poor education system in Nepal, wealthy children were sent to India for their 
education. Here they mingled with Nepali dissidents who were exiled by the 
Rana autocracy. Students and dissidents alike witnessed Ghandi’s protest 
movement and the work of the Indian Congress. Eventually coalescing with the 
existing monarchy in Nepal, and with support of the Indian Government 
(Whelpton 2005), the factions pushed the Rana dynasty from power and 
restored Nepal’s hereditary monarchy (King Tribhuvan) to power. It was to be a 
constitutional monarchy, in order to prevent the autocracy of previous regimes.  
 
The 1950s were marked in Nepal with an uneasy relationship existing between 
the newly developing political parties and the monarchy. The next significant 
public administration development occurs in the 1960s. King Mahendra, father of 
King Birendra (who later died in the 2001 royal massacre), implemented the 
Partyless Panchayat System (PPS) in 1960 (formally in 1962 when a new 
constitution was enacted). The rhetoric was that the PPS would decentralise 
power and foster development. The reality was that it was an attempt by the king 
to regain absolute control through the abolishment of the political parties and 
controlling who gained power in the PPS. 
 
Assemblies were established from the local to the central/national level, which 
gave the illusion of decentralisation and a democratic polity. Village or town 
councils were directly elected. From this pool of elected members, their 
members “formed an electoral college to choose district-level representatives” 
(Whelpton 2005: 101). A majority of the national legislature (Rastriya Panchayat) 
was selected from amongst the district councils, with some seats kept free for 
representatives of royal nominees:   
“The Rastriya Panchayat’s powers were limited and the whole 
arrangement was designed to allow an element of popular represent while 
the king ruled unhindered by the pressures of parliamentary democracy’ 
(ibid 2005: 101).  
 
Nepal was divided into 14 zones with each zone divided into 75 districts. Within 
the district were village and town panchayats (approximately 30 per district). 
Each village or town was subdivided into 9 wards. Mayors and ward chairmen 
were directly elected (Bienen et al. 1990). The PPS system was dominated by 
‘traditional elites’ who came to that stature through land ownership.  There was 
little opportunity or space for public participation. According to Bienen et al. 
(1990), the rural elites were not cohesive and factionalism was strong but the 
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factionalism was not created from ideology. Rather, the factions were created by 
allying with “local patrons whose land constitutes the single most important work 
opportunity” (ibid: 63). Patronage and private networks funnelled most of the 
funds earmarked for development away from the community and into the 
pockets of elites. National Assembly members also operated on a system of 
patronage and maintained affiliations with local factions:  
“From countryside to Kathmandu, then, politics under the Partyless 
Panchayat System is characterized by battles among elite factions for 
control over government resources” (Bienen et al.1990: 64).  
Cooperation at all levels of government was limited as there was no political 
ideology that galvanized cohesion within the bureaucracy or politicians, allowing 
the King to fill that role. Although the King set the broad policy objectives, he 
was unlikely to interfere in the bureaucracy or engage in dispute with elites 
because his rule largely depended on their support (Bienen et al. 1990).  
 
In February 1990, the outlawed political party’s joint forces and led a massive 
protest movement call the Jana Andolan’ (Peoples Movement), a non-violent 
movement aimed to restore multiparty democracy. The protest movement 
eventually led to two hundred thousand protestors marching through the streets 
of Kathmandu.  By April 1990, the King removed the ban on political parties. 
Both the overthrow of the Ranas in 1950 and the Jana Andolan movement 
characterise the struggle of the democracy movement in Nepal- one big step 
forward followed by several steps backwards, but the forward momentum has 
thus far been maintained.  
 
A series of events, in particular the Maoist led civil war (1996-2006), curtailed 
Nepal’s administrative, social, and economic development. Jones et. al. (2014) 
argue that the civil war was instigated due to a democratic deficit. Peace was 
brokered through the signing of the 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. In 
the same year, massive public demonstrations put an end to the monarchy, 
making Nepal a republic. The protests were another indication that Nepali 
people wanted accountable and democratic intuitions and government.  One of 
the demands was for a Constitution that would enshrine the rights of the people. 
A constitution would not be passed until September 2015, almost five months 
after the April 2015 earthquake. As previously discussed, many in Nepal (not 
only the Madhesis people) consider the 2015 Constitution to not have embraced 
the spirit of the 2006 demonstrations.   
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4.5 Modern Administrative Structure 
 
As per the 2015 Constitution, Nepal’s federalist structure will eventually be 
divided into seven provinces. However, the structures discussed below are the 
structures that were in place over the course of this research.  There are three 
main administrative levels: central, district, and the local level which includes 
both Village Development Committees and municipalities. Nepali government 
administrators are using the same administrative divisions that have been in 
place since the Panchayat period.  
4.5.1 Central Level Administration 
 
The central level bureaucracy is overseen by elected Cabinet members. At the 
time of writing, there are 41 Cabinet posts overseen by an elected political 
member. In the course of this research, the government has changed four times. 
When this research commenced there were only 27 ministries. Ministry posts 
are used to broker political alliances in coalition governments (Table 4-5).   
 
Table 4-5. Political Party Control of Ministries 2014 
Party Ministry 
Nepali Congress Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Development 
Ministry of Finance 
Ministry of Forest and Soil Conservation 
Ministry of Information and Communications 
Ministry of Urban Development 
Ministry of Law 
Ministry of Education 
Ministry of Irrigation 
Ministry of Physical Planning and Construction 
State Ministry for Labour 
CPN-UML Ministry of Home Affairs 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Ministry of Energy 
Ministry of Youth and Sports 
Ministry of Agriculture Development 
Ministry of General Administration 
Ministry of Commerce and Industries 
Ministry of Tourism and Civil Aviation 
Ministry of Health and Population 
Ministry of Land Reforms and Management 
Others Science, Technology and Environment 
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Party Ministry 
 Peace and Reconstruction 
 Cooperatives and Poverty Alleviation 
 Women, Children and Social Affairs 
 Commerce and Supplies 
 Defence 
 Labour and Employment 
(Source: Nepali Times, 2014) 
 
The majority of Ministry HQs are located within a gated compound called Singha 
Durbar located in Kathmandu. As noted previously, Singha Durbar is a site of a 
former Rana palace. At its centre is a thousand-room palace that now housed 
the Prime Minister’s Office and the National Planning Commission (Figure 4-10). 
The 2015 earthquake had rendered the palace uninhabitable, meaning the PMO 
and NPC offices were relocated into other buildings in the compound. The lack 
of space this created seemed to be pressurizing staff. Around the former palace 
were newer constructed buildings which housed the central offices of the 
Ministries of Energy, Environment, MOFALD, MOHA, Education, etc. Gaining 
access into Singha Durbar required an official meeting request to be sent to the 
main gate by the ministry official and a passport/id check. Its imposing walls and 
armed security seemed to reinforce the idea that the central government was  
out of reach for the ordinary Nepali. It contrasted severely with the district  
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(Source: D. Sapkota) 
 
headquarters, which are more accessible. Many central ministries (e.g. health, 
energy, irrigation, agriculture) have departments that deliver services at the 
district and local levels. The central level also plays a key role in district and 
local administration. The absence of local elections, the District Development 
Committee, municipal and Village Development Committees are overseen by 
appointed central government bureaucrats from the Ministry of Local Affairs and 
Federal Development. The District Administration Office is overseen by a 
centrally appointed bureaucrat appointed by the Ministry of Home Affairs. The 
central level appointees are expected to perform both the role of senior 
administrator and stand in for the political representatives who are absent due to 
the lack of elections.  
4.5.1.1 Senior Government Positions and Ministry Organisation 
 
The top bureaucratic post in the Ministry is the Secretary, who is supported by 
Joint-Secretaries, who are then supported by the Under Secretaries.  Below 
those positions, the staffing and organisation chart was unique to each Ministry.  
Figure 4-10. Former Rana Palace in Singha Durbar 
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4.5.1.2 Political Parties 
 
There are 178 registered political parties in Nepal (Election Commission of 
Nepal 2013). The three main parties, which have each held government power 
over the course of this research through various coalition governments, are the 
Nepali Congress, Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxists Leninists), and the 
Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist-Centre). Political parties are described in 
more detail in Chapter 8.  
4.5.1.3 Constituent Assembly (CA)  
 
Since there were no local and district elections at the time of this field work, the 
Constituent Assembly19 (CA) represented the only legitimate political institution 
by which political parties were elected by the people to govern on their behalf. 
The first CA was formed in 2008 after the decade long Maoist insurgency. Its 
establishment was a prerequisite of the 12 Point Understanding between 7 
Political Parties and the Maoists (GON 2005), which ended the war. In total fifty-
five political parties sought representation in the CA and twenty-five parties won 
seats (Bhattarai and Budd 2008). The CA was intended as an interim 
parliamentary assembly charged with drafting a Constitution that would organize 
“the form of the state and establish the domains or boundaries in which state 
power may manifest itself” (Williams 2015: 247).  Furthered through the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement 200620, Nepal became a federal republic 
thereby abolishing the monarchy that had existed for 240 years.  
The Maoists won 220 seats to form the government in the 2008 election, the 
Nepali Congress won 110 and the CPN-UML won 103 (Bhattarai and Budd 
2008). The election resulted in the most representative government in Nepal’s 
history (Shneiderman and Tillin 2015) yet still favoured elite male high caste 
                                               
19 The CA has 601 seats to be filled through a complicated electoral procedure of 
directly elected first past the post (240 members), proportional representation (335 
members) and 26 Cabinet appointed members.  In order to form a majority government 
301 seats must be gained.   
20 Article 3.4 of the CPA reads: “To pursue a political system that fully complies with the 
universally accepted fundamental human rights, competitive multiparty democratic 
system, sovereignty inherent in the people and the supremacy of the people, 
constitutional check and balance, rule of law, social justice and equality, independent 
judiciary, periodic elections, monitoring by civil society, complete press freedom, 
people’s right to information, transparency and accountability in the activities of political 
parties, people's participation and the concepts of impartial, competent, and fair 
administration” (Government of Nepal 2006). 
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members, calling its legitimacy to formulate a Constitution into question21 
(Williams 2015).  The legacy from the first CA was remarkable only for its 
display of internal and external party division and conflict. As Snellinger writes:  
“By the time the multi-party democratic republic was instituted in 2006, the 
different political parties had their own political rhetoric, practices, and 
traditions that were not necessarily informed by the liberal democratic 
values that undergird deliberation and consensus or voting as a 
quantitative alternative” (Snellinger 2015: 233).  
Given a two-year mandate to formulate a Constitution and after a series of 
extensions the CA was dissolved in 2012 having failed to produce a consensus 
based Constitution. 
 
The next election for the second CA was held November 19, 2013. With high 
voter turnout of 78% (International Foundation for Electoral Systems 2016) the 
public expressed their frustration at the Maoist government’s inability to draft a 
Constitution. The Nepali Congress and the United Marxist Leninists won 196 
seats and 175 seats respectively and formed a coalition government. The 
Maoists became the official opposition with 80 seats (a significant loss of 149 
seats). The NC split governing with the CPN-UML by divvying up ten ministries 
each to oversee. After some political wrangling over which party would control 
the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Prime Minister (Nepali Congress) made the 
formal announcement of Cabinet Ministers on February 25, 2014. Since the 
election in 2013 until the time of writing, various permeations of coalition 
governments have governed. The current government is run by the Maoist-
Centre party in coalition with the Nepali Congress. 
4.5.2 Government Administration, Mainstreaming DRR and Caste 
 
Here, the discussion briefly considers the implications of the caste system for 
the mainstreaming DRR policy agenda. Earlier in this chapter, it was found that 
the caste system has a long history in Nepal. From a public administration 
perspective, caste encouraged a stratified and hierarchical division of labour. 
Caste is a component of the Hindu religion; although not all people living in 
Nepal are Hindu, all citizens—regardless of religion—are categorized according 
to caste.  
 
                                               
21 “The constituent power is the generating force that gives rise to the characteristics of 
the constitutional order” (Williams 2015: 247). 
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“…everyone was organized in terms of their relative ritual purity into the 
four broad varnas of the classical Hindu caste system: The Brahman 
priests, the Kshatriya kings and warriors, the Vaisya traders and 
businessmen and the Sudra peasants and labourers—with an additional 
group technically “outside” the caste system because of their ritually 
defiling occupations which rendered them “untouchable” by others” 
(Bennett et al. 2008: 1). 
 
Although caste is found in Kathmandu Valley as early as the 14th century, in 
1854 the Ranas centralized and further codified caste in the National Code or 
Muluki Ain (Bennett et al. 2008). This was an attempt by the Kathmandu elite to 
unify Nepal’s caste system and to protect their own status as high caste 
members. The reality of caste incorporation throughout Nepal is not 
homogeneous. Caste in Nepal is incredibly nuanced and complex owing to 
Nepal’s ethnic diversity and the rural remoteness of much of its geography (see 
Levine 1987 for a discussion of caste on Humla district populations). In 1962, 
the GON made both the caste system and any discriminatory practice illegal. 
That said, caste remains pervasive in Nepali culture and occurrences of caste-
based discrimination are common (Al Jazeera 2014; My Republica 2016). 
 
The problem that the caste system poses for mainstreaming DRR lies in the 
hierarchical and discriminatory culture that ensues from such a social system, 
which is incompatible with the ethos of both mainstreaming and DRR. Subedi 
(2010), in reference to an essay written by C. Bouglé, lists three primary 
principles of caste:  
 
1. “Hereditary Specialization: the hereditary association of caste and 
specific trade or profession. 
2. Hierarchy: Personal status, as rights and duties, is unequally divided and 
determined by the rank of the group to which one belongs. 
3. Repulsion: The phenomena of mutual repulsion between social groups, 
division into opposed fragments, isolation on the group level and 
mechanism to prevent alliances and relations across the group boundary 
like endogamy pollution concepts and food taboos” (Subedi 2010: 143). 
 
These principles are most clearly demonstrated by the over-representation of 
high caste members in the modern bureaucracy. It is easy to see the historical 
trajectory of this phenomenon. Previously, it was noted that early into Nepal’s 
centralized state history, high caste members such as the Brahmin or Chhetri 
soon became disdainful of productive work, unless it aligned with work 
associated with their respective caste (e.g. priests, military) (Shakya 2013). 
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These high caste members were also close to the king, and thus served as 
bureaucrats and oversaw substantial tracks of land granted to them by the king 
(ibid 2013). In modern Nepal, high caste members continue to dominate the 
bureaucracy. Jamil and Dangal (2009) found the higher castes of Brahmin and 
Chhetri make up 74% of the bureaucracy despite the fact that they encompass 
only 29% of the population.  
 
That lower castes are poorly represented throughout the bureaucracy is one of 
many significant barriers for mainstreaming DRR. Inequality is found to play a 
significant role in lowering Nepal’s Human Development Index and is a 
significant contributor to disaster vulnerability. As argued in Chapters 2 and 3, 
mainstreaming is intended to stimulate significant policy change. It is unlikely 
that significant social and development reforms—that challenge the status quo—
will be realized when high caste members dominate the government 
administration.  
4.5.3 District Level Administration 
 
The district and local level administration is established by the Local Self 
Governance Act (LSGA) enacted in 1999. The LSGA sets out the governance 
arrangements at district and local levels and is considered progressive and fit for 
purpose. However, the absence of elections at the district and local levels 
negates much of the decentralised aspect of the legislation, since elected 
councils do not exist and are necessary to fulfil the legislative requirements set 
out in the Act.  
 
At present, there are 75 districts in Nepal (see Figure 4-5). Each district has a 
district headquarters that is administered by two offices: District Administrative 
Office and the District Development Office.  
 The District Administrative Office is overseen by the Chief District Officer 
(CDO) who is appointed by the Ministry of Home Affairs. It is the CDO 
who is responsible for the Nepal Police and for the administration of 
birth, marriage, death certificates, passport applications, etc. The CDO 
wields a lot of influence and power in the district.  
 The second office in the district is the District Development Office which 
is overseen by the Local Development Officer (LDO). The LDO is 
appointed by the Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Government. This 
office oversees and coordinate all development work in the district. They 
approve or refuse the development plans that come from the Village 
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Development Committees and formulate annual district development 
plans.  
 Also working in the districts are the ministry line departments (e.g. 
agriculture, women, children and social development, health, energy). 
These are in theory coordinated by the Local Development Officer.  
4.5.4 Municipal and Village Level Administration 
 
At the local level are the Village Development Committees (VDC) and the 
Municipalities. The LSGA (1999) also establishes the parameters of VDC and 
municipal governance.  As well, the LSGA mandates the requirement of 
participatory and bottom-up annual and five-year planning. There are 3,157 
Village Development Committees and 217 municipalities22 in Nepal. However, 
most of these municipalities were newly designated in 2015 and involved 
amalgamating several VDCs together. At minimum, a municipality has to have a 
population of at least 20,000 (or 10,000 in hilly areas) and electricity, roads, 
drinking water and communication facilities.  
 Each municipality is overseen by an Executive Officer, who is a central 
government appointee from the Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local 
Development. Because of the absence of local elections, the Executive 
Officer serves as both Mayor and Chief Administrative Officer. Each 
municipality creates an annual development plan. Unlike the VDCs the 
municipal plans go direct to MOFALD for approval.  
 Each VDC is overseen by the Village Development Secretary who is 
appointed by MOFALD.  
As stated earlier, the local administration in Nepal is particularly rife with 
corruption. Yet it is apparent that the GON has put mechanisms in place to try to 
reduce corruption and make the local level more responsive to community 
needs. For example, a significant portion of the funding for local bodies comes 
from central level grants overseen by MOFALD (Asia Foundation 2012). Each 
local body receives an “initial grant equal to 35 per cent of their total allocation 
under the development budget” (ibid: 61). The rest of the grants are allocated 
based on how well the local body has met the minimum conditions and 
performance criteria (MCPM) set out by the Ministry. The MCPM is discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 7. The best performing local bodies receive an additional 
30 per cent over their original allocation, while the worst performers forfeit 20 per 
cent. In 2009/2010, 17 District Development Committees and 28 municipalities 
failed to meet MC/PM criteria, and forfeited portions of their allocations (ibid: 62). 
                                               
22 At the start of this research there were only 58 municipalities. 
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Another example can be found in the 14-step planning process all local 
institutions need to follow to determine their annual planning.  Among other 
things, the 14-step planning process is intended to give marginalised local 
community members greater say into development agendas, and stimulate 
integrated planning.  
4.6 Chapter Summary 
 
One of the main objectives of this research is to examine the rhetoric and reality 
of mainstreaming DRR throughout the Government of Nepal. This chapter has 
provided a glimpse of the political, environmental, economic and social reality of 
contemporary Nepal. In doing so, many significant barriers are found that may 
impede the Government’s attempt to mainstream DRR. One barrier that stood 
out is that of corruption, which is so rampant and commonplace that for many 
years it left Kathmandu Valley residents without electricity each day. Corruption 
in the civil service is not a new phenomenon. It has long been an established 
part of Nepal’s public administration, which means that changing this culture will 
not happen overnight. What corruption signifies for this research is that policy 
and behaviour change is made more difficult in the Nepal context. Because 
mainstreaming DRR is about changing the policy environment it is very likely 
that there are those within the GON who will resist change, especially when that 
change involves reallocation of funding.  There are many significant barriers for 
policy paradigm change, but a few others found in this chapter are listed below: 
 The political economy of Nepal-India relationship regarding cross-border 
flooding. India’s past influence in water management and flood control in 
Nepal has prioritized India’s hydro-electric needs over Nepal’s need for 
risk reduction and environmental management.  
 The hazard bias that privileges large scale and urban disasters over the 
more frequent and cumulatively more damaging local/rural hazards.  
 Nepal’s low social development indicators demonstrates that DRR is only 
one of a myriad of development priorities to be implemented by the 
GON. 
 Absence of district and local elections means that there is very little 
public accountability at the lower levels of administration.  
 Long tradition within the public administration of centralised and highly 
competitive ministries working in isolation from each other.  The cultural 
component of caste and the overrepresentation of high caste members 
in the government is unlikely to promote change. This culture is not 
conducive to the cross-sector approach of mainstreaming. 
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The current reality of Nepal is that it is in a continual state of flux as it attempts 
to shake off centuries of centralised and autocratic rule and reform itself into a 
stable democracy- stable being a key word. There are many significant 
geopolitical, political, social, and economic obstacles that were discussed 
throughout the chapter that threaten to destabilise Nepal’s efforts to develop and 
democratise. Of particular concern to this research are the destabilising effects 
of hazards and disasters on Nepal’s progress. Nepal’s dynamic and diverse 
geography means that Nepal is at-risk from many hazards (e.g. earthquakes, 
landslides, flooding).  Additionally, climatic hazards in Nepal are being 
intensified by climate change. To this end, disaster risk reduction policy and 
implementation ought to be a key developmental priority for the Government of 
Nepal.  
 
Having discussed the reality of the current state of Nepali public administration, 
it adds a new dimension to the rhetoric of mainstreaming DRR as a policy 
prescription. The next three chapters explore the dynamics of mainstreaming 
DRR throughout the GON.  
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5 Research Methodology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter outlines, describes, and justifies the research process used in 
constructing this thesis. By doing so, it highlights some of the key 
methodological concerns with undertaking qualitative fieldwork research of this 
nature. It starts with a discussion of the philosophical approach taken, then 
outlines the choice of methods, describes the process of data collection and 
analysis, and concludes with a reflection on the methodological approaches 
taken.  
5.2 Philosophical Considerations 
 
The foundation of the research process begins with a reflection of what is the 
reality of the social world and how knowledge is created within it. It is widely 
accepted that conventional research falls into one of two research traditions- 
either an objectivist position that favours quantitative approaches or a 
constructivist position that favours qualitative approaches. In the context of this 
thesis this dichotomy is particularly problematic because it has entrenched 
research camps and discouraged the necessary interdisciplinary work required 
to better understand wicked problems such as DRR and climate change23 (Lach 
                                               
23 Lach argues, “[a]s many have pointed out, there is increasing recognition that most, if 
not all, environmental issues are interdependent with social issues, which has led to 
increasing calls for and funding that brings together different disciplines in multi-, inter-, 
and/or trans-disciplinary research. Yet, the concepts and methods we bring to these 
efforts are primarily rooted in the disciplines that shape the way we think about the world 
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2014; Holland 2014). With that in mind, the goal of this section is not to promote 
one paradigm over the other. In disaster risk studies, both objectivism and 
constructivism are meritorious and necessary for understanding the complexity 
underlying the field (Hilhorst 2003). Instead, the aim of this section is to justify 
the philosophical approach taken based on what best served the research aims 
and objectives (see Chapter 1).  
 
Nonetheless, the reason it is important to dwell on philosophical considerations 
is because the type of knowledge produced may be appropriated to further 
political and economic agendas. This can have significant implications at a 
policy/practice level where this research is situated. Providing much needed 
attention to disaster risk philosophical considerations, Chipangura et al. expands 
on this point: 
“Holding a particular world view in disaster risk, influences one’s personal 
behaviour, professional practice, and ultimately the position one takes with 
regard to policy responses. Understanding how disaster risk knowledge is 
produced is therefore not only part of a particular theory and methodology, 
but it contributes to a clearer vision of disaster risk as a field of study … In 
developing countries, where disaster risk science and management is 
often imported from developed countries, the conceptual underpinnings of 
disaster risk reduction could be misinterpreted or misused. This would 
imply that from the very onset policy arrangements and instrumental 
systems that flow from these underpinnings could also be flawed and unfit 
for their intended purpose” (Chipangura et al. 2016: 262-263).   
Bringing attention back to the philosophical, there is a long-standing bias for 
research and subsequent policy that is generated from an objectivist tradition. 
This is further elaborated in the next section on objectivism.  
5.2.1 A Critique of Objectivism and Quantitative Research 
Traditions 
 
Objectivism (closely aligned with realism, naturalism, positivism) believes in an 
objective and independent ‘real world’ (Moses and Knutsen 2012). For an 
objectivist, reality is a world with defined structures and things that have 
governed relationships with each other. People are able to know this reality 
through observation using the senses. Knowledge is generated through 
repeated and accumulated ‘systematic observations’ so that regularities can be 
documented and accumulated (Moses and Knutsen 2012). With enough 
                                                                                                                               
and how we conduct research, making these interdisciplinary enterprises challenging 
and often frustrating” (2014: 88). 
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regularity, knowledge eventually becomes law. Objectivism aspires for a value-
neutral (Gomm 2009) research process that has a hierarchy of quantitative 
research methods. Objectivism is the philosophical basis of the traditional 
sciences. In the field of disaster risks this includes hazard focused disciplines 
such as seismology, meteorology, hydrology, volcanology, etc. 
 
Objectivism has also been influential in the social sciences. In the early 19th 
century, the French founder of sociology, Comte, believed that knowledge about 
the social world could be gained through the application of scientific research 
method principles. This required that the same governing and observable 
structures and laws that exist in the natural world to be present in the social 
world. In the post-war era of the 20th century, objectivist approaches came to 
dominate particularly the fields of economics and political science. The term 
political science, more widely used in North America, is indicative of the fields 
long standing desire to be ‘scientific’, evidence-based, and predictive.  
It is important to reflect on the extent that objectivist research preferences have 
held sway in contemporary policymaking. Valued by proponents for being 
impartial, removed from special interests and bias (Elgert 2009), an objectivist 
policy tradition is enmeshed within post-New Public Management (see Chapter 
2). For instance, Kisby (2011) outlines the UK’s evocation of a post-NPM 
approach in the form of ‘New Labour’24 and its push for evidence-based policy 
making (EBPM). Kisby quotes the former UK Secretary of State for Education 
and Employment, David Blunkett:  
“We’re not interested in worthless correlations based on small samples 
from which it is impossible to draw generalizable conclusions. We 
welcome studies which combine large scale, quantitative information on 
effect sizes which allow us to generalise” (Blunket 2000 in Kisby 2011: 
109). 
There is no faulting a drive for policy to be informed by science/evidence rather 
than based on guesswork (Kisby 2011). However, many authors question the 
objectivist assertion that evidence-based policy (EBP) is value-neutral and free 
from bias (Kisby 2011; Elgert 2009). They argue that EBP is in fact a “co-
production and thus embedded in, and reflective of power relationships at 
various levels. Often to the advantage of the powerful within these 
                                               
24 The New Labour movement’s promised third way promoted by the UK’s Blair 
Government is widely recognised as a post-NPM construct. “Critics claim, however, that 
the third way, and the emphasis on partnership particularly, amounts to little more than a 
rhetorical cloak for the continuation of neoliberal policy by other means” (Entwistle et al. 
2007: 1569). 
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relationships…” (Elgert 2009: 376). A consequence of EBP has led to the rise of 
‘the technocrat,’ a phenomenon that is widely acknowledged as having 
depoliticised the public policy process (Bourdieu 2002; Flinders and Wood 
2014). The term technocrat “implies an authoritative elite that possess expert 
positivist knowledge…” (Wilson 2006: 502). Under NPM, governments 
‘outsource’ policy making to elites/experts, which removes policy agenda setting 
away from deliberative and democratic processes (Landwehr 2009). Some 
authors argue that in the context of global development, depoliticized and 
technocratic policymaking reproduces dominate global economic and political 
processes (Cooke 2003; Wilson 2006).  
 
A case has been made that the objectivist paradigm is not suited to answer the 
research questions set out in Chapter 1, which aims to interrogate not just policy 
mainstreaming but also its close association with neoliberalism. Its core 
philosophical underpinnings are closely aligned with those of mainstreaming and 
NPM (see Chapter 2). Again, this discussion turns to Chipangura et al. who 
argues: 
The development of disaster risk studies within human ecology and 
natural sciences, driven by the particular interests of technocrats, has 
created the paradigmatic view of disaster as non-routine, physical 
events… This hazard-centred or technocratic paradigm in which disaster 
risk is understood has been embedded in a general discourse of capitalist 
modernity where nature and society have been seen as separated and 
nature considered a commodity that can be appropriated and controlled 
through expert knowledge and modern administration (2016: 268). 
If the questions were framed through an objectivist lens, the results would likely 
reproduce the same sort of reductionist and technocratic responses that fit 
uncomfortably with disaster risk reduction. More to the point, objectivist research 
would not account for the dynamic and constantly evolving complexity that is the 
reality of life in Nepal.   
5.2.2 Constructivism and Qualitative Research Traditions 
 
This discussion now turns to the alternative choice of constructivism, the 
research paradigm selected for this thesis.  Constructivists (closely related to 
interpretivism) have a different understanding of social reality than objectivists. 
Constructivism holds that reality is subjective and socially fabricated. The social 
world is not reducible to quantifiable laws and structures because every person 
attaches different interpretations to the world as they see it. In this sense, people 
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construct their own realities. The challenge of constructivist research lies in the 
fact people “participate in indeterminate lifeworlds, often attaching different 
interpretations and meanings to seemingly similar ‘facts’ and events (King and 
Horrocks 2010: 11). Social phenomena are in a constant state of flux (Bryman 
2008). Recognising this, constructivism is not about finding one objective truth, 
but rather, the point is to keep the discussion going (Moses and Knutsen 2012). 
Constructivism does not have a prescribed hierarchy of research methods. 
Methodologies tend to be qualitative, and may include ethnography, narrative, 
phenomenological, or case study approaches.  
 
Qualitative research methodologies are widely employed in disaster studies, 
especially in research concerning how social, economic, cultural and political 
systems influence disaster events (see chapters 2 and 3; Phillips 2014). Indeed, 
Chipangura et al. (2016) go so far as to argue that disasters are entirely a social 
construction and that the objective research agenda should be abandoned. This 
is not the central tenet of this thesis, but it does illustrate the salience of 
constructivism on disaster research. Although less widely used in political 
studies, constructivist research in the discipline has occurred and is gaining 
ground. Much of the policy change literature is rooted in a constructivist tradition 
(e.g. March and Olsen 1984; Hall 1993; Hay 2011). Hay suggests, “[p]olitical 
analysis couched in an interpretivist vein is, then, first and foremost concerned 
with capturing—or, as interpretivists typically prefer, with ‘reconstructing’—the 
meanings and beliefs of agent participants in political processes and practices” 
(Hay 2011: 168).  Rayner elaborates on this by explaining how political actors 
construct meaning and influence within an institution:  
“… the most productive approach is found amongst those historical 
institutionalists… who posit a world of agent action strategically with 
respect to institutional constraints whose functionality and efficiency are 
always in question. Neither rational calculating machines nor cultural 
dopes, actors reflexively monitor their interactions with institutions, seeking 
to change their institutional context as they learn about their own strategic 
successes and failures” (Rayner 2015: 73). 
Thus, constructivist approaches are suited for research involving public policy 
problems—such as disaster risk reduction and its attendant solution of 
mainstreaming—because public policy problems are by their nature social 
constructs (Kisby 2011).   
 
The significance of the qualitative approach is the emphasis it places on 
understanding and explaining the research subject matter of focus (Hay 2011; 
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King and Horrocks 2010); however, it is not without its critics. Where quantitative 
research provides statistical findings and correlations, qualitative research 
provides meaning.  In order to do so, qualitative studies collect “fine-grained 
empirical detail” (Hay 2011: 173) from the social world giving a “detailed account 
of specific social settings, processes, or relationships” (King and Horrocks 2010: 
11). Critiques of this approach argue that “social constructivism has some 
difficulty in justifying its own research findings insofar as that logically they can 
only be social constructions of social constructions” (Gomm 2009: 333). In order 
to address this critique, qualitative research rooted in constructivist 
methodologies use reflexivity, rigor, and procedural objectivity (Gomm 2009). 
5.2.3 The Role of Reflectivity in Constructivist Research 
 
Constructivism recognises that the researcher plays an active role in the co-
production of knowledge: “[i]f political subjects encounter the context in which 
they find themselves through a veil of ideas (beliefs, understandings and 
meaning), then does not the same apply to the political analysts?” (Hay 2011: 
168). The person/analyst conducting the research brings their own “veil of ideas” 
that are generated from a host of variables. These may include attributes such 
as age, gender, nationality, ethnicity as well as attributes such as educational 
attainment, wealth, marital status, religious affiliations, and work experience. In a 
constructivist tradition, there are no assertions that research is unbiased and 
neutral, although steps are taken to minimize the bias that does exist. The 
researcher is required to reflect and report on how their personal beliefs and 
behaviours have influenced the research process (Ormston et al. 2014).  
Ormston et al. write that “… it is important that researchers themselves reflect 
on potential sources of bias and report on these alongside technical details of 
the study’s conduct” (Ormston et al. 2014: 23). By identifying and reflecting on 
one’s own belief, the aim is to acknowledge the role these beliefs have played in 
the construction of the research25. 
                                               
25 In keeping with both the principles of reflexivity and the rigour and procedural 
objectivity demanded from robust social science research, the author herein discloses 
factors that were accounted for while conducting research. I am a Canadian, female 
PhD candidate, lucky to have earned a scholarship from Northumbria University in the 
UK to conduct this research. I am an English speaker and have no understanding of 
Nepali. I was raised in a low income single parent family, which has shaped my socialist 
and left leaning worldviews.  I have a BSc in Applied Disaster and Emergency Studies 
from Brandon University, and an MSc in Disaster Management and Sustainable 
Development from Northumbria.  I worked for a time as an emergency manager in the 
City of Victoria, located along Canada’s earthquake vulnerable west coast. As an 
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This thesis is rooted in the constructivist research tradition used in both disaster 
and policy change studies. Along with trying to grasp a better understanding of 
how Nepali bureaucrats and politicians understand the process of 
mainstreaming DRR, it also is a critique of the underlining assumptions of a 
post-NPM policy process that is a result of policymaking rooted in a politicized 
objectivist tradition. However, objectivist traditions also contribute somewhat to 
the development of this research. Objectivism reinforces the need for a 
systematic and reproducible methodological approach. Constructivist 
methodology on the other hand, enables a research framework that accesses a 
broader and more flexible field of inquiry. For the purposes of critiquing an 
established policy process the constructivist research agenda better allowed for 
gathering data that would interrogate the overall agenda in a unique way. Rather 
than a quantified account of mainstreaming DRR within the Government of 
Nepal, the objective is to understand how it was being transmitted and 
metabolized throughout the government and whether policy paradigm change is 
facilitated. In essence, it sought to understand how the Government of Nepal 
constructed mainstreaming DRR and what that meant for the policy process 
itself.  
5.3 Research Design 
 
Having discussed and situated this research in a constructivist paradigm, this 
section moves on to discuss how this research was conducted.  
5.3.1 Case Study Framework 
 
Researching mainstreaming DRR within an organisational setting such as the 
Government of Nepal is ideally suited for a case study approach. The focus on 
                                                                                                                               
employee, I was struck by the need for the municipality to better work in a cross-sector 
way and the barriers that prevented us from doing so. My views of emergency 
management are shaped by my North American experience of working in a progressive 
office of emergency management and by the time spent in academia. This is another 
bias held against the dominant male, and paramilitary culture that dominates emergency 
management. While working at the City of Victoria, myself and a colleague would often 
wonder if we were focused on the right phase of emergency management. With limited 
budget and staff resources, most of our attention was directed towards preparing to 
respond. It was through academia that I gained an appreciation for the need to link 
disaster management with development processes by linking them through risk 
reduction strategies.  
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changing the policy dynamic also lends itself to using a case study approach. 
Cundill et.al (2014) find that:  
“a common interest in change orientated social learning, and therefore 
processes of change, makes case studies a necessary approach because 
long term process analyses are required that are sensitive to social 
ecological contexts” (Cundill et al. 2014: 39). 
Yin (2003) argues that a case study methodology is an appropriate strategy 
when a) the research questions being asked are ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions, b) the 
researcher has little ability to control the research environment, and c) the 
research is focused on contemporary real-life situations. All three of these 
criteria apply to this research. The research questions interrogate the how and 
why components of DRR mainstreaming in the GON. Conducting research 
within a government context means that there was little control of the research 
environment beyond fixing a time to meet with government staff (and at times 
that was beyond control). Finally, this research is aimed at exploring a 
contemporary policy process in a real-world setting. It was impossible to explore 
it in-depth in any other location (e.g. desk study, laboratory, etc.)  
 
Using Yin’s (2003) conceptual framework, this research is framed as an 
embedded single-case study with multiple units of analysis (see Figure 5-1). 
  
Figure 5-1. Yin’s Conceptual Case-Study Framework 
(Source: adapted from Yin 2003: 40) 
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Figure 5-2. Enlarged Single-case Embedded Case Study Design 
 
(Source: adapted from Yin 2003) 
The wider details of the framework were evident: context being the global policy 
environment that advocated for mainstreaming DRR and the case being the 
Government of Nepal.  All that was left to determine were the embedded units of 
analysis (herein called sub-units). Having multiple sub-units was a necessity; the 
research context and case were far too complex and broad in scope to fit Yin’s 
holistic study framework. As discussed, the literature review indicated that 
mainstreaming DRR involved a multitude of different phenomena. Additionally, 
interviews were planned across a wide swath of the Government of Nepal (e.g. 
mainstreaming encompassing both horizontal and vertical integration) not just a 
single department or branch of government that might have made a holistic 
framework more feasible. Therefore, having multiple sub-units would help in 
focusing the case study inquiry (Yin 2003: 45).  
 
Upon entering the field, the sub-units were intentionally left quite broad and 
amenable. The initial sub-units were: the process of mainstreaming, 
mainstreaming and decentralisation, and the politics of mainstreaming. As part 
of a constructivist research tradition, the exact focus of inquiry was left to be 
inductively derived through the data as it was generated. Through interaction 
with the participants it was hoped that they would lead and establish what the 
focus areas ought to be. The next few sections discuss in greater detail how the 
research process eventually led to establishing the units of analysis, which 
Central Government
District/ Local Levels
Political Parties
Government of 
Nepal
Global policy environment advocating  
mainstreaming DRR
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would become the main topic areas for each of empirical chapters (Chapters 6-
8). 
5.3.2 Fieldwork and Site Selection 
 
In total three trips were made to Nepal to collect data. These are outlined in 
Table 5-1. The bulk of data collected was gathered during Trip 2.  
Table 5-1. Fieldwork Dates and Seasonal Conditions 
Fieldwork Dates Conditions 
Trip 1 
Kathmandu Valley 
June 21, 2014-July 4, 
2014 
Season: Late grishma 
ritu (summer), early 
barsha ritu (monsoon) 
season. Hot, dry, dusty, 
some rain. 
Trip 2 
Kathmandu Valley, 
Baridya & Solukhumbu 
Districts 
October 1, 2014 - April 
11, 2015 
Seasons: Sharad ritu 
(autumn), hemanta ritu 
(pre-winter), shishir ritu 
(winter), basanta ritu 
(spring). Some political 
unrest- the Constitution 
deadline was missed 
resulting in several days 
of organised bandha 
(strikes).  
Trip 3 
Kathmandu Valley 
March 31, 2016- May 
14, 2016 
Season: Grishma ritu 
(summer). Extremely hot, 
dusty and dry. One-year 
post-earthquake, 2 
months after the end of a 
135-day blockade along 
the Indian border.  
 
With the exception of the Central Government Ministries, which were all 
physically located in Kathmandu Metropolitan City, the other field sites were 
determined while in the field during Trip 2. 
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Table 5-2. Fieldwork Sites and Selection Determinants 
 It was always a research intention to conduct 
interviews within a large municipality located in 
Kathmandu Valley. LSMC was selected based on 
the advice of NSET. NSET had a long and 
supportive working relationship with the municipality 
and felt that the municipality would be more 
accessible for research that other municipalities in 
the area. By extension, Lalitpur district was 
selected. The District Development Office proved 
the most challenging to obtain interviews. For 
example, despite many failed attempts the Local 
Development Officer for the district was unable to 
be interviewed.     
Lalitpur District/ Lalitpur 
Sub-Metropolitan City 
(LSMC 
Bardiya District Bardiya was selected on the recommendation of a 
staff member of the NGO Practical Action Nepal. It 
was a district that had been severely affected by 
flooding in 2014. Because of its propensity to flood, 
the district has had a lot of disaster and DRR 
interventions. Practical Action had completed a 
project to assist the district government with DRR 
mainstreaming. Practical Action offered research 
support in the district in exchange for a brief 
evaluative report on the level of mainstreaming 
found in the district. The promise of support fell 
through at the last minute, but regardless research 
for this thesis carried on. 
Solukhumbu District This site was selected near the end of Trip 2 and 
was chosen because of NSET. It was a district that 
has had few DRR interventions. NSET had just 
completed a scoping trip to assess traditional 
Sherpa building practices for their earthquake 
resiliency. This mountain district made an 
interesting contrast to Bardiya (terai/plains) and 
Lalitpur (urban Kathmandu Valley) both of which 
have had active NGO involvement in DRR.   
5.4 Methods of Data Collection 
 
This discussion now turns to look at the data collection methods employed. In 
order to answer the research questions, tools were needed that would enable 
the collection of rich descriptive data. Interviews were selected as the primary 
method. Another factor determining data collection had to do with the 
exploratory nature of this thesis. Tools were needed that allowed for a less 
structured approach—as opposed to fixed and tightly organised—so that 
participants would be free to discuss and reveal the subjective meaning and 
understanding of the topic area (Arthur et al. 2014). In the end three qualitative 
methods were selected: in-depth semi-structured interviews, document analysis, 
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and direct observation. Each method has its strengths and weakness (see Table 
5-3) and is discussed in more detail below. 
Table 5-3. Methods: Strengths and Weaknesses 
Method Strengths Weakness 
 
In-depth Semi 
Structured 
Interviews 
 
 targeted, focuses 
directly on case 
study topic 
 insightful, provides 
perceived causal 
inferences 
 
 bias due to poorly constructed 
questions 
 reflexivity- interviewee gives what 
interviewer wants to hear 
 language and translation barriers 
 time intensive, organising 
interviews, conducting, and 
transcription 
 refusal, respondents refuse to be 
interviewed 
 
Document 
Analysis 
 
 stable, can be 
reviewed repeatedly 
 research is 
conducted with 
relatively little 
expense 
 unobtrusive, not 
created as a result of 
the case study 
 exact, contains exact 
names, references, 
and details of an 
event 
 broad coverage, long 
span of time, many 
events and many 
settings 
 may uncover issues 
not noted by other 
means 
 
 
 retrievability, can be low 
 can be time consuming to collect, 
review, and analyse many 
documents 
 biased selectivity, if collection is 
incomplete 
 reporting bias, reflects bias of 
author 
 access, may be deliberately 
blocked  
 language and translation barriers 
 
Observation 
 
 reality, covers events 
in real time 
 contextual, covers 
context of event  
 
 
 time consuming 
 selectivity- unless broad coverage 
 reflexivity- event may proceed 
differently because it is being 
observed 
 cost- hours needed by human 
observers 
 language and translation barriers 
(Source: adapted from Yin 2003) 
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5.4.1 In-depth Semi-Structured Interviews   
 
In-depth interviews were selected as the primary data collection tool because of 
the potential for qualitative interviews to generate rich and descriptive data (King 
and Horrocks 2010). The interviews were conducted using a semi-structured 
approach. If visualized on a continuum from highly structured interviews to 
highly unstructured interviews, initially the approach taken fell more on the 
structured end.  At first, a list of interview questions was closely followed giving 
the interview a more structured approach, but allowing room for digression and 
some flexibility.  Over time this approach was relaxed and a topic guide was 
used instead of a list of questions. This created a relaxed and natural 
atmosphere that enabled a conversation rather than a methodical question-
answer dynamic. The shift in interview tactics was partially the result of greater 
confidence and experience on the part of the author, and partially due to 
recognising that depending on the participant, most prescribed questions were 
irrelevant to their context.   
 
Interviews were conducted in a variety of settings. The majority were conducted 
in a government or political party office. At the local level, some of the interviews 
were conducted outside the homes of the VDC secretaries. All interviews were 
audio recorded, and a majority (90%) of the interviews were transcribed. Almost 
50% of interviews were conducted in English, the other 50% required the use of 
a translator (described below). The average length of an interview was roughly 
45 minutes (they range in length from 15 minutes to 2 hours). As seen in Table 
5-4 below, the majority of participants were male.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
1
2
1
 
 
Table 5-4. Overview of Interviews Conducted 
Field Site Location Ministries/Divisions Total Male Female  
      
Ministry- Central  18 18 0  
 Home Affairs     
 Federal Affairs and Local Dev’l 
Local Infrastructure and Building Code 
Specialist 
    
 National Planning Commission     
 Education     
 Irrigation (DWIDM)     
 Energy     
 Industry     
 Health and Population     
 Land Reform and Management     
 Science, Technology and Environment     
 Women, Children & Social Welfare     
 Physical Infrastructure and 
Transportation 
Urban Development (KVDA) 
    
 Agricultural Development     
      
 Political Party Representatives     
 Maoist 2 2 0  
 United Marxist Leninist  3 3 0  
 Nepali Congress 3 3 3  
 National Campaign for Disaster Risk 
Reduction Members 
4    
  
 
1
2
2
 
Field Site Location Ministries/Divisions Total Male Female  
      
Lalitpur District      
 Lalitpur Sub-Metropolitan City 
Executive Officer 
Police Division 
Social Welfare Division 
Urban Development Division 
Environment Division 
Finance Division 
Public Construction Division 
Heritage Conservation Division 
Urban Governance Expert (MOFALD) 
Fire Section 
Disaster Management Section 
Earthquake Safety Section 
Wards 12, 4, 15 
23 17 6  
      
 District Development Office 3 2 1  
 Planning Officer     
 Technical Office     
 Energy, Environment & Climate Change 
Officer 
    
      
 Village Development Committee 1 1 0  
 Devichour     
Bardiya District 
 Gulyeria Municipality 7 7 0  
 Executive Officer     
 Urban Governance Expert     
 Fire Section     
  
 
1
2
3
 
Field Site Location Ministries/Divisions Total Male Female  
 Social Mobilizer     
 Human Resource Chief     
 Planning Officer     
 Urban Development Officer     
      
 District Development Committee  5 4 1  
 Local Development Officer     
 Technical Office     
 Administration Officer     
 District Governance Expert     
 Energy, Environment & Climate Change     
      
 Ministry Line Departments  4 3 1  
 District Education Officer     
 District Health Officer     
 District Agriculture Officer     
 District Women, Children & Social 
Welfare Officer 
    
      
 Village Development Committee 4 4 0  
 Shirpur     
 Khairi     
 Manau     
 Dhodhari     
      
 Political Party Representatives 3 3 0  
 Maoist     
 United Marxist Leninist     
 Nepali Congress     
Solukhumbu  District 
  
 
1
2
4
 
Field Site Location Ministries/Divisions Total Male Female  
 Chief District Officer  1 1 0  
      
 District Development Committee 4 4 0  
 Local Development Officer     
 District Governance Expert     
 Technical Officer     
 Energy, Environment and Climate 
Change Officer 
    
      
      
 Ministry Line Departments 4 3 1  
 District Agricultural Officer      
 District Health Officer     
 District Women, Children and Social 
Welfare Officer 
    
 District Education Officer     
      
 Political Party Representatives  2 2 0  
 United Marxist Leninist     
 Nepali Congress     
      
Misc. Nepal Staff Administration College 2 2 0  
Total   88 78 10  
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5.4.2 Sampling Strategy and Interview Requests 
 
A combination of targeted and snowball sampling was used to reach research 
participants. The targeted approach involved using existing government DRR 
contacts and directly asking them for an interview. Traditional snowball sampling 
involves asking a research participant to suggest the name of another suitable 
interview participant, who then is asked to suggest a new contact, and so on. 
This strategy is particularly useful in research environments that are less than 
ideal, i.e. conflict zones (Cohen and Tamar 2011). In Nepal, although it is 
possible establish contact with government staff members, the task was made 
easier by using existing networks and variations of snowball sampling.  
5.4.3 Bardiya and Solukhumbu Sampling Strategies 
 
The snowball strategy was used in its traditional sense in the districts of Bardiya 
and Solukhumbu. The initial interview was held with the Chief District Officer (in 
Solukhumbu, contact pre-arranged through NSET) and the Executive Officer of 
Gulyeria (in Bardiya, contact through research assistant). Each higher-level 
contact endorsed the research, gave permission to conduct further research 
within their jurisdictions and provided the contact numbers for other participants 
to initiate the snowball effect.  As word got out about the research, and as 
relationships were brokered, it became easier to engage participants.  
5.4.4 Kathmandu Valley Sampling Strategies 
 
Conducting interviews at the Kathmandu Valley field sites (central government 
ministries and Lalitpur district) required a more formal approach than that taken 
in either Bardiya or Solukhumbu districts. Contact details of the central 
government ministry participants were mainly gathered through UNDP Nepal-
Flagship 526 and through NSET. UNDP provided the names of the focal points 
designated to act as DRR representatives. UNDP was willing to share contact 
details because they saw value in a research project that focused on 
mainstreaming DRR policy. NSET provided contact with their government 
contacts who, in most cases had disaster management as part of their everyday 
                                               
26 In 2011, UNDP funded a project to establish focal points in all Ministries to be the 
interface with disaster management and their ministry development initiatives (further 
discussion of the focal point system is in Chapter 6).   
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job portfolio (e.g. MoHA, MOFALD, Department of Water Induced Disaster 
Managment) and were close associates with NSET.  
 
Whenever possible, a week prior to contacting the Central ministry staff focal 
person, an email was sent to the potential respondent that included a) a Nepali 
letter of introduction and support from NSET, b) research information sheet in 
Nepali on university letterhead (both included in the supplementary appendices). 
The main body of the email was composed in English by the author and briefly 
included a synopsis of the research and a request for an interview. This alone 
never compelled a participant to establish a meeting time and location. The only 
method effective for this was a direct phone call made a week later. Most 
respondents acknowledged verbally that they had read and received the email, 
which made it easier to arrange an interview; it was less of a ‘cold call’ and the 
participant was expecting further contact. Especially when language was a 
barrier and the poor quality of phone lines, this facilitated things considerably.    
 
Using the established focal points was largely beneficial. For the most part, they 
were aware of the issues surrounding DRR as they had received training and to 
some extent they were aware of the gaps in their own ministries related to DRR. 
However, because they had received some training they were not representative 
of the overall ministry. In some cases, the awareness of the focal persons was 
almost nil. But to take a larger sample from within each Ministry would have 
demanded a great deal more time and resources.   
5.4.5 The Challenges of Government Interviewing  
 
Despite the fact interviews can generate rich data, as the primary method there 
were some major challenges experienced in Nepal, including: the length of time 
it took to arrange interviews, participant reflectivity (in that it was clear the 
participant was saying what they thought the interviewer wanted to hear), and 
unless the respondent was fluent in English language barriers were a persistent 
challenge.      
 
Arranging interviews with government employees was a uniquely frustrating and 
time-consuming experience, resultant from cultural differences. Scheduling 
appointments and sticking to timelines is unusual in Nepal. This meant the time 
spent trying to arrange and conduct interviews took much longer that they would 
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have in a UK or Canadian context. This was mostly the case for the Kathmandu 
Valley interviews. One scenario commonly met with was the participant 
requesting the author to call-back the next day to arrange an interview time. 
Following this advice, a second phone call was made in the morning of the next 
day to the participant; an interview time would be made for later in the day. The 
author would arrive at the pre-determined time, only to find the respondent was 
in another meeting, out of the building, at lunch, etc. This meant that it was 
impossible to conduct multiple interviews in one day, as one interview could take 
the whole day to chase up and be conducted. Fortunately, the second fieldtrip 
had six months and enough time was provided to conduct interviews in 
Kathmandu Valley. Arranging meetings in Bardiya and Solukhumbu was much 
less formal and time consuming. There it was possible to conduct several 
interviews in a day.  In these districts, it usually only took gaining approval of the 
chief bureaucrat (e.g. Local Development Officer or Executive Officer) and then 
the author was free to start pursuing interviews.  
 
Another challenge of using the interview approach was the reflexivity on part of 
the respondent. For the most part, participants seemed to give a balanced 
account of the work being done. However, there were instances of extremes in 
either direction. As government employees, it needed to be recognized that they 
were bounded by their institutional allegiances. Outright candour and frankness 
in the interviews was rare, but when experienced was appreciated. Some 
respondents clearly exaggerated the importance of the topic within the GON and 
the level of work being done. Most participants fell in between these extremes. A 
majority of respondents provided thoughtful and considered interviews. This 
variability of responses was largely mitigated by balancing what was clearly 
observable of concrete efforts to mainstream DRR. It was clear from the lack of 
progress in the areas of DRR (most noticeably in the post-earthquake 
interviews) that very little had/was being done concerning mainstreaming DRR. 
In order to meet this challenge, it required a change in interview questions for 
those officials claiming great progress. Questions were altered to challenge their 
assertions.  
 
The final major challenge with interviews concerns language barriers. Similar to 
other PhDs conducted in Nepal (e.g. Oven 2009) language was one of the 
biggest barriers to conducting research. At both the central government level 
and in Lalitpur District, most government staff were able to communicate in 
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English. A translator was used when this was not possible. The insights and 
understandings generated from the interviews conducted in English were 
valuable insofar as the level of English fluency the participant had. Barring 
strong fluency, nothing compared with the interviews conducted in Nepali. Upon 
reviewing the transcribed and translated interviews conducted in Nepali, the 
benefits of participants expressing themselves in their first language was clearly 
preferred.  
5.4.6  Document Analysis 
 
A secondary method used was that of document analysis. In the process of 
fieldwork, it was common to hear respondents remark that the GON was good at 
producing documents but poor at implementing them. Therefore, the main value 
of document analysis provided insights into what the GON considered best 
practice. It was soon apparent that the majority of GON documents themselves 
did not represent government actions (beyond the production of the document) 
nor could they be used to further explain processes. Here was a clear case of 
rhetoric meeting reality. Prior argues that “[i]n approaching documents as a field 
for research we should forever keep in mind the dynamic involved in the 
relationships between the production, consumption, and content” (Prior 2003: 
26). Every document is a construct that has been developed in a particular 
context and social setting. What is included or excluded in a document or even 
its very existence can reveal much about an author, an organisation, a 
government, etc. The documents themselves are “‘social facts’ in that they are 
produced, shared and used in socially organized ways” (Atkinson and Coffey 
2004: 58).  
 
When reviewing documents, the following set of questions (Hammersley and 
Atkinson 1995 in Silverman 2013: 286) proved helpful in considering how the 
document stood as a social construct.  
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Table 5-5. Assessing Documents 
1 How are documents written? 
2 How are they read? 
3 Who writes them? 
4 Who reads them? 
5 For what purpose? 
6 On what occasion? 
7 With what outcomes? 
8 What is recorded? 
9 What is omitted? 
10 What is taken for granted? 
11 What does the writer seem to take for granted about the readers? 
12 What do readers need to know in order to make sense of them? 
(Source: Hammersley and Atkinson 1995 in Silverman 2013: 286) 
Documents are not merely props or byproducts of human action but are a 
reflection of the current mode of thinking (Prior 2003).  
5.4.7 Observation 
 
The final method used was observation as a complement to the data collected 
through interviews and was done concurrently with the interview process. This 
method was not employed as fully as originally planned. Initially, the author tried 
to be embedded within a central government ministry related to DRR (e.g. 
MOFALD, MUD), with the aim to adopt a more ethnographic methodology and 
spend time observing-participating in government processes from within. 
However, upon entering the field it became apparent that this approach would 
not be feasible. Firstly, many central level ministries are located within a gated 
compound called Singha Durbar, located in Kathmandu (discussed in Chapter 
4). Nepali contacts felt it would be too difficult for an ‘outsider’ to gain that level 
of daily access within the compound. Secondly, the language barrier would have 
stifled any gains. Although English is widely spoken at the central level, Nepali is 
mostly spoken between government staff.  
 
Instead, observation was used as a method to gain understanding, and was 
advantageous for gaining insights into the environment of government. Although 
the author was not allowed to engage in entrenched observation, the interview 
process allowed for many hours spent inside government buildings. During this 
time, it was observable whether staff were busy, how long tea breaks would last, 
how organised the office spaces were, the types of interactions between staff, 
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etc. This served to provide “an understanding of the physical context for what is 
later described in interviews” (McNaughton-Nicholls et al. 2014: 254).  
5.5 Practicalities and Logistical Considerations 
 
Undertaking fieldwork in a developing world context like Nepal presents unique 
challenges. No matter the amount of planning and preparedness, fieldwork 
required flexibility and determination.  
5.5.1 Research Assistants 
 
Two Nepali research assistants were employed for this research. Both were 
male recent university graduates, in their early 20s, and from a high caste 
(Brahmin). The main RA employed, Dipendra Sapkota, assisted with arranging 
interviews in Kathmandu Valley and Solukhumbu, provided translation services 
during interviews, and was employed to translate and transcribe the recorded 
interviews once the fieldwork was complete. Originally, he was employed as the 
author’s language tutor, but his employment quickly evolved to RA. He was born 
and raised in Kathmandu Valley. He was an enormous asset for this research. 
His educational background was in microbiology; however, he was very quick to 
catch on to the jargon and themes related to DRR.  
 
The second research assistant, Bishesh Gautam, was employed only in the field 
in Bardiya as Dipendra was not able to travel at that time. He was recommended 
through a personal contact at an NGO. Bishesh was a recent graduate of an MA 
in Rural Development and was from a prominent family based in Bardiya’s 
district capital city, Guleryia. His uncle was the elected Nepali Congress 
representative from the district in the Constituent Assembly. His family 
connections in the district was an asset when requesting interviews. However, at 
times it was also was a liability. At some points, there was a sense that the 
participants were measured in their responses because of the RA’s family 
connections. However, his influence and ability to get interviews outweighed his 
positionality. His outgoing and upbeat personality made most people to feel at 
ease.    
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5.5.2 Ethics  
 
Before entering the field, this research met all university ethical requirements. 
Internal research ethics approval was granted on May 13th, 2014. Throughout 
the fieldwork, all respondents were given information sheets about the research 
which included clear statements that participation was voluntary and at any time 
before, during or after, they could withdraw consent. This was typically reiterated 
again by the researcher. The researchers contact information was provided in 
the form of both a business card and included on the information sheet. Before 
starting the interviews, the respondents were asked to review and give informed 
consent. The respondents could choose to remain anonymous or consent for 
their identity to be disclosed. The majority of senior level bureaucrats chose to 
allow their identities to be disclosed, whereas, the majority of subordinate staff 
wished to remain anonymous. All political party members did not wish for their 
identities to be kept anonymous.  Both the information sheets and the informed 
consent sheets were provided in either English or Nepali based on the 
respondent’s preference. In total, 100% of respondents provided signed 
informed consent.   
 
During the write-up process the wishes of the respondents were maintained. In a 
few instances, where the respondent had selected to be disclosed but their 
response proved to be a bit controversial or could prove problematic, the 
respondents identify was kept anonymous. The challenge of protecting 
respondents is daunting. In many instances, the government respondent could 
be easily identifiable with minimal effort. This presented certain challenges as 
based on their ministry, geographic location, and/or job position they were 
prominent and could be easy to identify. In these instances, identifying features 
(project name, participant job title) were removed. 
5.5.3 Positionality 
 
Being a female researcher in a predominantly male environment was a non-
issue for the majority of respondents. Women are poorly represented in the 
bureaucracy (Mahat 2003, Udas and Zwarteveen 2010), and rarely found in 
policy or executive levels. As Table 5-4 shows, only 12% of the respondents for 
this study were women, the majority of women respondents were found in the 
Ministry of Women, Children and Social Welfare. In order to gain credibility, past 
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work history of the researcher (e.g. Canadian emergency management at the 
local government level) was used as an ice-breaker. Challenges faced working 
in the Canadian local government and trying to advance DRR were described, 
with an emphasis on the problems faced. The message that was conveyed was 
that this was a supportive research agenda that recognized the challenge of 
DRR as being universal and global. Often this was an effective way to bridge 
differences, and to create an understanding of a shared work space, albeit with 
contextual differences. It also led to credibility of the researcher as someone 
who was experienced and knowledgeable about not just disaster management 
but also government contexts.  
 
Scheyvens et al. (2003) argue that positionality and “ethical issues which arise 
in relation to cross-cultural situations thus need to be considered and questioned 
seriously by all scholars pondering fieldwork in the Third World, and ethical 
principles should in turn inform all stages of research” (Scheyvens et al., 2003: 
139). For the most part, the type of power relations described in most 
development fieldwork texts, where the researcher held power over the 
researched, did not seem to arise in this research.  Perhaps this is because the 
research focus was not at the community level, but instead was focused within 
the government. The bureaucracy in Nepal remains a powerful and highly 
politicized institution.  In several frustrating instances, it seemed as if the 
government officials held all the power to derail this research agenda by either 
ignoring interview requests or refusing to participate. On the third research trip, 
the government in power had changed and was taking a hard line against 
‘foreigners’ who were openly critical of the government, particularly in the area of 
human rights27. This radically changed the power dynamic and led to the 
researcher becoming much more circumspect about her research activities, 
especially in light of the third fieldwork trip in the post-earthquake environment- 
an environment that was especially easy to be critical of government activities 
(or rather the lack thereof).  
 
There was an instance were the relationship between researcher and the 
respondents became skewed and this was the result of not being explicit about 
the purpose of the fieldwork. This occurred in Solukhumbu District when a local 
                                               
27 On May 2nd, 2016, Robert Penner (a Canadian who was living and working with a valid 
work visa in Nepal) was arrested and later deported on the basis of his Twitter activities. 
In particular, Penner was vocal about government abuses during the blockade.  
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resident mistook the researcher’s agenda for the possibility of a development 
project. Although he himself was not asked to be a respondent, he took it upon 
himself to offer help to the researcher. It was not until the end of the research 
trip that the misconception became apparent. It was explained to him that this 
fieldwork was only for academic purposes and no project or funding would 
follow. The lesson derived from this was that the researcher would always be 
perceived as able to access project funding- given the heavy reliance on NGOs 
in Nepal. This was less so at the central government level, where bureaucrats 
were used to working with UN and NGO staff. At the central level, this was a 
hurdle the researcher had to surmount- the fact that without project funding in 
hand, central government staff motivations to respond to interview requests 
were harder to gain.  
5.5.4 Gaining Access 
 
The hierarchical nature of Nepalese administration made gaining research 
permissions at times a complicated procedure and at others very 
straightforward. The first set of interviews were conducted at LSMC in 
December 2014, with the official request made through NSETs Deputy Director. 
NSET drafted a letter to the Executive Officer of the municipality, introducing the 
researcher as an intern, which satisfied all concerned because my affiliation and 
the responsibility for my actions was NSETs. The NSET letter was signed by the 
EO, which was my pass to commence research within the municipality. No 
challenges or problems were made throughout the month spent researching at 
LSMC. 
 
Research permission for central government interviews was not as 
straightforward. Again, NSET brokered the first two interviews with two key 
ministries- Ministry of Home Affairs, and Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local 
Development. Perhaps their consent to be interviewed represented a tacit 
consent and all that was formally required. It put the research on the radar of the 
two most active ministries in the area of DRR and if they had wished it to not 
proceed they could have stopped it if they wished. The reality of dealing with the 
central government was that to push too hard to gain proper central level 
consent might have derailed the entire research agenda. It is likely the research 
would be stonewalled, either on purpose or through bureaucratic ineptitude. In 
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any case, no problems were encountered and thirteen ministries were 
interviewed.   
5.5.5 Data Analysis 
 
The process of data analysis closely followed that as outlined by Creswell 
(2009) in Figure 5-3.  
Figure 5-3. Data Analysis Process 
 
(Source: adapted from Creswell 2009: 185) 
 
The first step was to transcribe the recorded interviews. The majority of 
interviews were transcribed in full. Transcribing was an on-going process that 
occurred both during fieldwork and at the university.  Transcription was a 
lengthy, expensive, and time-consuming endeavour. As previously noted, the 
interviews were approximately 50% English and 50% Nepali. The primary 
research assistant, Dipendra, did all of the translating and transcribing of the 
Nepali interviews deemed most important, while the author transcribed the 
English recordings. The transcription software F5 was used for the transcription.  
 
Interpreting the meaning of 
themes and descriptions
Interrelating themes and 
descriptions
Coding the data
Reading through all the data
Organising and preparing 
data for analysis
Raw data
DescriptionsThemes
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The next step of the data analysis process was a read through of all the data. In 
reality, the process of data collection was an iterative process and the 
transcriptions had been reviewed as they were completed in order to consider 
the direction that the research was taking. However, once the fieldwork was 
completed a period of time was set aside for reviewing the transcriptions based 
on a broad categorisation.  It was determined at this stage that the embedded 
units of analysis (see Figure 5-1) would be the different jurisdictions of the policy 
mainstreaming process, for example, a) the central government (transcriptions 
n=18), b) the district and local governments (transcriptions n=58), and c) the 
political parties (transcriptions n=9). The district and local government units of 
analysis were further broken down into sub-groups by jurisdiction (i.e. LSMC, 
District Development Office- Lalitpur, District Development Office- Solukhumbu).  
 
The next step required the labelling (or coding) of the data. This was done 
manually and without the aid of computer software. This allowed for a more 
hands on process. Each embedded unit of analysis was labelled separately. 
Organising and structuring the labelling process was made easier through the 
data being collected through semi-structured interviews. Although there was 
room for digression, most interviews followed the same pattern of questions. 
Therefore, all transcripts were roughly organised in the same manner and 
around the key themes of the research.  
 
For each embedded unit of analysis (later to become empirical chapters 6-8), a 
framework was created. Based on a thorough read-through of the interview 
data, each of the four sub-questions were either restated or reformulated to 
better reflect how the data presented itself. Each transcript was then reviewed in 
order to assess how the respondent answered the sub-question. Excerpts were 
cut and pasted from the transcript into the data framework (see Figure 5-4 
below). Data was sorted by political party and colour coded by jurisdiction- 
Solukhumbu, Bardiya, and central level.  This allowed the data to be easily 
compared and contrasted both within and across jurisdictions.  
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Figure 5-4.  Example of Data Sorting Table 
(Source: the author) 
5.6 Reflections on Methodology 
 
Rooting this research in a social constructivist paradigm was a critical 
component for being able to address the research objectives and questions. In 
the absence of strong legislative authority and institutional processes it is mostly 
up to bureaucrats to interpret and implement policy according to their own 
motivations, enrichment, and beliefs. As discussed throughout this research, 
social learning is critical to this process. Cundill et al. (2014) were correct in their 
assertion that case-study research is ideal for studying the process of change 
through social learning. In addition, there is a long historical precedent of 
policymaking in Nepal being made on the subjective whim of the monarchy or 
dynasty autocrat. Evidenced-based, objective policymaking does not exist in the 
current Nepal government environment. 
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What is more, this research aimed to avoid a superficial understanding of the 
mainstreaming DRR dynamic in Nepal and drill down to uncover the real barriers 
preventing change. Using qualitative interview approaches allowed the scope for 
bureaucrats to frame the challenges and opportunities they faced and to discuss 
both mainstreaming and DRR as they understood it to be. Assessing documents 
produced by the GON and the political parties as social constructs shed light on 
the relationships between international organisations, the GON, and the 
electoral voters.  For example, the election manifestos (later discussed in 
Chapter 8) represented what the political parties understood could win an 
election; that they included content related to DRR was an indication that the 
political parties were responding to public, but more likely to external influences 
like the UN and donor initiatives. So too, the National Strategy for Disaster Risk 
Management (later discussed in Chapter 6) was produced with extensive 
consultation, but later revised by MOHA. That the National Strategy included 
global development buzzwords is itself a reflection of the relationship dynamic 
between supranational organisations, donors, and the GON. 
 
Methods and methodology are only as good as the skill of the researcher 
employing them, so it is useful to reflect not only on the methodology but also on 
how the researcher’s skills and confidence evolved over the course of this 
research. This thesis and its methodology is a reflection of a learning journey 
and much was learned through trial and error.  
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6 Mainstreaming DRR: Central 
Government Rhetoric or Stimulus for 
Change?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The majority of data used in this chapter was collected months and weeks 
before the April 25th, 2015 earthquake.  Two months prior to the earthquake, the 
Ministry responsible for disaster management in Nepal (MOHA) suggested that 
it was supportive of a significant change in policy with the reorientation of 
disaster management throughout the GON: 
And if we could succeed to incorporate all disaster policies in all sector 
planning then at that time then maybe we don’t need a disaster 
management plan or policies. This is the goal of disaster management 
policy is not to have a disaster management policy in the future. It has to 
be incorporated in all sectors. All sectors speak for disaster (MOHA). 
The respondent suggests that MOHA supports what Hall (1993) termed a third 
order change in policy. In light of the literature review and the discussion of 
Nepal’s administrative history, this is a progressive yet highly questionable 
policy position for MOHA to have taken. So much so, that it has generated the 
overarching question that guides this chapter- is mainstreaming DRR at the 
central government level merely rhetoric or does it serve as a substantive policy 
agenda for change? In order to answer this, the chapter is organised to answer 
the following sub questions: 
1. What led to the GON’s adoption of mainstreaming DRR as a policy 
strategy?  
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2. How is the Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA) responding to the change 
from disaster management to mainstreaming disaster risk reduction 
throughout the government? 
3. Is mainstreaming DRR seen as a cross-sector development issue within 
the government? 
4. Within the disaster policy subsystem are there any advocacy coalitions 
(from the ACF) within the central government pushing for policy change?  
The focus of this chapter is the central government level. If mainstreaming DRR 
is to be found in Nepal, it is more likely to be found in the central government. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, historically power has always resided at the upper 
echelons of the administrative government body. In contemporary Nepal, things 
are no different. In the absence of local elections, the central government is the 
most functional level of government; it controls and directs policy agendas and 
spending down to the local level.  
 
Eighteen in depth semi-structured interviews were held across the central 
government in ministries, departments, and one development authority that 
reported to the central government. Interviews were also held at the Nepal 
Administrative Staff College (NASC). Additionally, information gleaned through 
informal discussions are also used to further contextualise the discussion. The 
majority of government respondents were undersecretaries within their ministry, 
one respondent was a joint secretary. All government respondents were male.  
 
This chapter starts by examining how the mainstreaming DRR policy agenda 
rose to prominence within the GON. It then looks at how MOHA is responding to 
the shift in policy and whether or not DRR policy is being framed as a cross-
sector development issue at the central government level. The next section 
identifies existing policy coalitions (as discussed in the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework) by examining the level of subsystem involvement (Candel and 
Biesbroek 2016) throughout the central government.  Next, it examines how two 
of the respondents described the process of project coordination in the GON. 
Finally, the chapter concludes with a brief post-script from fieldwork conducted 
after the earthquake.     
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6.2 The Shift from Disaster Management to Disaster Risk 
Reduction 
 
This section answers the question, what led to the GON’s adoption of 
mainstreaming DRR as a policy strategy? Nepal’s disaster management cultural 
and legal situation is discussed and then the policy change agenda of 
mainstreaming DRR is examined.  
6.2.1 Nepal’s Response Paradigm 
 
Nepal’s disaster management institution shares the same problematic global 
paramilitary response culture that was outlined in Chapter 2. The Natural 
Calamity Relief Act (NCR Act) was ratified in 1982 and continues to guide 
disaster responsibilities. The NCR Act does not require any actions to be taken 
for disaster mitigation nor recovery- it only requires minimal actions related to 
response preparedness. The NCR Act establishes the Ministry of Home Affairs 
(MOHA) as the ministry responsible for disaster management. MOHA is 
responsible for “ensur[ing] security, rule of law and good governance through 
integrated and co-ordinated mobilisation of resources” (GON 2013: 2). The 
ministry has control over the Nepal Police and the Armed Police Force which are 
deployed in times of disaster.  
 
There is a danger of characterising MOHA and the police forces it commands as 
instruments of public protection. Until recently, paramilitary forces in Nepal were 
used for suppression and for the limiting of rights and freedoms (Pandey 2009). 
In the last decade Nepal’s security forces have been reformed to be 
“democratic, transparent and accountable to the people” (ibid: 253). Over the 
course of this fieldwork, the tenuous relationship between the public and the 
police was evident. Concerns were raised over police action during the 2015 
protests against the newly enacted Constitution.  As reported by a 2015 Human 
Rights Watch report:  
“There is, in short, compelling evidence of criminal attacks on defenseless 
police by protesters, and abundant evidence in several cases of serious 
crimes by police against protesters and bystanders, including 
disproportionate use of force and extrajudicial killings. In addition to the 
deaths, hundreds of people have been injured, some of them grievously”  
(Human Rights Watch 2015: Online). 
 
 141 
 
This is problematic, since MOHA’s historical role in disaster management means 
that it is now the de facto ministry responsible for coordinating mainstreaming 
DRR. It was disclosed during an informal discussion that MOHA could ‘shut 
down’ an organisation’s work in DRM if it saw fit to do so. This highlighted the 
extent of power that MOHA has in the government and a wariness of MOHA 
amongst actors in the DRM subsystem.  
 
Returning to the existing legislation, although the NCR Act was written in the 
time of the Panchayat government and makes reference to the monarchy, its 
administrative structures still fit Nepal’s highly centralised governance structure.  
The legislation establishes disaster relief committees at the central, regional, 
district and local administrative levels (Figure 6-1) that are chaired by MOHA. 
These committees are routinely activated in times of disaster and their function 
was well understood by a majority of respondents.  
 
Figure 6-1. Nepal’s Disaster Response Structure 
                                          
 
The legacy of the NCA Act has been twofold: 1) to entrench disaster 
response/relief as the primary role for government and 2) to entrench the 
Ministry of Home Affairs’ role as the primary government body responsible for 
disaster management.  MOHA’s role as the ministry with responsibility for all 
components of disaster management was widely acknowledged by central 
government respondents:  
 
Central Disaster Relief 
Committee (CDRC)
 
Regional 
Committees
 
District Disaster 
Relief Committee 
(DDRC)
 
Local Disaster 
Relief Committee 
(LDRC)
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MOHA is the main ministry dealing in Nepal regarding DRR programs 
(Ministry of Energy). 
MOHA is the lead ministry and the DM and relief section… and National 
Emergency Operations Centre is already established. And some of the 
national adaptation plan of action has already been prepared. Local 
adaptation plan of action, district EOC centre is active under chairmanship 
of CDO. Since all these mechanisms are more related to MOHA because 
they are the leading Ministry related to DRR (Ministry of Agricultural 
Development). 
There are no specific policies or legislations on earthquake risk reduction 
within our ministry. We do not focus so much on that issue as the Ministry 
of Home Affairs is working on that (Ministry of Industry). 
 
There was evidence to suggest that MOHA’s role as the lead agency for disaster 
management was being strengthened. In recent years, the disaster 
management division within MOHA had grown from a “four or five-person 
section but now you can see twenty people around” (MOHA). At the same time, 
the respondent from the Ministry of Health and Population stated that there was 
a decrease in GON funding for DRR initiatives in his ministry because more 
money was being directed to MOHA: 
No, I see the decrease in funding. That is what I was telling you earlier. 
They have the funding, we have to go from our Ministry to the National 
Planning Commission to ultimately the Ministry of Finance. They have 
funding for MOHA more. In the recent years, earlier they have allocated to 
the MOHP also for new activities as emergency fund for hospital 
retrofitting program, and for the capacity building program. In those areas, 
they used to allocate funds. But now we internally manage funds and with 
the help of other partners, donor agencies. But from the government 
mechanism it is very nominal (MOHP). 
 
The evidence suggests that the response paradigm is becoming even further 
entrenched within the GON.  This is a historical and legal precedent set by the 
NCR Act that is continuing to be reinforced through greater GON expenditure on 
human resources and budget allocations being given to MOHA.   
6.2.2 Bringing About DRR Policy Paradigm Change 
 
In light of the strong institutionalised disaster response paradigm discussed 
above efforts were underway in Nepal to shift the paradigm to that of disaster 
risk reduction. These efforts are discussed in the following section. 
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6.2.2.1 The Hyogo Framework for Action and the National Strategy for 
Disaster Risk Management  
 
The primary impetus for mainstreaming DRR in Nepal came through the Hyogo 
Framework for Action, and subsequent donor and INGO driven incentives to 
reform Nepal’s antiquated disaster management institutions to meet HFA 
objectives.  In response to the HFA, the National Strategy for Disaster Risk 
Management in Nepal (herein referred to as the National Strategy) was adopted 
by the GON in 2009 as “the result of the necessity felt for a concrete, meaningful 
and integrated document based on Hyogo Framework of Action…” (GON 2009: 
iv). In the absence of legislation, the National Strategy is the only central level 
document that outlines the GON policy goals and articulates how the GON 
frames (or defines) the DRR policy problem. 
 
The development of the National Strategy was the result of external GON 
stakeholder efforts. For instance, funding for the development of the National 
Strategy was provided by the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid 
Department, UNDP provided project coordination, and technical assistance was 
provided by the National Society for Earthquake Technology (NSET) (NSET 
2011). Having been endorsed by the GON, the National Strategy explicitly sets 
mainstreaming DRR as a policy goal.  
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Table 6-1. Comparison of the HFA and the Nepal National Strategy 
(Source: UNISDR 2005; GON 2009) 
The National Strategy gives importance to institutional development and 
prescribes mainstreaming/integrating DRR as a strategic priority for 
implementation. The frequency upon which the National Strategy document 
uses the terms mainstreaming and integration is indicative of the GONs support 
Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015 National Strategy for Disaster Risk 
Management in Nepal, 2009  
 
Priority 
Action 
One 
 
Ensure that disaster risk reduction is 
a national and a local priority with a 
strong institutional basis for 
implementation.  
 
Key activities: 
 
Support the creation and 
strengthening of national integrated 
disaster risk reduction mechanisms, 
such as multi sectoral national 
platforms, with designated 
responsibilities at the national 
through to the local levels to 
facilitated coordination across 
sectors. National platforms should 
also facilitate coordination across 
sectors, including by mainstreaming 
a broad based dialogue at national 
and regional levels for promoting 
awareness among the relevant 
sectors.  
 
Integrate risk reduction, as 
appropriate, into development 
policies and planning at all levels of 
government, including in poverty 
reduction strategies and sectors and 
multi sector policies and plans. 
 
 
Ensure that disaster risk reduction is 
a national and local priority with a 
strong institutional basis for 
implementation: 
 
 
 
 
Strategic Activity 3: mainstream DRR 
into national development. 
 
 
 
 
Strategic Activity 4: integrate DRR 
and preparedness into development 
plans, programmes and regular 
activities of local development 
institutions for effective response to 
disasters. 
 
Priority 
Action 
Four 
 
Reduce the underlying risk factors 
 
(iii) Land-use planning and other 
technical measures: 
 
(o) Mainstream disaster risk 
considerations into planning 
procedures for major infrastructure 
projects, including the criteria for 
design, approval and implementation 
of such projects and considerations 
based on social, economic and 
environmental impact assessments. 
 
 
Reducing the underlying risk factors: 
 
Strategic activity 19: Integrate DRR 
concept into infrastructure 
development planning, and 
execution processes. 
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for the policy process, i.e. “mainstreaming” (n=20), “integrate DRR” (n=3) and 
“integration of DRR” (n= 4). As seen in Table 6-1, the National Strategy shares 
similar language to the HFA, providing further evidence that mainstreaming DRR 
in the GON was diffused directly through the UNISDR HFA framework. 
 
Although the National Strategy maintains HFA’s focus on mainstreaming and 
integration of DRR, it removed much of the detailed content found in the HFA. At 
no point does the National Strategy provide a definition of mainstreaming nor 
does it provide the GON sector ministries with guidance for integrating DRR into 
sector plans and policy. The closest the National Strategy comes to offering 
substantive processual guidance is outlined in Table 6-2.   
 
Table 6-2. National Strategy Central Level Mainstreaming DRR Directives 
Challenges Strategic Activity Indicative and 
Outcomes 
Responsible 
Agency 
 
Enhancement of 
the spirit of 
integrated 
outlook among all 
agencies, sectors, 
and individuals is 
necessary for 
mainstreaming 
development 
programs into 
DRR related 
issues. It is also 
necessary to give 
thought to link 
disaster related 
issues with poverty 
reduction program 
and MDG. 
 
Mainstreaming 
DRM into National 
Development. 
 
DRM mainstreamed 
in existing National 
Development 
Strategy and 
policies including 
PRSP, MDG and 
Periodic 
Development Plans. 
 
Arrangement made 
for mandatory 
disaster risk 
assessment of large 
infrastructure 
development 
projects. 
 
A contact point at all 
ministries for the 
formulation and 
implementation of 
disaster risk 
mitigation and 
preparedness 
program.  
 
 
All concerned 
ministries, NPC, 
and National 
Disaster 
Management 
Authority 
(proposed). 
(Source: GON 2009) 
 
As seen in Table 6-2, the National Strategy seeks to enhance “the spirit of 
integrated outlook”, but this alone in the Nepal public administrative context is 
not enough to incite action (see Chapter 4). Some of the recommended actions 
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in the Indicative and Outcomes column had been acted upon, such as 
incorporating DRR into various national level development plans and focal 
persons in each ministry. It makes reference to the National Disaster 
Management Authority (NDMA) as an agency responsible for implementation. 
The creation of the NDMA as a high level government agency has been 
proposed in Nepal since 2008. It is a contested feature of the National Strategy 
and is discussed below in section 6.3.1. 
6.2.2.2 Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium (NRRC):  Flagships Four and 
Five  
 
The discussion now turns to discuss the two mechanisms that were working to 
support the GON’s adoption of mainstreaming DRR. To assist the GON to 
achieve its National Strategy/HFA commitments, an innovate strategy was 
devised by the Nepal UN Resident Coordinator at the time. Launched in 2009 by 
UNDP in partnership with the GON, the Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium is a 
unique and integrative mechanism “to prioritize and implement key elements of 
the NSDRM” (IFCR 2011: 8). A Steering Committee, made up of senior 
government officials, donors, UN agencies and others oversee five thematic 
programme areas (called Flagships) each led by a GON ministry and supported 
by a relevant INGO/NGO. They are organized as follows: 
 
Flagship 1: School and Hospital Safety (led by Asian Development 
Bank/Ministry of Education & World Health Organisation/Ministry of Health 
and Population) 
 
Flagship 2: Emergency Preparedness and Response (led by Red 
Cross/Ministry of Home Affairs) 
 
Flagship 3: Flood Risk Management (led by World Bank/Ministry of 
Irrigation) 
 
Flagship 4: Community Based Disaster Risk Management (led by 
International Federation of Red Cross/Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local 
Development) 
 
Flagship 5: Policy/Institutional Strengthening (led by United Nations 
Development Programme/Ministry of Home Affairs) 
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Mainstreaming DRM is considered a ‘key element’ of the National Strategy that 
both Flagship 4 led by the Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Development 
(community/local level) and Flagship 5 led by MOHA (central level policy) are 
working to address. The main role of each Flagship is to facilitate coordination 
and compile lessons learned. An online information sharing platform for both 
flagships had been created, allowing access to some of the meeting minutes, 
presentations, and documents28. The result was greater transparency around 
the processes concerning disaster risk management, which is in stark contrast 
to the way MOHA traditionally operated as a powerful, clandestine, law and 
order institution.  
6.2.2.3 DRR Focal Point System  
 
In 2011, UNDP-Nepal launched a $16.55 million (USD) Comprehensive Disaster 
Risk Management Project (CDRMP) “to strengthen the institutional and 
legislative aspects of disaster risk management (DRM) in Nepal by building the 
capacities of MOHA, MOFALD, other partner ministries, departments and local 
governments…” (UNDP 2015: Online). Unlike the coordination function of the 
NRRC, the CDRMP was a programme aimed at direct government intervention. 
One component of the CDRMP was support for MOHA to jointly establish along 
with the Ministry of Science, Technology, and Environment (MOSTE) a Climate 
Change (CC) and DRM Focal Point29 System. The Focal Point System was 
intended to “develop an institutional mechanism that would harmonize and 
effectively respond to future needs of disaster risks and risks aggregated due to 
climate change impact” (UNDP-Nepal 2015: 5). This was the most visible policy 
instrument for mainstreaming DRR observed.  
 
The majority of central government respondents (n=9) interviewed for this 
research were (or had been) their ministry CC/DRM focal point. A CC/DRM focal 
point is a government staff member who is typically appointed (in most cases 
they were ‘voluntold’ by senior ranking ministry staff) and assigned the DRR 
portfolio for their ministry. Initially twenty-six Focal Points from various Ministries 
were assigned (UNDP-Nepal 2015). One respondent, a young engineer, had the 
focal person job offered to him as a career advancement opportunity:   
                                               
28 Flagship 4 (http://flagship4.nrrc.org.np/) and Flagship 5 (http://flagship5.org.np/) 
29 “…it was proposed that the system will be called as a focal point instead of a focal 
person system, in order to avoid personality driven results” (UNDP-Nepal 2015: 5). 
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I still remember my Joint Secretary. What he said is “ok, I am sending you 
to the training related to disaster”. I said at the time, “no, I’m a civil 
engineer why should I go for this disaster?” He said “you know this 
disaster is very key thing. You should know what the disaster is and it 
would be very helpful for your career” … And now it was very good 
experience (Ministry of Physical Infrastructure and Transportation). 
The primary function for Focal Points is to stimulate DRR integration throughout 
their respective ministry. Focal Points from each ministry were invited to attend 
and share information on disaster related issues through participation at various 
coordination meetings hosted by MOHA. Attendance at the coordination 
meetings was varied: 
 
I think in one year we met four or five times (Ministry of Energy).   
On average once a month. MOHA invites us and we will gather and make 
discussions related to the issues (Ministry of Agricultural Development). 
One time per three months (Ministry of Women, Children and Social 
Welfare). 
Historically, the only time various ministries would be called upon to meet and 
discuss disaster related issues was during a disaster response as part of the 
Central Disaster Relief Committee (as required by the DCR Act).  The Focal 
Point System established a new mechanism to discuss disasters more broadly 
and during non-disaster periods:  
 
…we are also having regular meetings as focal ministries, it is conducting 
regular meetings of the focal persons regarding any issues, any 
documents, any capacity building programs, or any action plans or some 
sort of contingency plans they are developing. They are shared at that 
meeting and we used to do the information exchange with other Ministries 
(Ministry of Health and Population). 
 
In one instance, it was clear that serving as a ministry focal point had made a 
lasting impression. The respondent was no longer the appointed focal person, 
but his experience of serving for 2 years and the training he had gained 
prompted him to share that knowledge more broadly:   
 
After all this disaster awareness and disaster focal person I learned much 
more. I wrote the text books of my civil engineering. As a civil engineer we 
don’t study this disaster management. We only say what is the hazard? 
(Ministry of Physical Instructure and Transportation).   
One avenue of training for the focal points had been provided by the Nepal 
Administrative Staff College (NASC). NASC is an autonomous educational 
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facility aimed at enhancing public sector capability. Two trainers from NASC, 
who were involved in the DRM course development and delivery, were 
interviewed. The respondents described their training role with the focal points: 
 
Government also have provision to make focal person in each ministry like 
that and we deal with them. They come for training, and they go back, 
then a new batch come for training and they go to their places and they 
work. So, it is a very continuous process. Now you see it has been one of 
the major agenda for building the public-sector capacity (NASC).  
 
The NASC respondents had a strong grasp of the concept of mainstreaming 
DRR: 
So, mainstreaming we have defined, it means that even in each and every 
development works we have to consider what might be the disaster risk 
through this development works. Sometimes what happens is that disaster 
affects the development works and sometimes development works bring 
disaster as well (NASC).  
The NASC training seemed to be stressing the need for risk reduction 
approaches to be applied throughout the government. The following story was 
told by the respondent: 
Interesting thing we met one of the guys yesterday who had been trained 
in disaster things. And he had been working in a land revenue office now. 
Generally, what happens is that in Nepal they tell us that when there is a 
disaster it is the primary responsibility of the MOHA for the rescue and 
operations and all these things and Ministry of Urban Construction and 
Physical Planning and Development. But he had been working in the land 
revenue. But what he said was, after being trained in the disaster things, 
you know last time when we are proposing the next year’s planning. He 
said that, “Our building is not good in an earthquake. For the DRR and all 
these things. Let’s try to retrofit. What can we do to reduce the risk of this 
earthquake because our office is very vulnerable?” So, he spoke to the 
director general, and he said, “Is it really needed?”  … So, you see how an 
individual, a sensitized individual, can bring the issues to the upper level 
as well. Even he was proposing something, even though it was very little, 
he was thinking in line with the DRR things (NASC).   
 
The NASC respondent’s depth of knowledge concerning both DRR and about 
the public administration challenges facing Nepal indicated that the NASC may 
be an excellent resource and tool for promoting DRR sector integration and 
building government capacity. Unfortunately, funding for this training had run out 
and they had discontinued the course at the time of the pre-earthquake 
fieldwork.  Another disconcerting factor was that the respondent from MOHA 
was unaware of the mainstreaming DRR expertise that existed at the NASC, 
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providing evidence that there was a disconnect between the work of MOHA, 
UNDP and NASC.  
There is a training… we have a staff college a very good training centre. 
They are teaching very well. But actually, they have not taught about 
mainstreaming. Actually, we can expedite them at the staff college to have 
a mainstreaming training in the future (MOHA). 
 
At the time of fieldwork, the focal point system showed limited signs of being 
functional.  Of the nine respondents who were focal points, two were no longer 
their Ministry DRR focal point. They had been transferred to other 
divisions/departments and had not been replaced. Another limiting factor was 
that most respondents were at the under-secretary rank in the bureaucracy. The 
respondents at this level did not have the capacity to make decisions on behalf 
of the Ministry, they could only make suggestions to senior leadership:  
Without good leadership, we cannot do anything. We are not in a decision-
making level. We can only suggest to someone. We can’t make this 
decision (MOWCSW). 
Taking into the account the highly centralised and top down ethos of the Nepal 
administration system meant that decision making comes from Ministers and 
their appointed Secretaries:  
And what I experienced was that the leader the Secretary who is the apex. 
So, if those persons who have been given this responsibility of job or in 
executive position they will suggest them or they, how to say, if this 
executive person convince these ministries and secretaries in a well way, 
only then it can be done (MOLRM). 
 
Findings from a 2015 UNDP evaluation of the focal points also called into 
question its efficacy. The review stated “…there is a question mark on the very 
existence of the Focal Point System in Nepal. The discussion with concerned 
authorities presented a very mixed and contrasting picture” and that “…efforts 
are still needed to institutionalise this system by the government ministries for its 
durability and sustainability in the long run (UNDP-Nepal 2015: 8). 
6.3 How is MOHA responding to the paradigm shift? 
 
This next section seeks to answer the question of how MOHA is responding to 
the policy change indicated by mainstreaming DRR. It first examines how MOHA 
subverted the creation of an executive level National Disaster Management 
Authority. It then examines a leadership conflict over Flagship 5 that was 
underway during the period of fieldwork.  
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6.3.1 The Disaster Management Legislation and National Strategy 
Revisions 
 
In 2008, new legislation had been drafted to replace the antiquated NCR Act. It 
is in MOHA’s handling of both this draft legislation and the National Strategy 
(that was adopted) where it becomes apparent MOHA was subversively 
resisting policy change. To further contextualise this, several DRM sources 
outside of the government also disclosed their suspicions that MOHA was 
reluctant to give up control of the DRM agenda, pointing to its management of 
the draft DRM Act and National Strategy. Evidence to substantiate is also found 
in academic research (Jones et al. 2014), an IFRC report (2011), and again 
confirmed by this fieldwork.  
 
The main point of contention in both the National Strategy and the draft DRM 
Act is the position and the level of autonomy from MOHA that the central 
National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) would be afforded. The global 
best practice is for the NDMA to be situated high within the politico-
administrative hierarchy in order to coordinate ‘other sectors’ through ‘strong 
leadership’:   
 
“The Office or Ministry leading the National Platform for DRR should be a 
permanent structure that is in a sufficiently high position to coordinate the 
participation of all relevant partners with a national coordination mandate 
in disaster risk reduction, disaster management, national planning or 
environment. The leading Office or Ministry should have capacity for 
strong leadership and capacity to coordinate other sectors and 
leverage political commitment and mobilize resources for and 
knowledge on DRR” (UNISDR 2007: 8; emphasis added). 
 
After an extensive consultative process, the first drafts of the National Strategy 
and the DRM legislation proposed that the NDMA be situated under the Prime 
Minister’s Office in line with global best practice. Later government revisions 
made by MOHA reverted responsibility for the NDMA to MOHA (IFRC 2011; 
Jones et al. 2014). The changes made by MOHA to the draft legislation had 
been “substantive” (IFRC 2011: 2) as compared to the initial 2008 version.  
By all accounts, few outside of MOHA had seen the revised version of the 
legislation. Jones et al. also reported that, “the status and content of the current 
draft Act remains unclear” (Jones et al. 2014: 83). Prominent central government 
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DRR subsystem members—notably the National Planning Commission (NPC)—
was asked if they had read the draft DRM act; they had not. 
But I have not seen the draft. But maybe let’s see if new Act is coming… 
What type of institutional mechanism they are provisioning in the new 
Act…Otherwise it is a very critical issue (NPC). 
 
The rational for keeping the draft legislation ‘in MOHA’ was reputedly because 
further consultation would slow down the process of getting the legislation 
through parliament. Scepticism abounds when the draft legislation was already 
eight years old. When asked about this, the MOHA respondent justified it this 
way:  
Up to now our planning is to establish NDMA within the MOHA. Because 
everybody thinks and our legal document also says that MOHA is a focal 
agency for disaster management. But once it is established and functional 
then our plan is to change this, maybe direct under the Prime Minister’s 
Office (MOHA). 
 
It is clear from the above quote that MOHA was capitalising on its legal and 
cultural precedent within the central government to maintain ownership of 
disaster management. When asked why MOHA had done this, the respondent 
affected a caretaker role: 
But initially if you establish under the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), 
maybe they will just lose their way. Because for them it is a totally new 
organization and they cannot take lead. They will establish under MOHA 
and they will learn for one or two years and get well set up and after that 
time it is better point to change from MOHA to Prime Minister Office 
(MOHA).    
Given the length of time it has taken to get the legislation passed into law, it is 
highly unlikely the legislation would be amended in short order to situate the 
NDMA under the PMO. It should also be noted that there was an awareness 
within other ministries of the need for the NDMA to be located in a high level 
executive position: 
It [NDMA] would not be aligned with any Ministry, it should be aligned with 
the Prime Minister so the political leadership will also be there and the 
reporting of that unit should also go directly to the Prime Minister. When 
the Prime Minister is responsible and he is the supreme person to take 
charge of disaster management. Then all other are compelled to do that. 
So that would be a good idea for the setting up of the new structure in 
government. If it would be aligned with the MOHA or to any other ministry, 
then it will not work. The highest political leadership, if it will be there then 
only it can work effectively (MOHP). 
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6.3.2 The Politics of Letting Go 
 
Within the NRRC Flagship programme, MOHA is the lead government agency of 
both flagship 2 (emergency preparedness/response) and flagship 5 
(policy/institutional strengthening). Flagship 5 is the flagship with the most 
influence, since its focus on institutional and policy development outcomes could 
have the potential to reform Nepal’s disaster management institutional 
arrangements. This section explores the tension that arose when disaster 
management institutional reforms began to be discussed in Flagship 5.    
 
At the time of fieldwork, the National Planning Commission (an apex authority 
responsible for developing periodic plans and for approving annual ministry 
sector plans) was pushing for leadership of Flagship 5. As an apex authority, the 
NPC had strategic and high-level oversight over all of the ministries, a feature 
that MOHA lacked. The NPC was incorporating DRM concerns into its 3 and 5-
year development plans (see section 5.5.2). NPC’s leadership was also backed 
by non-government Flagship 5 members because it was thought that the NPC 
had the mandate, capacity, and power to implement mainstreaming DRR. 
During several informal conversations, it was disclosed that there was conflict 
within Flagship 5 between MOHA and NPC over the leadership of Flagship 5, 
which was delaying progress. 
 
One informant felt that “it was the right people in place at the right time” at the 
NPC to lead on the issue of DRR policy mainstreaming. The respondent for 
NPC was a joint-secretary who had spent numerous years working in the 
environment ministry. He had led various Nepal delegations to international 
climate negotiations and had written several articles on DRM mainstreaming in a 
government trade publication. He recognised the necessary links that DRR and 
climate change shared and hoped that both would become mainstreamed into 
policy:  
We have to consider our development mainstreaming, is what the 
planning commission is looking to do right now. Is that all this country we 
try to incorporate into the mainstreaming of our development process 
where DRR and climate change should be concerned as a key and 
integral part of the policy (NPC). 
He was well versed in the basic principles and rationale behind cross-sector 
DRR integration. He identified the ambiguity that comes with international 
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“jargon”. He noted that mainstreaming is more than policy integration; it involved 
a deeper process of ‘internalisation’: 
In the international level there is a lot of jargon. Mainstreaming is a very 
sweet word, but very difficult to define it. What is mainstreaming? What’s 
the impact? .... Mainstreaming means the internalisation of this concept 
within your planning process (NPC).  
MOHA was questioned about the alleged leadership conflict taking place in 
Flagship 5. The respondent from MOHA stated that the Ministry was “maybe” 
willing to hand over responsibility for Flagship 5 in the next phase of the NRRC 
programmes30. The MOHA respondent summarised the conflict in this way: 
And last NRRC meeting the authorities from NPC meeting claim they will 
lead Flagship 5 because it is a policy issue and we have agreed on that- 
this is their claim. And we just have communication on that, “ok we will 
give you this leadership, but not in this phase but maybe in next phase”. 
Because MOHA is always happy if anyone wants to have some leadership 
on that. Because disaster management is not just job of MOHA but the job 
of everybody (MOHA). 
On the surface, the MOHA respondent endorsed the NPC and recognized its 
suitability for the coordination of mainstreaming DRR within the government: 
At the central level why National Planning Commission is doing because it 
is a government mandatory organization to formulate three or five-year 
priority plan. They always develop priority plan. And once they develop 
priority plan it goes to budget and resources for implementation. So if we 
start the mainstreaming in the planning process, in the priority plan, if you 
put so many disaster things there, like if you talk about agriculture then in 
the agriculture sector you put so many disaster policies inside agriculture 
and forestry so many disaster things there (MOHA). 
 
He acknowledged that MOHA was poorly suited to lead development planning 
initiatives because the Ministry was concerned with front line response rather 
than development issues:  
Because we are talking about disaster management in development 
process. Development planning process. MOHA is traditional organization 
dealing with law and order and peace and security (MOHA).  
 
He also recognised that MOHA did not have the power to oversee, compel, or 
monitor other Ministries’ annual plans as to whether DRR was incorporated. This 
was something the NPC could do:  
                                               
30 At the time of fieldwork NRRCs future was uncertain as its first mandate was drawing 
to a close. Some thought the NRRC had achieved its objectives and others thought the 
NRRC should be realigned to focus on new priorities. As of November 2016, NRRCs 
future had not been determined.  
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Because they are producing the plans, programs and budget and at the 
time of approval it is not coming through the MOHA channel. Because 
different Ministries have separate identity and separate power balance and 
they don’t have to present their program and budget to MOHA. They can 
directly go to NPC, directly to MOF for approval and MOF can allocate 
budget. And no one is asking MOHA for coordination. Because each 
Ministry has equal status and in that case your job is to coordinate but 
without any power. Without mandate, without fund, without power. It lacks 
fund and power to coordination. And because of this reason some 
preparedness and recovery works is lagging behind. 
The respondent was forthright in declaring NPCs suitability, which makes 
reconciling his words with the apparent conflict difficult. Informal discussions 
within the broader DRM subsystem in Nepal, the literature on policy change, and 
prior research on DRR governance in Nepal all suggested that the respondent 
had misrepresented MOHA’s core policy beliefs, which were to maintain the 
status quo.  
6.4 DRR Policy Mainstreaming Framing In The Central 
Government 
 
This section answers the question of how DRR policy is framed within the 
central government. It begins by examining the responses from MOHA and 
other central level members of the DRM subsystem. It then explores how the 
Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Development is framing the DRR policy 
issue within its ministry. 
6.4.1 Central Government DRR Policy Frame Disputes 
 
As discussed above, mainstreaming DRR into national development is a 
strategic priority of the GON’s National Strategy. However, the data reveals a 
discord between how the National Strategy framed DRR as a cross-sector 
developmental policy issue with how MOHA was framing DRR in its contact with 
the Focal Points from other ministries.  
 
In general, the respondents legitimised MOHA’s role in disaster management 
based on what they understood disaster management to entail, specifically 
technical approaches to response/relief. This is to be expected considering the 
content and salience of the out-dated NCR Act as well as the global disaster 
management first-response culture. When asked whether MOHA was the 
appropriate coordination ministry for DRR one focal point respondent replied: 
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Yes, because as far as we are concerned MOHA is responsible for 
disaster. Let’s talk about what MOHA has to respond. MOHA it has Nepal 
police force. Again, it has the armed police force… helicopters, and trained 
manpower. These manpower and technicians in case of loss of 
communication. Our mobiles don’t work in disaster… MOHA has VSATs 
[satellite communication] (MOPIT). 
This quote is illustrative of the way that disaster management policy and practice 
had been framed by MOHA in the post-HFA/National Strategy environment. The 
respondent’s knowledge of disaster management came from his experience as 
a DRM focal point and it was through MOHA led events (post National Strategy 
adoption) that he came to understand disaster policy. MOHA had focused on 
response training, rather than focusing on DRR sectoral integration:  
So, during my stay in the Ministry we are just exercised, like table top 
exercise and field level exercise that was conducted by US Army. It was 
just a simulation exercise (MOPIT).     
This focus on response planning was again confirmed by the Ministry of 
Children, Women and Social Welfare respondent, who described the content of 
the focal point meetings attended: 
We discuss ‘how to’ when come earthquake or flood. And the techniques 
have been taught to us. How to be safe from disasters… How to work 
jointly when come disasters. Jointly how to face and cope with disasters 
(Ministry of Women, Children & Social Welfare) 
This demonstrates that despite MOHA’s declarations of mainstreaming DRR 
requiring development sectors to integrate DRR, in the meetings it held with 
other ministries, it continued to reinforce the dominant disaster response policy 
frame.  
 
However, the belief that disaster management policy only encompassed 
technical response solutions was not held by all respondents. Opinions changed 
when respondents had received training from outside of the government. In 
these cases, respondents were not content to assign MOHA full ownership over 
the disaster management portfolio and understood the role that their ministry 
played in enhancing DRR: 
MOHA is always trying to work on the response part, not the mitigation 
part. They are responsible to use the police and armies for the response. 
What I feel that is that mitigation is much more important. It is also 
response is important, but mitigation part is the very much needed activity 
in Nepal I think. For example, we are trying to retrofit and trying to build 
awareness in the community by giving the training. It is the mitigation that 
is very needed activities. So that after that, the mitigation part is much 
slower. Not given much priority (Department of Education). 
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Another example was found in the Ministry of Health and Population respondent, 
who understood that the Health ministry also played a role in mainstreaming 
DRR: 
It is very hard for people to make understand that it is MOHA is leading 
this whole process and it is responsible for the main agency of 
government but there are roles there for all Ministries. That is what 
mainstreaming means. MOHA is also working for disaster but not 
encroaching the response of MOHA, because we have different 
responsibility within our sector (MOHP). 
Both the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health are the GON leads for 
Flagship 1- school and hospital safety. The respondents themselves were active 
participants in the broader subsystem that pertained to disaster risk reduction 
and had gained training from reputable organisations.  
6.4.2 Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Development 
 
Despite attempts to subvert central level framing of DRR policy as a cross-
sector developmental issue, the Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local 
Development (MOFALD) is an example of a ministry that had framed DRR as a 
cross-sector policy problem within its ministry processes. MOFALD is the 
government lead for Flagship 4 and was actively working to mainstream DRR 
considerations throughout its ministry which had direct influence at the local 
level (district/local considerations are discussed in Chapter 7). Unlike MOHA, 
MOFALD seemed to be ‘getting on’ with DRR integration in a constructive and 
practical way. As the ministry responsible for local development it was ideally 
suited for the task. A division dedicated to DM/DRR existed within the ministry 
with three full time staff members. Many MOFALD ministry staff had prior 
experience working at the district and local levels. It was felt this helped them 
understand the cross-cutting nature of DRR and the importance of incorporating 
DRR into ministry development planning.  
Yes, disaster risk reduction is the main cross-cutting issue among 
development partners. All of our ministry colleagues are talking about 
these issues. Many times. And we are planning jointly these programs. 
And so many meetings, under DRR where conducted here. Our 
establishment of the fire department is to sensitize all our colleagues and 
all of our partner friends. So, we have no problem of DRR sensitization 
and they all are aware about this issue. So many friends of Ministry are 
the ex-LDOs and ex-EOs or VDC Secretaries, they already know the 
realities of this issue (MOFALD).   
MOFALD had also created policy instruments to assist with DRR integration. In 
2012, MOFALD had prepared the ubiquitous Local Disaster Risk Management 
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Plan, a planning document that is found widely throughout Nepal at the local 
level (see Chapter 7). The ministry had also incorporated DRR tasks into new 
performance contracts that their staff at the district (Local Development Officer), 
municipal (Executive Officer), and VDCs (Village Development Secretary) had to 
commit to. For example, given a two-year time frame the Executive Officer of a 
municipality had to work to establish land pooling and open space management, 
building code implementation, and fire brigade (at least one truck with staff) 
management. They also had created Minimum Conditions and Performance 
Measures (MCPM). These were a set of guidelines that local bodies needed to 
meet. Their performance in certain areas, including a few regarding DRR, was 
tied to the level of funding they would receive.  
 
During the pre-earthquake interview, the respondent was busy formulating a 
national fire policy in order to enhance fire response capacity throughout Nepal. 
It was essential that the policy quickly became institutionalised before a change 
of government occurred and for funding purposes.  
Our Joint Secretary, Secretary, and Deputy Prime Ministry preference is in 
this field. So we quickly studied to establish this department and the [fire] 
report is already prepared. And soon we are planning and organizing a 
small workshop in our ministry and briefing them about progress about 
studies. And after that we are planning to coordinate our line agencies like 
Ministry of Finance and Ministry of General Administration to arrange all 
the things (MOFALD).   
While the efficacy of MOFALD’s efforts to integrate DRR throughout its Ministry 
processes are not evaluated here, this discussion is an example of a ministry 
that has internally framed DRR policy as a cross-sector responsibility. In this 
instance, mainstreaming DRR was spurred on by high level political support and 
with the assistance of a bureaucratic staff that could see the utility of such 
measures. MOFALD was establishing a new policy area within the ministry, 
which at this point in time was not viewed to be in conflict with existing policies.  
 
The above discussion reviewed how the respondents framed the policy problem 
of mainstreaming DRR. There is evidence that MOHA is actively reinforcing the 
traditional disaster management/response policy frame. However, as awareness 
was growing of DRR there are signs that there is a growing movement within the 
GON to challenge the status quo and generate some of the conditions required 
for Hall’s (1993) third order policy change discussed in Chapter 3. This is 
significant because it suggests that that within the GON there is a weak—yet 
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emerging—advocacy coalition (Chapter 3) around DRR developing within the 
central government. The next section will examine this contention in more detail. 
6.5 The Policy Subsystem and Advocacy Coalition 
Building 
 
Despite MOHA’s efforts to prevent policy change, there is evidence to suggest a 
growing awareness and activity level related to DRR in some of the ministries. 
This suggests that an emerging coalition may be forming within the GON. This 
section examines what is driving the advocacy coalitions development and 
outlines the reported activities the various ministries are engaging in.  
6.5.1 Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium 
 
The NRRC was having an appreciable effect on coalition building within the 
GON. It is clear that participating in the NRRC was strengthening awareness 
and ownership of DRR policy. This is evidenced throughout earlier sections of 
this chapter by the responses from the lead Ministries of the flagship 
programmes (e.g. Health, Education, MOFALD), which all frame DRR as a 
cross-sector policy problem in which their ministry was a stakeholder. Without 
NRRC’s facilitation, it is highly unlikely that a mechanism for mainstreaming 
DRR (flagships 4 and 5) would exist at all. But most importantly, it was raising 
several Ministry profiles and encouraging ownership of DRM issues that 
previously had been the purview of only MOHA.  
6.5.2 National Planning Commission 
 
The NPC is included as a driver of DRR coalition building because it had begun 
to promote DRR integration within ministries through its inclusion of DRR 
considerations into its periodic plans. The NPC establishes the long-term 
development priorities for Nepal in period plans that range from three, five, and 
seven year plans. Since the GON began formulating periodic plans in 1956, 
there have been nine five-year plans and four three-year plans. To date, there 
has never been a seven-year plan drafted as this would require a sustained 
period of political stability that is unrealistic in a Nepal context. At the time of the 
first fieldwork visit, the GON was operating within the 13th periodic plan (covering 
a three-year period 2012-2015). In this 13th periodic plan, a commitment had 
been made to resourcing DRR.  
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“While the 10th three-year plan prioritized DRR at the policy level, 
implementation and budget allocation did not begin until the 13th three-
year plan. This highlights the lag between policy and planning and 
resource allocation for implementation” (GON 2015: 9).   
The periodic plans set out targets and development goals for the government, 
which in reality are rarely achieved, but indicate a capacity within the 
government for strategic planning.  
 
Respondents indicated an awareness of the inclusion of DRR into the national 
development plans: 
The National Planning Commission has included disaster risk 
management this time in its 13th 3-year plan. This issue was not in the 
priorities of the National Planning Commission before and hence was not 
included in any of the plans. It has defined the roles and responsibilities of 
the different ministries in that sector. We will implement the things that we 
have committed to do for this sector (Ministry of Industry). 
This is significant, because within the GON the NPC is well positioned to compel 
ministry adoption of mainstreaming DRR. The NPC is responsible “for 
formulating a national vision, periodic plans and policies for development” (NPC 
2016: Online). The NPC is influential for two reasons: 1) it is chaired by the 
Prime Minister with the Finance Secretary as an ex-officio member; 2) it 
provides economic guidelines and priorities for all line ministries; “almost all 
economic development and economic policies and programmes come into force 
either at the initiative of the Commission or on its advice or recommendations” 
(NPC 2016: Online).   
6.5.3 Donor Funding and DRR Coalition Building 
 
Perhaps the most influential driver of DRR coalition building within Ministries 
was the new donor money attached to the issue of DRR. In a sort of symbiotic 
relationship, respondents indicated that donor funds were contingent on the 
ministry showing leadership on DRR. For example, funding for the MOFALD 
DRR initiatives specified above went into the Local Governance Community 
Development Programme (LGCDP) fund ‘basket’. MOFALD also discussed the 
importance of institutionalising programmes in order to gain funding.  
These activities [discussing the Performance Contract requirements for 
LDOs and EOs] are performed under LGCDP provides funds to act on 
these activities. All the donors are in MOFALD, under this Ministry. All the 
donors give first the budget in a single basket and we plan our local level 
plan and we transfer the money to them and separate sector we also 
manage the budget from government side also (MOFALD).   
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If we are not establishing an institution, nobody can support us. Firstly, if 
we establish our department then after that many organizations wanted to 
help us. And they wanted to work with this [fire] sector. So we are planning 
quickly to establish fire department. After that our donor partners, our 
communities, they are asking us how we provide you support for capacity 
development mainly. They are asking us rapidly (MOFALD). 
This was also seen in the Department of Education which was the coordinator 
for Flagship 1 on school safety: 
…the main development partners, like Asian Development Bank, 
Government of Australia, DFID, in our ministry World Bank, JICA which 
contribute to the pool fund. They have been contributing directly or 
indirectly to make our schools safe. If the leadership of the Ministry of 
Education is not there, then all the donor development partners cannot get 
together to put their money in the same basket fund, and to utilize that 
fund, to construct our school building or other structures and all retrofitting 
works (Ministry of Education). 
Although not part of the NRRC, the respondent from the Ministry of Agricultural 
Development also highlighted the importance of donor involvement.  
In our Nepalese case we are lucky enough that a number of donor 
agencies and number of development partners and foreign countries are 
assisting us in focusing on DRR programs. That is why we are very much 
helped by the various program given by our donors. So only important 
thing is to coordinate the fund and to make well planned and to make 
effective programs and implement them is our challenge (Ministry of 
Agricultural Development). 
In the case of the Ministry of Irrigation- Department of Water Induced Disaster 
Management, donor funding from JICA was no longer available as it was 
deemed the GON had gained enough capacity to manage on its own. However, 
the ministry was struggling to cope with the added pressure created by a 
changing climate. 
Previously in the field of disaster, completely it was JICA support of the 
department. And this time they thought now we don’t need to help the 
government because we are established about disaster. But this time we 
are facing the climate change induced disasters. That is why again we are 
going to contact JICA for these things. They are also interested in help 
and support for these things. Right now. And we contact to World Bank 
also interested to fund… (DWIDM). 
From the data derived there is evidence that donor funding was incentivising 
DRR coalition building within sector ministries. Without ‘baskets’ and 
programmes related to DRR the funding would not be available.  
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6.5.4 DRR Subsystem Involvement 
 
The thirteen central level ministries/departments interviewed have been 
subjectively sorted by their level of engagement31 based on the awareness level 
of the respondent, the DRR activities they reported, and the level of staff-time 
dedicated to address DRR issues. Table 6-3 is an overview based on the 
interview responses, it is not a comprehensive evaluation of government 
activities.   
Table 6-3. DRR Activities Across the Central Government 
DRR Activity 
Level 
Government Body Activities/Justifications  
Medium 
Engagement 
Ministry of Federal 
Affairs and Local 
Development 
- Most active ministry in internalising DRR 
throughout ministry operations. 
- Flagship 4 government lead 
- Inclusion of DRR indicators in LDO and EO 
performance contracts 
- Full time staff dedicated to DM and DRR 
issues 
- Working on improving overall governance at 
district and local levels (through Urban and 
District Governance Experts) 
- Good working relationship with MOSTE to 
implement Environment-friendly Local 
Governance Framework  
- National fire policy in development 
-  Developed the Local Disaster Risk 
Management Plan- widely distributed at the 
local level. 
 Ministry of 
Agricultural 
Development 
- Recently created a division within the MOAD 
planning section dedicated to DRR initiatives. 
- Active in DRR subsystem meetings. 
- DRR activities are stimulated by food security 
concerns & annual economic losses due to 
disasters. 
 National Planning 
Commission 
- Included DRR into Periodic Plans to help 
stimulate sector line adoption 
- Active participant in Flagship 5, Chair of DRM 
Mainstreaming Technical Working Group. 
 Ministry of Science, 
Technology, and 
Environment  
- Working on Climate Change Adaptation 
- Good working relationship with MoFALD to 
implement the Environment-friendly Local 
Governance Framework at the local level. 
- Budget code for CCA established. 
 Ministry of Irrigation- 
(Department of Water 
Induced Disaster 
Prevention) 
- Full time work on flood and landslide risk 
reduction 
- Flagship 3 lead 
 
Medium-Low 
Engagement 
Ministry of Home 
Affairs 
- Held coordination meeting for Focal Points and 
active in activities related to DM 
                                               
31 High level engagement was purposively left off as none of the ministries were 
investing adequate resources for DRR. 
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DRR Activity 
Level 
Government Body Activities/Justifications  
- Did not see DRR as necessary for MOHA to 
integrate within Ministry  
 Ministry of Education- 
(Department of 
Education) 
- Technical division concerned with safer school 
construction. Lead on Flagship 1.  
- DRR integration efforts throughout Ministry 
lacking. 
- Efforts underway to incorporate DRR 
considerations in new Education Act.  
 Ministry of Health and 
Population 
- Flagship 1 lead 
- developed standards on resilient hospital 
construction 
- training provided by Ministry to staff on DRM 
- Very small number of staff responsible for 
DRR coordination in Ministry. 
 
Low 
Engagement 
Ministry of Land 
Reform and 
Management 
- Piloting a project on land reform. Concerned 
about population displacements and 
environmental degradation.  
- project includes land use and hazards 
mapping 
 Ministry of Physical 
Infrastructure and 
Transportation 
- Prepositioning of heavy equipment to clear 
roads during rainy season when landslides are 
expected 
- No specific budgeting for DRR in road 
construction. 
 Ministry of Industry - Very little DRR awareness. Only recently 
engaged as focal point. 
- Conducted environmental impact assessments 
for new industry 
- developing fire protocols for industrial sites   
- No other integration of DRR into ministry 
operations 
- Indicated a willingness to integrate DRR policy 
into sector planning, based on NPC 
requirements 
No 
Engagement 
Ministry of Energy - Very little awareness of DRR. 
- No integration of DRR into ministry operations 
 Ministry of Women, 
Children and Social 
Welfare 
- Involved in response efforts as Protection 
Cluster lead.  
- Little awareness of DRR 
- No integration of DRR into ministry operations.  
(Source: the author) 
As seen in the above table, there is a growing level of involvement from 
ministries- beyond that of MOHA-  in DRR. Although the efficacy of this 
involvement is not assessed, it does indicate that awareness is building in 
ministries outside of MOHA. The main driver of this is unquestionably the new 
donor money available for DRR initiatives which was spurring ministries like 
MOFALD to create institutional mechanisms. Another driver is the NRRC, which 
was facilitating ministry ownership of DRR issues. The data captured through 
the interviews also points to the influence of the NRRC in stimulating this 
involvement. 
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6.6 The Complexity of Change in Nepal 
 
This section presents data that helps to answer the overarching question of 
whether mainstreaming DRR is rhetoric or a substantive change agenda. The 
following data was gleaned inadvertently from two of the respondents who were 
leading development programmes and projects that were peripherally related to 
DRR. It was striking how they described the efforts they were putting into 
making their projects succeed and the challenge of working within the Nepali 
bureaucracy. This greatly contrasted with the level of effort MOHA was putting 
into the mainstreaming DRR agenda. Although their discussion is about 
programme/projects and not specifically about policy change, the 
programme/projects under implementation would produce significant change in 
land-usage and urban development behaviours. In addition, their 
programme/projects required cross-sector engagement and so their insights are 
highly relevant for the overall discussion.   
 
In the programme/project planning stage, valuable insights were provided into 
the level of effort required. One of the respondents expressed a view that 
coordination efforts needed to happen at a much earlier planning stage than was 
typical in the government:  
Planning before implementation…. In most of the problems is the issue of 
coordination. Because this coordination is taking place only at the 
implementation level. Not at the planning level (Anonymous). 
 
It was also apparent that a great deal of effort was put into gaining senior 
bureaucrat and political party support at the early stages of the 
programme/project. One respondent spoke about his efforts to gain cross-
ministerial support for his project: 
Because in bringing and realizing the *** project I did a lot of tasks. Much 
effort. I went to Minister of Forest, Minister of Agriculture. I convinced the 
authorities of agricultural ministry and it was very difficult to build a project 
in an integrated way for different Ministries with different jobs. But still we 
were able to do that. In the last meeting, the most important aspect that 
they praised was that co-ordination is very fine (Anonymous). 
 
And the other respondent spoke to the need to gain political party support for his 
programme/project: 
So immediately after that these elections were declared—the 
parliamentary elections. So, then I prepared a 5 point issues to be 
addressed in the manifesto of the major political parties and I shared this 
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with 8 political parties. And you will be surprised to know that two major 
political parties have combined 2 different issues that I had requested 
them to be included and included them in their political manifesto... And 
before that, immediately after the election when these 15 members of 
parliament were elected I was the first one to have interaction with them. 
..So we had a one day discussion with them and then I prepared all these 
documents based on the interactions and feedbacks. And then we tried to 
include and mobilize all these 15 members of parliament elected... So I 
was successful in having some of the issues in the national plans and 
policies read out by the President. And then similarly I met the Minister of 
Finance before he prepared his budget and then I went through the 
support of the Members of Parliament to include certain critical items to be 
funded by the government… (Anonymous). 
 
Both respondents came across as politically astute and clearly conveyed that 
without high level buy-in of their proposed programme/projects, success would 
be unlikely. Political party support is a pivotal component for development 
projects in Nepal and is further discussed in later chapters. One of the 
respondents recognized that his non-partisan approach was a strength: 
I am not political savvy. But because I don’t carry any party flag, I have the 
strength to talk to go and talk to any politician (Anonymous). 
Another topic area that both respondents commented on was the difficulty of 
working in a cross-sector and coordinated manner in Nepal. As one of the 
respondents explained: 
…so I said “we are also doing a land use plan and why not for this project 
develop a flood map of the project area?” So the answer is- one ministry 
says it’s my job, the other ministry says it’s my job, we say it’s our job, but 
it’s the job for the people. So somewhere the feeling is that one ministry 
might have projected itself into the scope of the other ministry. That could 
be one psychological problem…. And in this project work and coordination 
task one other important problem I have felt is overlapping of job. For 
example, agricultural and forestry have some overlapping in their 
activities. So sometimes there is a tug of war over who will complete this 
job, which is the problem (Anonymous). 
 
Likely, coordinated planning at an earlier project stage would have prevented 
ministry bickering about job responsibilities. The second respondent provided a 
possible explanation for why inter-ministerial coordination was a challenge:  
So I think within the government system this is a problem. The inter-
agency competition. Who will influence the project and who will get the 
credit? …There is this competition and the competition is how you get 
more budget and how you become visible. How you get the benefit out of 
that budget. (Anonymous) 
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Presumably the respondent is referring to donor funding, since GON project 
funding is extremely limited. This comment is reminiscent of the earlier 
discussion (section 6.5.3) about donor funding driving leadership and DRR 
advocacy coalition building. However, here funding is seen as a negative 
influence that sparks competition between the ministries. This competitive 
environment may also be a cultural and historical remnant of the panji land 
granting system (see Chapter 4) that fostered a competitive environment in the 
bureaucracy. 
 
While the efficacy of their programme/project efforts are unknown, their 
discussion is an acknowledgment that Nepali bureaucrats understand 
implementing projects requires a sustained and politically targeted approach. 
Their discussion of the complexity of steering such tasks, when contrasted 
against the mechanisms that were in place to steer mainstreaming DRR in 
Nepal, are suggestive that the MOHA led mainstreaming DRR efforts are 
superficial at best. Despite the rhetoric in the National Strategy and from MOHA, 
it clearly lacked the basic hallmarks that project implementation required. Most 
tellingly, there were no indications of inciting broad based political support for 
the agenda, which is discussed in Chapter 8, is a necessary component of 
Nepal bureaucratic politics.  
6.7 Earthquake Post-Script 
 
Upon returning to Nepal a year after the earthquake, not much was found in the 
way of mainstreaming DRR progress.  Earthquake recovery was the primary 
focus for government respondents, and the earthquake seemed to have no 
discernible effects as a focusing event for changing the dominant policy 
paradigm.  
 
One notable change had occurred within the NRRC Flagship 5. MOHA partially 
fulfilled its commitment to the NPC and handed responsibility for DRM 
mainstreaming over in 2015; the first DRM mainstreaming Technical Support 
Group (TSG) meeting was held on October 15th, 2015 and was chaired by NPC. 
A subsequent meeting was held on October 31st, 2015. However, the 
momentum of October 2015 quickly ended and at the time of writing (October 
2016) no further meetings had been held. The reason given for this was that the 
NPC Joint-Secretary was tied up with the drafting of the 14th 3-year periodic 
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plan. Also, government priorities had shifted and all efforts were on earthquake 
recovery (despite progress on rebuilding or financial recompense being abysmal 
and the initial TGS meetings were held post-earthquake). As discussed above 
initially the NPC was pushing for leadership of Flagship 5 as its work related to 
policy development and mainstreaming. MOHA maintained control over Flagship 
5 and the NPC was chair of a technical working group within the flagship. But 
the tension had been resolved.    
 
The NPC respondent originally interviewed during the pre-earthquake fieldtrip 
had retired and his replacement was leading the TSG. It was disclosed that the 
source of tension during the pre-earthquake fieldwork had been precipitated by 
the former NPC respondent who strongly pushed MOHA to hand over 
responsibility for DRM mainstreaming and policy development. This seems 
plausible; the original NPC respondent had provided the researcher with several 
articles he had written for a Nepal magazine on the topic of DRM 
mainstreaming. In one of the articles he frankly opined that DRR inclusion in the 
11th periodic plan resulted in “no significant progress...”  His prior work within the 
government on climate change adaptation had primed him and was well versed 
in the international policy prescriptions concerning DRR and CCA. He was what 
the policy literature terms a policy entrepreneur; that is a person “who seek[s] to 
initiate dynamic policy change” (Mintrom 1997: 739). His replacement exhibited 
none of the drive to push the agenda; he had been promoted from a non-
disaster or climate change related role from the tourism ministry. The tension 
between the NPC and MOHA had subsided but it appeared that the DRR 
mainstreaming agenda was suffering in its dissipation. In the post-earthquake 
context, no discernible pressure was being exerted on MOHA in regard to 
mainstreaming DRR.  
6.8 Chapter Summary 
 
The overarching question driving this chapter was whether or not mainstreaming 
DRR was being used by the Government of Nepal as rhetoric or as a substantial 
policy prescription for change. What was found was that the concept of 
mainstreaming DRR was being used by MOHA to give the illusion of change in 
policy but that there was a clear disconnect between what MOHA was saying 
publically about mainstreaming DRR and its actions. For instance, the 
respondent from MOHA was quite clear during the interview that in the context 
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of mainstreaming DRR, MOHA wanted other ministries to incorporate disaster 
policy into their development processes, to such an extent that it would make a 
central led disaster management policy redundant. In other words, for the sake 
of reducing the risk of disaster, MOHA was working itself out of a job. DRR was 
also framed in the National Strategy as a cross-sector development policy. 
However, underneath the rhetorical force of MOHA’s policy stance, the reality 
was that MOHA was subverting any and all efforts of meaningful change. This 
was evidenced by MOHA rewriting the draft legislation in order to prevent the 
proposed National Disaster Management Authority from being strategically 
located in the Prime Minister’s Office. This was also evidenced in the way 
MOHA was framing DRR as the focal point lead to other ministries and in its 
reluctance to hand over Flagship 5 to the NPC.  
 
This conclusion has several consequences for this research. Firstly, it ties in 
with the literature review discussion of the nature of neoliberal buzzwords (see 
Chapter 2). It is now possible to see how global policy prescriptions like 
mainstreaming and DRR become a part of the Government of Nepal’s 
development lexicon- in this case it was through the HFA and donors. As 
discussed, mainstreaming is highly problematic as a global policy prescription 
because of its empty and vague buzzword status. When a global ‘buzzword’ is 
appropriated by the GON it is easily used to manipulate and distort the policy 
environment. This supports what Loughlin (2002) argued in Chapter 2 that 
modern public administration “privileges rhetoric over reality” (Loughlin 2002: 
231), which is a detriment to thorough and sound policy decision making. This is 
also further justification of why global policy prescriptions used for disaster risk 
reduction policy need to be critically examined.  
 
The second consequence is that MOHA has done very little to promote 
mainstreaming DRR throughout the government. However, there was a growing 
awareness throughout the ministries that DRR is a cross-sector responsibility. 
This seems to suggest that an advocacy coalition (as discussed in the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework in Chapter 3) is forming within the central government. 
Also from the information gleaned from the central level respondents, it is 
becoming apparent that an increased awareness of DRR was having an 
appreciable effect on respondent’s outlook on disaster policy. With greater 
awareness of DRR, respondents were not content to let MOHA control the 
disaster policy agenda (e.g. as found in the responses from the NPC, MOHP, 
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MOFALD, and MOE). Based only on the central level findings, it is too early in 
this research to map out the Advocacy Coalition Framework or to fully 
appreciate the role of social learning may be playing in shifting the policy 
dynamic. For that, a better understanding is needed of what is happening at the 
lower levels of the government administration. That is the focus of the next 
chapter, which will examine what effect, if any, the policy prescription of 
mainstreaming DRR was having at the district and local levels.    
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7 The Reality of Mainstreaming DRR at 
the District and Local Level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The story of mainstreaming DRR in Nepal continues in this chapter with a look 
at the district and local levels. While the central government in Kathmandu 
Valley continued to spin its rhetoric around mainstreaming DRR across its 
central level ministries, flush with donor money and hidden behind the walls of 
Singha Durbar, vertical (i.e. district and local level) realization of DRR was 
tenuous at best. The reality is that it is at the district and local levels where DRR 
is needed most. As one respondent reported: 
Our VDC [Village Development Committee] is one of those at very high 
disaster risk… There is a gap in the embankments in the upper part of 
Manau [name of VDC]. The river has changed its course with time and has 
started flowing from the gaps in the embankments (Bardiya, VDC 
Secretary). 
 
As discussed, the district and local political administrative levels are highly 
problematic in Nepal because of the absence of elected political representatives. 
However, this is only one factor impeding DRR implementation. Historically, 
local level governance has never been strong in Nepal. In spite of the 
decentralisation granted by the Local Self Governance Act (1999), the attendant 
funding and resourcing of local government entities has never been in place. As 
explained by the Asia Foundation: 
“…the LSGA unleashed unprecedented expectations and quickly faced 
difficulties in implementation, particularly due to the capacity crunch at the 
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local level, disjointed planning, and the onset of conflict. As a result, the 
LSGA became a repository of unfunded mandates rather than an enabling 
instrument for local bodies to take control of their affairs” (The Asia 
Foundation 2012: i).  
Since no substantive policy was implemented at the central government level to 
address the issue of mainstreaming DRR, it is not surprising that little was found 
at either the district or local levels. As a result, this chapter is not just about 
mainstreaming DRR as it is traditionally conceived of as a top down process 
(e.g. as outlined by Lafferty and Hovden (2003) in Chapter 2). Instead, this 
chapter is concerned with formulating an analysis of what barriers and 
opportunities exist for DRR policy integration and thus in limiting any resultant 
paradigm policy change. An intriguing case study was uncovered in Lalitpur 
Sub-Metropolitan City (LSMC). Here were indications that the municipality was 
open to DRR integration. LSMC is an important case study because both 
Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1993) and Candel and Biesbroek (2016) argue that 
local actors are frequently the source of innovation and thus are an important 
component of advocacy coalitions and policy integration.  
 
The overarching question guiding this chapter is to identify what was enabling or 
preventing DRR policy integration from occurring in district and local 
governments in the fieldwork sites.  In order to uncover this, a series of sub-
questions are addressed.  
1. To what extent is mainstreaming DRR filtering down from the central to 
the district level/local level? 
2. What did district and local level government staff report as the main 
challenges and barriers to implementing DRR work? 
3. What is different about Lalitpur Sub-Metropolitan City (LSMC) and why 
was it more conductive for DRR policy integration? 
The data for this chapter was derived from interviews held in three districts 
(Lalitpur, Bardiya, and Solukhumbu). Where possible, interviews were held 
across divisions in the District Development Offices, the municipality, and Village 
Development Offices in each district. This is not a comparison of the districts 
rather examples are drawn from across the field sites to give a composite 
overview of the diversity of district and local level realities in Nepal. 
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7.2 Review of District and Local Level responsibilities 
 
Figure 7-1 is a review of the district, municipal and VDC responsibilities as per 
the Local Self-Governance Act.  
(Source: The Asia Foundation 2012: 59). 
7.3 Central Level DRR Policy Found at the District and 
Local Levels 
 
Amongst the rhetoric of mainstreaming DRR across ministries at the central 
level, the intention is for ministries to integrate DRR vertically down into their 
district development work. Lafferty and Hovden suggest that vertical integration 
of environmental policy integration entails sectors forming an environmentally 
“prudent decision-making premise in their work” (Lafferty and Hovden 2003: 12). 
In no instance did the district or local bodies meet Lafferty and Hovden’s criteria. 
The extent to which any central level DRR policy was filtering down into the 
district/local levels is the focus of this section. It first examines what was found in 
the specific district line agencies (e.g. Education, Health, Agriculture and 
Women, Children and Social Welfare), and then examines MOFALD and its 
district and local level efforts to integrate DRR through the District Development 
Office.  
 
 
 
The Village Development Committee is responsible for 48 functions under 11 headings: 
agriculture, rural drinking water, construction and transport, education and sports, irrigation, 
soil erosion and river control, physical development, health, forest and environment, 
language and culture, tourism and cottage industry, and some others under the heading 
‘miscellaneous’. 
 
Municipalities have 68 different functions. These include finance, physical development, 
water resources, environment, and sanitation, education, sports and culture, works and 
transport, health, social welfare, industry and tourism and under the heading 
‘miscellaneous’. In addition, it has 13 ‘optional’ functions. 
 
Likewise, the LSGA specifies 48 functions of the District Development Committee: 
agriculture, rural drinking water and settlement development, power, works and transport, 
land reforms and land management, women and disadvantaged people, forest and 
environment, education and sports, wage labour, irrigation, soil erosion control and river 
training, information and communication, language and culture, cottage industry, health and 
tourism. 
Figure 7-1. Functions of Local Administrative Bodies in Nepal 
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The only example of DRR policy from either of the Flagship 1 leads (Ministry of 
Education and Ministry of Health and Population) was found within the District 
Education Offices. The blueprints for new school designs were developed by the 
central level in the Department of Education. The earthquake resilient designs 
were then provided to the district offices. 
The ministry has defined the same structural design for the schools 
throughout the country. The ministry has published a booklet explaining 
the estimation of bar, the arrangement of reinforcement, the mapping and 
drawing and the construction design. Our work is to apply that on the field 
(Solukhumbu, District Education Office). 
 
This was the extent of DRR policy transmission found within the districts (i.e. 
there was no specialized training for teachers nor was disaster preparedness 
apart of the curriculum for students, in either Solukhumbu or Bardiya). From the 
District Health Offices, it was unknown by both respondents whether building 
blueprints with seismic reinforcing had been filtered down to the district level for 
health post construction. Nonetheless, none of the central planning initiatives 
discussed by the Ministry respondent (Chapter 6) had filtered down to either of 
the two districts. The district received policy related to health emergencies (i.e. 
epidemics, pandemics), but nothing related to disaster management plans or 
policy. 
 
Returning to the issue of the school building designs, it was noted by both 
respondents that the design specifications created difficulty for district level 
implementation. The Bardiya District Education Officer commented on the 
designs being earthquake but not flood resilient. The 2014 Karnali floods had 
damaged 92 schools in the district. Although the structures were only minimally 
damaged, the flood waters destroyed most of the teaching materials and 
classroom resources.  
There are some gaps in our policies. For an instance, if the schools in this 
region were constructed keeping floods in mind, there would not have 
been so much destruction. In the places like Bardiya which are at high risk 
of floods, the buildings have to be constructed in a different way. That has 
to be included in the national policy. The buildings that are constructed 
here are like those constructed in the hills and the cities, that never 
experience floods (Bardiya District Education Office). 
 
In the mountainous district, the respondent from the District Education Office 
was facing another set of challenges related to constructing the central 
blueprints: 
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It is very difficult to work here first due to the uneven geographical 
condition. Secondly, we cannot dig deep into the earth due to the lack of 
machineries and equipment. Thirdly, there are unskilled manpower who 
don't have enough practice. We have to go from time to time to the 
construction sites and watch if they are doing the work the right way. All 
these are creating difficulties in our work (Solukhumbu District Education 
Office). 
 
It should be noted that the Solukhumbu District Education Office respondent 
was a sub-engineer who himself had never received training on how to construct 
seismic reinforced buildings.  
 
In the remaining district line agencies (e.g. Women, Children and Social Welfare 
and Agricultural Development) there were again few indications that central 
DRR policy was filtering down to the district levels. Both the respondents from 
the MWCSW acknowledged their role in the response focused district disaster 
relief committee as the cluster leads for protection. And the Agricultural District 
Offices were focused on food security issues, which is associated with DRR. As 
found in Chapter 6, the Ministry of Agricultural Development had a newly 
established DRR division within the ministry planning section. Perhaps with time, 
more specific DRR policy will make its way to the district levels.  
The best examples of DRR policy filtering from central to district/local levels 
were found in the work that MOFALD (Flagship 4 lead) had done. For example, 
a MOFALD DRR initiative that was being implemented at the local level was that 
of local capacity building for municipal fire brigades.  
The ministry has allocated some budget for fire station and vehicle and fire 
fighter for all these things (Solukhumbu, Local Development Officer). 
 
The Executive Officers of Lalitpur Sub-Metropolitan City (LSMC) and Guleryia 
(Bardiya) acknowledged this work but as they already had a small fire brigade 
they did not qualify for more funding. 
 
Another ubiquitous example of MOFALD’s DRR work was the Local Disaster 
Risk Management Plan (LDRMP), published in 2011. Its bright pink cover was 
seen in many local government offices. Written in both Nepali and English, in 84 
pages the LDRMP outlines a comprehensive approach to formulating a DRM 
plan. LSMC was using it to formulate their ward and municipal plans. When 
asked if it was fit for purpose, the LSMC Disaster Management Section Head 
replied: 
 175 
 
We are trying to make it successful. But my observation it that it is 
sufficient. When we are working with this guideline, it is very effective. But 
the problem is how to fulfil our work in this guideline? That is the main 
thing (LSMC Disaster Management). 
As discussed in the previous chapter, MOFALD has instituted several initiatives 
aimed at promoting DRR integration through its ministry bureaucrats that held 
senior positions in the district and local administrative levels. These bureaucrats 
were required to sign a performance contract that stipulated a few DRM 
conditions. The LDOs and Executive Officers that were interviewed understood 
this initiative and seemed supportive of its objectives. 
That's a good thing and I heartily appreciate the performance contract 
agreement… This focuses on result-oriented management. Until now we 
were only process oriented. We should not be just process oriented but 
the results should also be seen in the public. We have 264 indicators that 
the ministry has designated. If those indicators are not met, I shall be 
liable to punishments. Therefore, I should either work effectively or should 
quit the position of LDO. This also means I have to be able to make the 
people under me work effectively. Our ministry (MOFALD) is only the 
ministry in Nepal to do this kind of agreement and we are very proud of 
that (Bardiya LDO). 
 
Major things to be done by the Executive Officer while working here. 
These are incorporated in the agreement. I have signed recently, two 
months ago. This is the first time there is a performance contract with 
Ministry. Within the performance contract there is one point related to risk 
management. We should adapt many measures to minimize the 
earthquake risk or other risk necessary plan should be formulated to cope 
with that risk. That is the risk management plan (LSMC, Executive Officer). 
 
What is encouraging about this approach, is that MOFALD had taken a less 
technocratic approach to DRR integration than what was found with the Ministry 
of Education for example. The extent of the Ministry of Education’s approach 
was the transfer of technical building specifications to districts, whereas 
MOFALD was attempting to change employee behaviours through the 
performance contract, a much more difficult endeavour to achieve. While its 
effectiveness is not evaluated here, it had raised DRR’s profile amongst the 
senior MOFALD staff in the district and local levels. The challenge for the LDO 
and Executive Officer was to get DRR policy integrated into the development 
programmes and projects in the district and local levels. Some of these 
challenges and barriers are the focus of section 7.4.  
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Unexpectedly, disaster management/DRR was found at the district level in 
relation to work occurring on environmental governance. It was being facilitated 
in cooperation with the Ministry of Science, Technology, and Environment 
(MOSTE) and MOFALD through the district development office. In comparison 
with the issue of DRR, climate change adaptation (CCA) mechanisms for 
implementation were more robust from top to bottom. For example, the Prime 
Minister heads the Climate Change Council and the National Planning 
Commission has established a Climate Change budget code for all ministries. 
Both a National Adaption Plan of Action and a Local Adaption Plan of Action had 
been endorsed. The central level oversight for CCA policy was within MOSTE. 
MOSTE had no mechanisms for local level implementation, so it channelled 
funds through MOFALD to implement policy at the district and local levels. 
… 80% of budget [related to CCA] should go to the field. We can only 
invest 20% budget in administrative or some other things, 80% has to 
send to the field. And side by side we have the national climate change 
support program in the Ministry. We have a very small unit here. The 
whole budget we send to MOFALD. And they implement the budget 
(MOSTE). 
 
To this end, there was a staff person in the District Development Office 
responsible for Energy, Climate Change and Disaster Management. According 
to one respondent, the disaster management portfolio was a new addition to the 
job title and no work had yet been completed. At the time of the interviews, 
district staff were piloting a programme within the Village Development 
Committees called the Environment-friendly Local Governance (EFLG) 
Framework 2013. One of the objectives of the framework is: 
“To mainstream issues related to environment, climate change adaptation 
and disaster management in the local planning process” (MOFALD 2013: 
7). 
Because the Energy, Climate Change and Disaster Management staff in the 
District Development Office mainly discussed alternative energy strategies and 
CCA in their interviews, it was a surprising to later find DRR content in the EFLG 
during a desk review of the document. This document set out a list of indicators 
to be used by districts, municipalities and VDCs.  The indicators used in the 
EFLG matched those of the Minimum Conditions and Performance 
Measurement Guidelines (discussed earlier in 6.4.2) that local governments had 
to fulfil. In terms of disaster management, it makes reference to the ubiquitous 
Local Disaster Risk Management Plan published by MOFALD and the 
establishment of DRM committees.  All told, it appeared to be a simple tool for 
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both DRR and CCA integration at the local level. However, the EFLG appears to 
be another technocratic exercise with little additional resourcing to support its 
objectives and implementation. That it was not widely touted at the central level 
as an example of mainstreaming DRR at the local level is puzzling but is further 
evidence that DRR is poorly coordinated amongst central government ministries 
like MOSTE, MOHA, and MOFALD. It also demonstrates that DRR is not being 
prioritized at the district/local levels even though it is a key component of the 
EFLG Framework.  
7.4 Challenges and Barriers to integrating DRR work 
throughout the District and Local Levels  
 
As outlined in Chapter 4, Nepal’s public administration is rife with corruption and 
largely unable to meet the social and economic needs of the country.  
Unsurprisingly, there are many challenges identified by respondents as barriers 
to mainstreaming DRR. A majority of the respondents were well considered and 
informed about the ills plaguing the Nepal bureaucracy. In order to present the 
main challenges/barriers, each have been sorted into three main categories: 
capacity and resource, political, and institutional and cultural barriers. Most of 
the challenges discussed here are problems that impact the bureaucracy 
generally and are not particular to mainstreaming DRR and policy change.  
 
However, it is in these general barriers where the difficulty also lies in changing 
district and local level policy paradigm from that of response to DRR. It goes 
without saying that one of the greatest impediments for DRR integration at the 
district/lower levels is the absence of legislation and policy to guide and compel 
it. The absence of a functional institutional mechanism for integrating DRR is 
summarized by the LDO Solukhumbu: 
This area, the disaster area, is centrally managed by MOHA. You know 
that our national system is mainly concentrated on relief. Since 3 or 4 
years then they have just shifted directives to DRR… Basically until now, 
the central and the other local bodies all are concentrated on the relief 
only. And there is no, I mean I don’t want to say no mechanism, but we 
haven’t mainstreamed all the disaster portion in our old development 
books. That’s the reality in the local bodies. So I think that it is basically 
new term for us. For the local bodies, because we have allocated our 
budgets to different areas for example to the women, seniors, other 
marginalized people like this. But specially we haven’t allocated in DRR in 
system to any funds, until now. So that’s the way. So we have not able to 
mainstream DRR system in our local bodies (Solukhumbu LDO). 
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Whilst the following discussion is not a comprehensive review of all the 
bureaucratic difficulties in Nepal, it does provide an interesting insight into what 
district and local level bureaucrats understood as challenges and barriers. 
7.4.1 Capacity and Resource Barriers 
7.4.1.1 Funding 
 
Not surprisingly in a least developed country like Nepal, funding was identified 
by respondents as a significant barrier.  
The main challenge is the lack of funds and resources (Bardiya LDO). 
Even though some budget is allocated to the local level, it's not effective to 
carry out projects (Bardiya VDC). 
 
Unlike CCA discussed above, DRR had no budget code attached to it.  
However, funding could be prioritized for disaster recovery and relief; therefore, 
the funding mechanisms around disasters issues are maintaining the status quo 
and preventing policy paradigm change. As a respondent from the District 
Education Office describes: 
Every year after our programs has been approved from the higher level, a 
Program Implementation Directive (PID) is made. After the PID is made, 
we publish the indicator for every school. There is a provision in the PID 
for giving more priority to the disaster affected schools. In case there is a 
need of construction or reconstruction of disaster affected schools, we 
have a fund at the regional level which can then be sanctioned for that 
(Solukhumbu District Education Office). 
 
Budget and funding constraints meant that bureaucrats were rarely able to meet 
public demands: 
We cannot address all the demand raised by public related to 
development activities. We have a limited budget but unlimited demand of 
the people. So we have to compromise with the demand... we implement 
very few projects because we have limited budget. But people are not 
satisfied with the limited expenditure because their needs are very high 
(LSMC EO). 
When we compare with the resource available to us, this is probably more 
than 50 times bigger demand, compared to their resources. It is quite 
difficult for us to manage this demand (Solukhumbu LDO).   
 
This suggests that decision makers at the district and local levels are having to 
prioritize DRR considerations amongst a myriad of pressing development 
issues.  
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7.4.1.2 Staffing Shortages 
 
Even more than funding, another significant issue discussed by six respondents 
were the routine staffing shortages that were made more acute during times of 
disaster response. This was most apparent in the district line agency offices, but 
also discussed frequently within the LSMC. 
The appointment is for 19 staff. However, we are only 4-5 of us at the 
moment as six staffs were recently transferred. So, I have to say that we 
don't have enough manpower at the moment (MOWCSW Bardiya). 
I am the only one at the moment working in this ward. If the manpower 
would be increased, it would be easier. I would be able to give more time 
for DRR related issues (LSMC Ward Secretary). 
We repeatedly asked the **** Division for more staff but they don't seem to 
give attention to our demand. They have been giving us false assurance 
by saying that it is in process. We have at the moment 8 staff. We 
demanded for 10 more staff but our demand has not been addressed yet. 
How can I say that they are supporting us? (Anonymous) 
 
This is a significant constraint for implementing new DRR policies, let alone for 
the existing role that bureaucrats had to play in DM response. A respondent also 
felt the added burden of working without elected politicians in place.  He saw the 
absence of elected officials as a resource deficit having to be overcome by the 
bureaucrats themselves. When asked how local elections will improve the 
situation in LSMC, he responded: 
The responsibility will be distributed. The things which we are having to do 
now by ourselves. Now we are having to go to the community and hold 
ward level meetings, and the manpower is the same. When we had 106 
elected body members, we had the same manpower and 106 those who 
were directly linked with the community. And we are having to do without 
additional staff (LSMC Public Construction Division Chief) 
7.4.1.3 Lack of DRR Awareness  
 
Awareness both within the bureaucracy and amongst the political parties was a 
noted challenge: 
One more thing to consider- before we can teach other people, we 
ourselves have to be aware about this issue. Therefore, capacity of our 
staffs has to be built at first (Bardiya MOWCSW). 
 
Training and information programs have to be provided… We have to be 
capable of answering the questions of the public regarding this issue. If 
the VDC itself doesn't know something clearly, we cannot explain the 
public about that. So, I think there has to be efforts from the governmental 
side for these things (Lalitpur VDC) 
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Staff are supportive [of DRR initiatives], but they have very lack of 
knowledge about the disaster. Before we go to the community, our staff 
should learn about the disaster. First of all, we should have to give 
awareness to staff. When the staff doesn’t know about the disaster, how 
will we give guidance to the community people? (LSMC Public 
Construction Planning). 
 
One local government respondent discussed the challenge of trying to 
implement DRR when the local politicians had no awareness of it:  
Yeah in planning process in local government of Nepal political parties 
play key role in that level. And you know how our politicians are… And 
they are not more sensitive in the sector of pre-planning phase of disaster. 
When they are responsive, is when the disaster occurs. Then only are 
they responsive. That we have to give something, we have to make home 
for them, we have to provide rice for them. And they never think that how 
in preliminary phase we have to think. They never think. This, this is the 
problem for us while working in the local body (Bardiya Municipality). 
7.4.1.4 Physical Infrastructure and Material Resources 
 
An example of the resource capacity gap is best exemplified in the interview with 
the LSMC fire brigade. The LSMC fire chief reported 54 fire events had occurred 
between April 14th 2014 and the date of the interview (December 14th, 2014) 
indicating that the fire brigade in LSMC is active and an essential resource. 
Despite this, all of its funding and resources had come from external donors 
rather than the municipality: 
The municipality hasn't provided us with the basic things like jackets, 
gloves, shoes etc. necessary for fire-fighting activities. The things we have 
were provided to us by various NGOs, INGOs and the Japanese people. 
The municipality hesitates to even provide us fuel for our fire trucks. The 
fire trucks need fuel for both running and pumping the water (LSMC Fire).  
 
Another specific example of lack of physical infrastructure was discovered in 
Bardiya district. The interview took place at the VDC Secretaries house as the 
VDC office had been damaged in the war: 
The VDC building was destroyed during the civil war. Although we 
demanded for building construction, it has not been in the priorities of the 
DDC till now. The VDC would have constructed one but it's beyond its 
capacity as the construction cost is around 5 million rupees (Bardiya 
VDC). 
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7.4.2 Political Challenges and Barriers 
7.4.2.1 Inequality and marginalisation 
 
The entrenched inequality in Nepal was identified as a barrier to development. In 
a village development committee in Kathmandu Valley (only 30-40 minutes from 
the main cities by rough road) this barrier was discussed by a respondent. The 
lack of development seen here was explained as the result of a lack of political 
access because the ethnicity of the population.  
How can I explain this? This place is so close to the capital, just about 12-
13 km away but still this place is very much backward in terms of 
development. The VDC is dominated by Tamang community who don't 
have much access at the higher level of government. I think that is the 
reason behind the backwardness. (I: So, this is no representative from this 
community at the higher level?) Right. This is all due to the lack of political 
access (Lalitpur VDC).  
7.4.2.2 Lack of local elections 
 
Another political challenge created by the absence of local elections was that 
the local bodies were vulnerable to indiscriminate programme downloading from 
the central government:  
And government [central] decides “ok municipality this maternity hospital is 
now run by you” or “you will run the fire brigade”. So this sort of, what do 
you call it, downloading all responsibilities to the municipalities. Is it the 
right time? Without the elected members? Without adequate funding? … 
all the responsibilities are being transferred to the municipalities. That’s a 
big problem. But it’s not the right time to do anything. My personal view, 
but from the central level they say, “it’s the proper time! You see no 
political leaders, they can’t stop us!” (Anonymous).  
7.4.2.3 Lack of political party consensus  
 
Finally, one respondent stated that the lack of political party consensus was 
impeding development of a comprehensive flood embankment system: 
The people that we elect [referring to central level Members of 
Parliament], whom we give the development responsibility, should think for 
the betterment of the local people and the society. I think it's in the hands 
of the political parties to be able to address the demands of the people 
and bring the planning’s into implementation. The sooner the parties reach 
a consensus, the faster the problems are solved (Bardiya VDC). 
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7.4.3 Institutional and Cultural Barriers and Challenges 
 
Many of the institutional barriers included here are also inherently political in 
nature.  They are discussed here as barriers that challenge the working 
environment of district and local level bureaucrats.  
7.4.3.1 Central government interference  
 
One thing that stood out in the LSMC interviews was a clear sense of self-
determinism and frustration at the current political situation, especially regarding 
central government interference: 
I’ve been working in our municipality for a very long time… The central 
government appoints our senior officer [the Executive Officer].  This is 
wrong. This is wrong. Because of our Self Government Act, it is wrong. 
This appointment should be done within the municipality, not from outside 
(Anonymous). 
7.4.3.2 Frequent transfers of senior government officials- LDO/EO 
 
The frequent transfers (seemingly on an annual basis) of both the EO and LDO 
positions was identified as a challenge. As indicated below, the situation of 
transferring EOs was frustrating for all concerned: the EO, the bureaucrats, and 
even the ward level disaster management committee volunteers:  
It is very difficult to move frequently. Minimum 2 or 3 years should be 
provided to work at one place. It would be better. If we do all things good, 
time should be provided. Sufficient time should be provided. Very difficult 
to play a role in a short time. We cannot play in expected time (LSMC 
Executive Officer). 
It is also the problem that the Chief of the municipality is changing so 
frequently. By this time, I have experience of four Chiefs in seven years. 
Can you imagine?! Making relationships is difficult. Making relations with 
the Chief is very difficult (LSMC Ward Level DMC volunteer).   
Another respondent suggested that the frequent transfers prevented the 
bureaucracy from strategic or creative planning related to disaster issues. 
I have done the work from more than twelve EOs. Just we work our daily 
work and I think there is no strategy about how to minimize the risk from 
disaster and any other aspect also. They are not thinking creatively. I think 
so (LSMC Anonymous). 
This is an important point. In general, the municipal staff do not transfer. For 
example, in the LSMC many of the staff interviewed had been working for the 
municipality for over a decade, whereas, the head of the organisation, are 
employees of MOFALD and are regularly transferred.  
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7.4.3.3 The overburdened LDO/Executive Officer positions 
 
The LDO and Executive Officer positions are pivotal to integrating DRR because 
of their role in overseeing development initiatives. From an outsider perspective, 
the job requirements of the LDO and EO seem destined for failure. Firstly, they 
are tasked with coordinating district development priorities with those of the line 
agencies (agriculture, education, health, irrigation). However, the mechanisms to 
facilitate this coordination are weak.  
In this district, until now all the sectoral offices are working on their 
mandates. For example, you know office of women, children and social 
welfare, office of agricultural development, etc., are there. But you know in 
reality, while developing some program and projects, there is no clear 
integration between all offices including the DDC (Solukhumbu LDO). 
Secondly, in the absence of elected political representatives, the LDOs and EOs 
serve as both bureaucrat and politician. 
Honestly speaking, I am fulfilling two gaps- the political gap and the 
bureaucratic gap. I have been playing two roles, one as an LDO and the 
other as a chairman. Even if I play a political role, I have to say that I am a 
true bureaucrat. In many issues, I have to work as per the legislations, 
governmental processes and procedures and the directions of the 
ministry. This is a local government and this is a government of the local 
people. The constitution also states that the sovereignty of Nepal is vested 
in the Nepalese people. The feelings of the Nepalese people are the 
biggest things for me. While working here in Bardiya, I have always kept 
the people of Bardiya at the top and have always tried to work to address 
their issues and demands. While doing that I am also fulfilling the 
governmental processes and procedures (Bardiya LDO). 
Since 12.5 years there are no political representative in the local bodies. It 
is done by bureaucrats. It is very difficult we have to be a trio 
responsibility: the responsibility of political, responsibility of political 
representative and the responsibility of a civil servant. So, it is very difficult 
to work with the people, with the society and within the organization as 
well (LSMC Executive Officer). 
All told, LDOs must respond to public demands, the demands of the political 
parties and the demands of MOFALD. DRR is one of many development 
concerns that the GON and districts are trying to address. The district 
development offices are beyond their capacity to coordinate and implement so 
many development agendas.  
7.4.3.4 Public demands do not include DRR 
 
The 14-step planning process (discussed in Chapter 4) created some 
challenges for local government staff who were beholden to the development 
requests of the community. For example, a senior staff member of Gulyeria 
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municipality in Bardiya District indicated that the institutional framework of the 
planning process and the public lack of awareness created a challenge for the 
local government to incorporate DRR into its development projects. 
…at the community level, you know, the municipal planning process is 
bottom up planning process. All the planning comes through the ward 
levels…. When the people select one project from the ward level they are 
not sensitive to disaster risk reduction. And when all the projects are 
selected through the ward level, we cannot be flexible with such types of 
projects. We are compelled to select this project, selected by our people 
through ward level and these projects are not disaster responsive 
(Gulyeria Human Resource Chief). 
7.4.3.5 Putting infrastructure development first 
 
Another institutional challenge identified by a respondent was how infrastructure 
development was privileged over social development initiatives:  
…no one is serious to the development. But they think that it is only the 
infrastructure. Making infrastructure is enough. That is not only 
development. There are many more dimension of the development. We 
have to go in the prospective of the women, vulnerable people, vulnerable 
people but no one cares about it. If we are doing like that, where will the 
development, where will it be orientated? Where will it be directed? That is 
the major challenge in the development sectors. So there is core 
challenge I say is one is the proper implementation of the policies and the 
aspect of the development means, you know, no one is conscious of 
proper development of the district (Bardiya District Governance Expert). 
All the district have similar problem and demand. The main demand is 
infrastructure. They ask for roads, sanitation, drinking water system, 
bridge, like this (Solukhumbu LDO). 
7.4.3.6 Corruption and bureaucratic risk aversion 
 
This research found a secondary consequence of corruption and political party 
interference. These conditions were contributing to a paralysis within the 
bureaucracy. Two respondents discussed the inertia within the bureaucracy in 
ways that suggested a highly risk adverse bureaucratic culture.  
Many officials are there and they are not motivated. They just see if I just 
start some new programs I will be blamed and many communities will ask 
many questions or political body will ask me why this? Like this. So they 
are scared, maybe yeah? (Anonymous) 
 
Similarly, the second respondent indicated that it was easier for a bureaucrat to 
do nothing than to risk being censured.  
But people here in Nepal they don’t talk about accountability. Because in 
the government system, while they say there is accountability—that it has 
to be transparent and accountable—but if you are not working you are not 
accountable for anything. But if you work and if you make small mistake 
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then you might be in problem. So that is why people just try to avoid the 
difficult decisions and taking responsibility. Because making decision is 
taking the responsibility… But if you work there are more chances of you 
being in problem. Problem means from the supervising agency and the 
vigilance agency32 But if you don’t work you keep getting the salary. You 
have to work through your own motivation (Anonymous). 
 
The policy environment tends to already be conservative and risk averse by 
nature (as discussed in the policy change literature in Chapter 3). The above 
quotes indicate that on top of this, Nepali bureaucrats are fearful of 
repercussions from upsetting the status quo. As discussed in Chapter 4, the 
ending of corrupt practices within the Nepal Electricity Authority had unleashed 
what was described as a ‘hornet nest’ (Shrestha 2016) as those who had 
benefitted from corruption pushed for the removal of the new head of the NEA, 
Kulman Ghising. In this environment, it is easy to see how innovation and policy 
paradigm change is crushed. It also shows that corruption is a formable barrier 
to be addressed if the bureaucracy is to be amendable to implementing new 
policy agendas.  
7.5 Lalitpur Sub-Metropolitan City Under the Microscope 
 
This chapter now shifts its focus and tenor, to examine LSMC as a case study. 
In doing so, it answers the final sub-question posed in the introduction: What is 
different about LSMC and why was it more conductive for DRR policy 
integration? That LSMC was an exception is demonstrated in the following 
quotes: 
Lalitpur Sub Metropolitan City is the example to make the planning and 
program about the risk management. This is the example municipality in 
the country (LSMC Executive Officer). 
The main role is I just… I was a local. I lived there, I was born in Lalitpur, 
and that’s my home. That feeling, yeah? That feeling drive you to work 
there. So I can just work there in building code and just check drawing 
designs and regular work I can do and I get salary. But let’s save our 
community, yeah? That feeling is necessary. And also I motivated staff 
and colleagues as well. We give salary but its maybe not enough. But let’s 
work for our city it will be related to our career also. So that is a motivating 
                                               
32 During the time of fieldwork, Lok Man Karki (Chief of the Commission for the 
Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA)) was under scrutiny for abusing the powers of 
the CIAA. His political appointment as Commissioner was called into question in the 
media and by the Court.  On January 9th 2017 a Nepal Supreme Court ruling removed 
Karki as head of the CIAA. 
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factor (MOFALD Local Infrastructure and Building Code Specialist- former 
LSMC employee).  
 
In order to complete this case study, twenty-three interviews were conducted 
over a three-week period with the Executive Officer, division chiefs and 
subordinates, and ward secretaries/ward level disaster management 
committees.  Notably, two of the nine division chiefs were women (Finance 
Division Chief and Heritage, Culture and Archaeological Conservation). Across 
divisions in the LSMC there was an appreciable understanding of the necessity 
to mainstream DRR. More than this, the staff at LSMC were keen to share and 
discuss various innovative initiatives the LSMC had produced. These included:  
 Being the first municipality to adopt the national building code;  
 Hiring full time disaster management staff; 
 Heritage conservation that reinforced traditional Newari earthquake 
resilient buildings; 
 Campaigning and achieving child labour free zones; 
 Hiring the first environmental engineer graduate.  
These innovations were suggestive of a competency and pride in the 
bureaucracy that was absent in other research locations. As one division chief 
claimed:  
I believe that I am an employee and I should do something for the country. 
The employee should not have the feeling that they are here only for 
salary. Due to such employees, Nepal's bureaucracy is condemned and 
criticized. Bureaucracy itself is not a bad thing; it has also good part. 
Someone may be bad but not everyone in bureaucracy is bad. Even the 
fingers of one hand are not equal (Social Welfare Division Chief). 
 
This is not to say that LSMC was the model of efficiency. As one respondent 
honestly opined:  
I think maybe you know that most of the government staff have lot of time, 
because with the government staff I think if they do work I think it’s for 2 
hours. We do have to work 7 hours in a day, but I think we are not working 
7 hours. We have plenty of time for doing the extra activities. Like the 
disaster risk reduction- we can talk about and we can do the orientation. 
But it’s not happening (Anonymous). 
7.5.1 Brief LSMC Background and Context 
 
LSMC is an ancient city located in Kathmandu Valley. Originally, it was a 
planned city constructed to replicate the Buddhist Wheel of Righteousness, with 
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four stupas33 (that still exist) marking its cardinal points (LSMC Online). What 
was once planned and ordered is now unregulated, aging, and unable to provide 
basic services like potable water. The entire Kathmandu Valley has seen a 
migration influx as rural people pushed into the valley in search of jobs, better 
education and security from insurgent forces during the Maoist revolt. The 
municipalities have been overwhelmed and unable to keep pace.  Many civic 
services—such as municipal water—are provided by boards, overseen by the 
central government. Presently, LSMC is the third largest local government in 
Nepal (following Kathmandu Metropolitan City and Pokhara Sub-Metropolitan 
City respectively), with a population of 226,728 with 54,748 individual 
households (Central Bureau of Statistics 2011d). 
7.5.2 Building Code Pioneers: “Right people, Right Time” 
 
What I feel is, in DRR this aspect from among all the municipalities in 
Nepal, we call ourselves pioneers. Because we are the first municipality to 
implement the national building code and to establish this disaster 
management related and earthquake safety section. We are the ones who 
went to the community and awareness programs (LSMC Public 
Construction Division Chief). 
 
One of the main reasons why LSMC is different from the other research sites, is 
that it was the first municipality to adopt the seismic building code, even before it 
became national legislation.  
There is building code which was in fact formulated by us. The building 
code that was formulated in Lalitpur was then taken by the government 
and then the government formulated the National Building Code (LSMC 
Social Welfare Chief). 
 
Although the above respondents claimed LSMC staff formulated the building 
code, the code was drafted between 1992-1994 by a team led by New Zealand 
earthquake civil engineers and several Nepali engineers (who were not LSMC 
staff but would go to become prominent advocates of earthquake safety34). The 
project was funded by UNDP and overseen by the central government 
Department of Urban Development and Building Construction (DUDBC). 
                                               
33 A stupa marks an important Buddhist religious site. Typically shaped like a mound or a 
dome they are often filled with relics (often the remains of monks and nuns). 
34 The two Nepali personnel on the project were Amod Dixit founding member and 
Executive Director of NSET and Yogeshwar Parajuli, another founding member of NSET 
and former head of the Kathmandu Development Authority. 
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LSMC’s role in its development was to work out the ‘kinks.’ As one LSMC 
respondent describes: 
Then we established one technical cell involving other professionals 
outside, and then when the building permit and designer is there, we 
started a consultation with a designer. All the time we are asking: How are 
you? What are the problems you are facing? Even the house owners we 
invited for input… 
 
LSMC’s role helped to give the policy national traction and helped to clarify 
implementation challenges. The code passed into national legislation in 2003.  
However, its early adoption by LSMC was the result of enthusiastic staff, a 
supportive executive, and elected political system.  
Right people and right time, right support and right time. Many local people 
who are working there also live there [meaning Lalitpur Sub-Metropolitan 
City]. And many technical persons working there at the time were young 
and energetic. And we also got support from Executive Officer. That is 
also very important. There was a mayor and an elected body. Actually, the 
time the building code was announced and the decision was made, we 
had an elected body—the mayor (who is now 77 years), the deputy mayor 
and the ward chairmen. They were also motivated and convinced through 
NSET. They were convinced and then they direct us, “ok go ahead” 
(MOFALD Local Infrastructure and Building Code Specialist- former LSMC 
employee). 
 
Because municipal staff are not transferred like their central level counterparts, 
many employees who had been active in pushing for the building code adoption 
were now in senior division chief roles. The majority of respondents interviewed 
had worked in the municipality for at least ten years. The current Social Welfare 
Division Chief (who had a financial rather than an engineering background) had 
attended disaster management training in 1997 in Bangkok that had evidently 
made a lasting impression on his work. He also pushed for LSMCs 
implementation of the building code. 
It was a time when they were not aware about it. Because they had no 
idea about it at that time, I was the only one who had attended the training. 
So, I was working to prepare different materials with what I learned in the 
training. Then I came to the issue of Building Code. People don't know that 
the buildings have to be constructed using earthquake techniques. Even 
the ones with engineering background didn't know that. I continuously told 
them about the Building Code and that we should strictly implement it. It 
became really hard to make everyone understand it. I took the training in 
1997 and only in 2003, the building code was eventually legislated (LSMC 
Social Welfare Division Chief). 
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At the time that LSMC adopted the building code in 2000, there were still elected 
local officials in place. In retrospect, one respondent speculated that without the 
local elected body, the code could not have been adopted by the LSMC: 
Last time there was an elected body in this municipality and we announce 
a building code, the elected body helps directly. Oh it is necessary. It is 
most important they realize. If in this time, no elected body, our 
bureaucracy is running this municipality, building code is not possible. 
Because bureaucracy can’t take more responsibility (LSMC Disaster 
Management Section). 
 
Adoption of the building code in 2000 was clearly a defining moment for those 
who were a part of the process. There was evident pride in LSMCs role in 
fostering the building code. A young and motivated staff pushed the executive 
and elected officials to adopt an innovative policy. Sadly, sixteen years later that 
dynamic is no longer possible in the LSMC. Without elected bodies, the central 
government controls local government agendas. Staff have little ability to shape 
and influence those agendas. The building code innovations in LSMC appeared 
just before the abolishment of local governments. Perhaps that is partly why 
LSMC staff were so affected by it and its memory lingered. It represented a time 
when they had some autonomy over local government direction. Its legacy was 
clearly sustaining an on-going motivation to institutionalize DRM in spite of the 
present day institutional and political constraints.  
7.5.3 Current Institutional DRR and DM Initiatives 
 
LSMC had instituted building code implementation through its Urban 
Development Division. There were two sections established, one was the 
earthquake safety section (building code section) and the other was the disaster 
management section:  
We have separated disaster management into two sections: one is pre-
disaster and the other is post disaster. So pre-disasters its preparation of 
strengthening building structures by implementing the building codes. And 
in post disasters we are managing how we will be capable enough to 
manage post-disaster scenario. For example, rescue management some 
storing of rescue related equipment and plans, some awareness 
programs, some establishment of different aware committees in DM 
committees in different levels of wards and centre of city. So talking of DM 
we have to separate in two phases, pre and post (LSMC Urban 
Development Division Chief). 
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Building codes were “interlinked” with the building permit process. There was 
one staff member in the building code section and three in the building permit 
section who would review building permits for their compliance with the National 
Building Code. The previous year 2013, LSMC had received 800 building permit 
applications.   
All the buildings are checked by the Building Code Section if they are 
following the code. No Objection Certificate is issued to the owner if 
everything is as per the code. Else, I won't provide the certificate. That is 
what my responsibility is all about (Building Code Section). 
 
Those in the permit section would do site visits to ensure compliance. The 
process was explained this way:  
There is a 3-step implementation. First step is land verification. One out of 
the three people [permit] goes for that land inspection. A 15-days notice is 
issued to the neighbouring land or buildings for any complaints. If there is 
no objection from anyone during this time, we provide a certificate that will 
allow them to construct up to the typing [drafting] level. The second step 
inspection is after the completion of typing level. If everything is ok and as 
per the code, a No Objection Certificate is provided for further 
construction. In the third step, the building is inspected and the Completion 
Certificate is provided. So, inspection is done three times for every 
building from starting till the end (Building Code Section).  
 
Even here, the absence of an elected mayor impeded LSMC’s ability to fully 
enforce building codes. If a building was constructed without following the proper 
building code, the LSMC had no legal authority to order the building to be 
demolished. Only a mayor (elected by the people) could sign an order to 
demolish a building that did not comply with the code. LSMCs hands were tied 
when it came to strict enforcement of the building code.  
 
Also, building code compliance seemed over estimated by LSMC staff. The 
Division Chief and section heads maintained that the building codes were fully 
implemented in LSMC, the reality of this seemed implausible. Looking at the 
number of annual permit applications (800), the number of reviews each permit 
required (3), and the level of staffing (3+1), 100% compliance was doubtful. 
Also, corruption is so systemic in Nepal, that it cannot be discounted in the 
LSMC. Nonetheless, the process of reviewing building permit applications for 
LSMC had become institutionalised and was viewed by staff as a component of 
LSMCs overall disaster risk management strategy. Attention now turns to the 
other DM and DRR work implemented by LSMC.  
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7.5.3.1 Disaster Management and DMCs 
 
LSMC had established a full-time disaster management section with two staff. 
The head of the section was an engineer who had been working on disaster 
related issues since 2002.  
Nowadays I’m working totally in this field. In office time. On one day, 
maybe two or three programs are organized in our community I am going 
there. Some presentations, some lectures, are participation in this 
program related to mitigation, awareness program, exercises, 
simulations… drama competition at the community level (LSMC Disaster 
Management). 
 
Although there were two staff specifically assigned to the DM section, 
encouragingly the DM understood other LSMC staff components as related to 
DRM: 
The DM section directly working is two persons. Two persons only. But it 
is so that if other sections work like fire brigade, other health sections, all 
the sections are about 50 people, But directly involved only 2 persons in 
our section (LSMC Disaster Management). 
 
These ‘auxiliary’ DM staff were not well integrated or part of an overall strategy 
for DRM in LSMC. The DM reported that Oxfam support was soon to be 
available for the drafting of a LSMC DRM plan. It was a promising step towards 
integration that the DM section head recognized DM as encompassing more 
than just the DM section. What is notable about LSMC, is that the DM section 
head lacked the proprietary DM control that was exhibited at the central level by 
MOHA.  
 
LSMCs disaster management section had a dedicated budget of RS 2.85 million 
(approximately 27,000 USD). At present it was the only division to get a specific 
budget for DRR:  
The divisions don't get separate budget for it. We have 22 wards and our 
main program is to aware the wards. We aware the students of various 
school in those wards. It's not possible to sanction huge budget for DRR 
because we don't have a source (LSMC Finance Section Chief). 
Until now, the annual budget had been spent mostly on training: 
Even though there is support from the supportive organization, we have 
been going to the community with our own programs. We also conduct 
programs. A lot of training programs are being conducted. There are other 
extra activities, Earthquake Safety Day and we also have been organizing 
School Safety Programs from school to school. The Mason training is also 
conducted by the municipality (LSMC Disaster Management). 
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The DM section head’s time was mainly spent on capacity building through its 
support of ward level disaster management committees (DMCs). Lalitpur had 22 
wards, and at present 19 had formulated a committee made up of local 
volunteers, and drafted a ward level DM plan which was submitted to the LSMC. 
The DM section head was in charge of linking the DMCs with municipal 
processes. A ward DMC secretary, who in general was critical of government 
DRM processes, was glowing in her assessment of the DM staff member 
support:  
And whenever we want him in the ward he manages to come. And he is a 
helping person. He is a very good person. He tries to facilitate us in 
administration or in the program or in managing the teams, he is a good 
helper (Ward Level DMC).   
 
The genesis of these DMCs had come through a variety of external NGO 
interventions. As such there was little in the way of standardization, for instance 
some were using MOFALDs Local Disaster Risk Management Reduction Plan 
(LDRMP), while others were not. At the time of fieldwork, the DMCs received 
zero funding from the LSMC. However, that was about to change. LSMC had 
proposed a budget increase to RS 6 million (approximately USD 56 000). At the 
time of fieldwork this increase had not been formally approved, but the DM 
section head was confident it would be. LSMC was increasing its DM budget in 
order to start funding the DMCs and now required the DMCs to submit a 
standardized DRM plan to the municipality every two years. It was confirmed by 
the LSMC during the post-earthquake fieldwork that municipal funding was 
going to the DMCs. 
 
Both the Urban Development Division Chief and the Disaster Management 
Section Head indicated that it is LSMC’s role to coordinate DRM activities within 
its jurisdiction, with support from external agencies. 
Coordination and monitoring part is municipality’s responsibility and other 
activities funding programme running this is the other organizations- 
Oxfam, NSET, and Nepal Red Cross (LSMC Disaster Management). 
 
When asked how his colleagues in LSMC respond when they are approached 
about DRR, the disaster management section head noted an increase in 
awareness and receptiveness. However, implementation throughout the 
municipal sectors was still lacking:  
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Response is very better in other divisions. Response is very better. But 
working condition and helping condition is not satisfactory. Response is 
very better. They talk about our policy and our programmes and they tell 
me that this is necessary. However,  in working conditions and 
implementation throughout sectors there is still some negligence (Disaster 
Management). 
 
It is clear that the building code adoption was a catalyst that sparked evolving 
institutional support. Since 2000, LSMC has institutionalised BCI as part of the 
building permit process, and established a separate section for disaster 
preparedness. According to staff, overall awareness amongst the staff was 
increased because of this effort. LSMC had advanced beyond building codes 
and established a separate section for disaster management. This section was 
organizing community disaster management preparedness at the ward levels 
and was beginning to financially support the DMCs. These advances are strong 
indicators of institutional support for disaster risk reduction.  
7.5.4 DRM Initiatives in other Divisions 
 
Within the LSMC, there were two ‘pockets’ of work being done by other divisions 
that related to DRM. Unfortunately, the fire brigade could not be included in this 
discussion, as it was very underfunded and neglected by the LSMC (see section 
7.4.1.4).  
7.5.4.1 Heritage, Culture and Archaeological Conservation 
 
The importance of Lalitpur’s historical monuments was evident in the Executive 
Officer’s list of development priorities and also by the budget allocated for 
heritage conservation: 
 
This is the city of world heritage, you know the Patan Durbar Square is 
listed as world heritage site by UNESCO. So, the primary duty of this 
municipality is to preserve the archaeological monuments and cultural 
things. And the drinking water, and the street light (LSMC Executive 
Officer).   
 
Lalitpur is a historical city. So, the maximum budget is sanctioned for 
preservation of historical monuments (LSMC Finance Division Chief). 
 
In order to raise its profile in LSMC a separate division was created and headed 
by a senior architect. The work of the division was not DRR per se, in that it was 
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not label or part of a comprehensive DRR strategy.  But in the conservation of 
the historical buildings, DRR was being enhanced. As explained by the division 
chief:  
The traditional type of construction is one of the earthquake risk reduction 
techniques. There are some wedges in our traditional houses. Have you 
already been to any Newari-type traditional houses? (I: Yes.) I think it is far 
better than the RCC buildings. (I: Modern buildings?) Yes, the system of 
rafters and every joist are well planned. There are wedges to tie up the 
links. They are flexible and can move during the time of earthquakes. So, 
there will be very less possibility to collapse due to disasters. And main 
thing is, there are number of joists and even if a point collapses, the other 
points remain in position. That's why the whole building will not collapse 
totally. So, the people living in such kind of houses are safer (LSMC 
Heritage Conservation Division Chief). 
 
In the 1934 earthquake, and again in the 2015 earthquakes, many of the 
traditional structures in Kathmandu Valley collapsed. The lessons from the 1934 
earthquake was that historical structures that are not conserved lose their 
earthquake resiliency due to rot that weakens the framework. LSMC division 
chief was aware of this. Their efforts at conservation were recognized as an 
important component of DRR. 
 
What I think we learned from the earthquake of 1934 is that the structures 
should be maintained from time to time. If there was regular maintenance, 
the buildings would not have collapsed completely. Another thing is the 
absence of Damp Proof Course (DPC) in the old structures. If the DPC 
was properly constructed and the buildings were maintained at regular 
intervals, I think the earthquake would not have done that huge 
destruction. There was erosion of bricks due to salt and acid. The thing 
about wooden structure is that if there are holes in it, it becomes the home 
for rats and termites. If the wooden parts were treated in time, it would 
have been protected from insects and pests. The wooden structure 
remained untreated. The rats made the walls weaker by making several 
holes in it. Because of such things, the chances of collapsing increased 
during earthquakes. The techniques were really good but the problem was 
the lack of timely maintenance and repair. Now, in order to be protected 
from disasters, we follow up with the people and advise them to pay 
attention to maintenance, repair and treat the wood. If we do that, we can 
keep the structures safe and protected (LSMC Heritage Conservation 
Division Chief). 
Fire is another hazard for old temples and wooden structures. Although LSMC 
has a fire brigade, it is not mentioned in the respondent’s discussion of fire risk: 
Fire is also a disaster and it can cause destruction. For an example in the 
Durbar Square area there is Taleju temple where the Pujari (priest) also 
stays. They have kept the wire exposed. In case the wire is short, the 
entire structure can catch fire and it can get destroyed immediately. So, 
fire extinguishers and fire hydrants should be kept. (I: Are they kept?) After 
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the proposal from a JICA volunteer, at present we have one fire hydrant in 
Durbar Square area, another in Sundhara and there is one in Nagbahal. In 
the Durbar Square area there is a system designed to use the water from 
the ponds in case of fire. The small fire extinguishers are not effective 
when it comes about the fire in wooden structures as the wooden 
structures catch fire very fast. However, there are several fire 
extinguishers around the museum. 
 
Through the conservation and preservation of the historic buildings, using the 
appropriate historical techniques, the division was in fact achieving DRR.  But its 
disconnect from a larger LSMC DRM vision was a limiting factor. In the past, the 
respondent reported some connection to the Disaster Management Division in 
LSMC through external trainings:  
There used to be several trainings related to DRM in the past conducted 
by organizations like UNDP and NSET. They [LSMC DM Section] used to 
involve us in such trainings as well. At the moment, we don’t have so 
much of involvement (LSMC Heritage Conservation Division Chief). 
 
She also did not see her division as part of LSMC’s DRR strategy:  
When we hear about disaster management, we have the feeling that it's 
the responsibility of his [Disaster management] section (LSMC Heritage 
Conservation Division Chief). 
7.5.4.2 Social Welfare Division 
 
The division chief for Social Welfare was discussed above (section 6.5.2) as an 
early champion of building code implementation. As head of the Community 
Health section, he was currently promoting DM cross-training for existing LSMC 
health volunteers and within the children and women’s groups. He reported that 
although his work was in coordination with the Disaster Management Section in 
LSMC, the DM training was instituted through his own initiatives:  
568 volunteers look after health-related issues, like what to do after 
disasters. Similarly, around 14000 women from 158 women groups help in 
creating awareness regarding this issue… (LSMC Social Welfare Division 
Chief) 
 
From the Health Section too we teach in a daily basis how to prepare for 
disaster management and we also have been doing that. After that, there 
is Community Development Section from where we provide training even 
to the children. The Disaster Management Section does not give trainings 
rather we provide trainings ourselves. We have 65 child clubs. We have 
been teaching the children in the clubs regarding disaster management. 
As I told earlier, we provide information related to disaster management to 
the women of 158 women clubs during trainings and orientation (LSMC 
Social Welfare Division Chief). 
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His efforts to integrate DM training into existing health programmes is a clear 
example of how social learning within the Nepal bureaucracy may lead to DRR 
policy adoption.   
7.5.5 Discussion 
 
This case study of LSMC set out to answer what is different in LSMC that made 
it receptive to DRR policy integration. There were several tangible differences 
that were found in LSMC and not in other locations. Unlike in the district or 
central government offices, the staff at LSMC were permanent and did not 
transfer. The division chiefs appeared to be formidable group of employees for a 
temporary EO to deal with. Most of the respondents spoken to had worked for 
the municipality for at least a decade.  Many of the division chiefs had started 
out in the municipality in junior positions. They had a long institutional 
knowledge of the city and its history. There also was a self-determination and 
discontent with central level interference. Finally, the staff of LSMC closely 
identified as residents of LSMC. This seemed to invoke a pride in the 
municipality that was not found in other research sites.  
 
It is also clear that LSMC benefits from being located in Kathmandu Valley, 
where many INGOs and NGOs are based. LSMC has strong connections with 
the Nepal Red Cross, NSET, Oxfam, and others. However, if it were not for 
LSMCs receptiveness to DRM institutionalisation it is unlikely these connections 
would exist. What is clear, is that DRR integration within the LSMC had not 
occurred because of central government involvement or international global 
frameworks. LSMC was not active in the NRRC flagships, nor were staff 
motivated by the HFA (the adoption of the building code occurred 5 years prior 
to Nepal’s signing of the HFA). The early adoption of the building code came 
mainly through enthusiastic engineers about the prospect of safer building 
construction and innovation. This is an important finding and highlights the 
neglected role that professional affiliation (perhaps through associations and 
organisations) can play in integrating DRR into work processes.   
LSMCs early adoption of the building code paints a picture of a time when 
younger staff were able to influence senior executives and political members to 
adopt new policy measures. In present day, the memory of this effort seemed to 
have left an indelible mark in LSMC, with the legacy being a cross-sector 
awareness of the importance of DRM initiatives. LSMC also stands out from the 
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other field sites because of its institutionalization of DM that included: 2 full time 
staff members, sectors incorporating DRM, and a new initiative to support and 
fund ward level DMCs.  
7.6 Chapter Summary 
 
The main objective of this chapter was to explore the opportunities and 
challenges for mainstreaming DRR at the district and local levels. This approach 
was taken because there were very few indicators that top-down MOHA-led 
mainstreaming of DRR was having any impact at the district/local level. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, mainstreaming DRR is not a substantive 
policy position of MOHA. This chapter also sought to find out whether 
mainstreaming DRR was occurring amongst the ministries that were leading the 
NRRC Flagships. Only the efforts of MOFALD (lead of Flagship 4) appeared to 
have an appreciable impact at the district and local levels. This was because 
MOFALD had taken the approach of changing senior bureaucratic behaviours in 
regard to DRR by making it a part of their performance contracts. MOFALD also 
had taken care to integrate various policy instruments so that they were 
harmonized. For example, the Environmentally Friendly Governance Framework 
was written to integrate the content from the Local Disaster Risk Management 
Plan and the Minimum Conditions and Performance Management Guidelines. 
The LDOs and Executive Officers were aware of their DRM commitments at the 
district and local levels, but were constrained in implementing them because of 
the district and local level realities. 
 
It is those realities—particularly the challenges—that further add to the argument 
that mainstreaming DRR in Nepal is mere rhetoric. Nepali bureaucrats are well 
aware of the challenges they face as public administrators. Any central level 
policy prescription that suggests applying a cross-sector approach to a wicked 
policy problem without serious commitments to reform and investment in the 
public sector is unlikely to succeed. Those at the district and local levels 
disclosed the numerous barriers they face in implementing DRR policy 
throughout development sectors.  
 
However, this chapter also found a source of optimism in the approach that the 
LSMC had taken to mainstream DRR into municipal operations. The LSMC case 
study demonstrated that current progress in DRR integration was stimulated 
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through staff learning and previous policy change success. Understandably, the 
bureaucrats were motivated because of their role as ‘pioneers’ in implementing 
the building code. This chapter did not assess the efficacy of LSMC’s building 
code programme. Instead it focused more on how that early success facilitated 
institutional adoption of DRM more than ten years after it pioneered building 
code adoption.  Contrary to the negative associations of the Nepal bureaucracy, 
the LSMC case study demonstrates the important role that bureaucrats can play 
(albeit with local elections) in instigating policy change. It is also a reminder that 
local governments may be an important component within the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework and in driving third order policy change. This is a significant 
conclusion because it is an idea that is not in keeping with Nepal’s long history 
of centralised rule.   
 
One final comment about this chapter is about the role that political parties play 
in Nepal’s public administration. LSMC staff were certain that a key reason the 
municipality was able to pioneer building code adoption was because there were 
elected municipal officials in place at the time. Currently, the lack of elections 
has the political parties exerting undue influence on LDOs and Executive 
Officers and dictating development objectives with no public accountability. In 
both instances, it is clear that political parties are key to the process of policy 
paradigm change. Because of this, the next chapter focuses on how political 
parties understand DRR and the role they may play in brokering DRR policy 
change. 
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8 The Policy Brokers: How Political 
Parties Understand DRR and What it 
Means for Policy Paradigm Change 
 
 
 
Before fieldwork began, the intention was to only research how mainstreaming 
DRR was occurring across the central government level (Chapter 6) and down 
through the district and local levels (Chapter 7).  Upon entering the field, it 
became apparent that one could not examine mainstreaming DRR throughout 
the bureaucracy without also examining the role that the political parties played 
in enabling or hindering its adoption. Because of the highly politicised nature of 
the bureaucracy (Chapter 4), political parties are key actors in Nepal for 
understanding how Hall’s third order policy paradigm change (and ultimately that 
of mainstreaming DRR) is to be achieved. To that end, this chapter diverges 
away from any discussion of mainstreaming DRR throughout the government 
(Chapters 6 and 7), to examine the role of political parties as potential 
mainstreaming DRR policy brokers (see ACF Chapter 3).  
  
8.1 Introduction 
 
In Nepal, a few political parties wield excessive influence to set government 
development agendas and priorities. In democratic states, there are checks and 
balances built into the governance system35 to ensure that power is not 
concentrated with any one political institution; usually these are achieved 
through legislation, regulations and by insuring independence of government 
branches (e.g. executive, legislative, and judiciary). In Nepal, political parties are 
regulated by the Political Parties Act (GON 2002), which stipulates transparent 
party financial reporting, prohibits party memberships for Government of Nepal 
                                               
35 Montesquieu (1748/1949:109) argued that separation of state powers was essential to 
minimize corruption in a democracy, “The principle of democracy is corrupted not only 
when the spirit of equality is extinct, but likewise when they fall into a spirit of extreme 
equality…Then the people, incapable of bearing the very power they have delegated, 
want to manage everything themselves, to debate for the senate, to execute for the 
magistrate, and to decide for the judges.”  
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employees, and prohibits any “act which may be contrary to public morality” 
(5.d). Nonetheless, instabilities (political, economic) and institutions with weak 
oversight have allowed political parties to exert undue influence on the executive 
branch administrative tool, the bureaucracy. In a Kathmandu Post article, Chief 
Election Commissioner Bhojraj Pokharel summarised how this came to be:  
“After 1990, with the end of absolute monarchy and declaration of 
constitutional democracy, there was a crisis of confidence between the 
political parties and the bureaucracy. As the bureaucracy was part of the 
old establishment, the political parties could not fully trust the old guards. 
And this led to some major reshuffling in the bureaucracy. The political 
parties promoted bureaucrats of their choice and side-lined the old, mature 
and experienced bureaucrats. This created a psychology of fear among 
the bureaucrats and they became submissive. They sought political 
protection to keep their jobs and get lucrative postings and promotions… 
The bureaucracy was not strong enough and became submissive to the 
political parties for its own vested interests, whereas the political parties 
started to control the bureaucracy for their personal gains” (Pokharel 2016, 
Online).       
 
The overarching question driving this chapter is to understand the extent to 
which political parties are acting as policy brokers for DRR. In doing so, it 
answers the following research questions:  
1. To what extent is DRR being promoted within and throughout the political 
parties? What is political party rhetoric and what is reality? 
2. What barriers and opportunities exist for political parties to push for DRR 
integration both internally throughout the party and externally throughout 
government development initiatives? 
3. How and why are political parties influencing DRR advancement in the 
two districts studied? 
This chapter presents the data from nine in-depth interviews held with central 
and district level MPs, political party spokesmen, and district chairmen from the 
central government, Bardiya, and Solukhumbu districts. In a few instances, other 
government bureaucratic interviews are introduced to contextualise what is 
being argued.  This research focuses on what are colloquially referred to in 
Nepal as the Big Three: Nepali Congress (NC), Communist Party Nepal- United 
Marxist Leninists (CPN-UML), and the Unified Communist Party of Nepal 
(Maoist-Centre).  Each party has large nation-wide membership and are 
organised throughout Nepal to the local level. They have, in various coalition 
arrangements, formed the national government since the end of the Maoist 
insurgency (2006) and the establishment of the Constituent Assembly (CA) in 
2008.  
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8.2 Overview of Political Parties in Nepal 
 
This chapter begins with a context setting overview of each party. It then 
outlines the general party structure and administration and ends with a 
discussion of the pervasive corruption that exists within the political parties.   
8.2.1 Nepali Congress (NC) 
 
The Nepali Congress (NC) is one of the oldest political parties in Nepal. It was 
founded in 1950 when the Nepali National Congress (founded 1948) and Nepal 
Democratic Congress (founded 1947) merged. In alliance with other political 
factions and the monarchy, the NC led the first people’s revolution that 
overthrew the ruling Rana dynasty in 1951 (Dhungel 2005).  It originated as a 
social democratic party but has shifted to a more centralist position with the 
arrival of far-left parties like the Maoists. According to the Nepali Congress Party 
website, “The total Active Members of Nepali Congress are 101,000. The total 
Ordinary Members are recorded to be 500,000. However, it is estimated that the 
actual membership may run up to 1.2 million” (Nepali Congress 2015: Online). 
8.2.2 Communist Party of Nepal- United Marxist Leninists (CPN-
UML)  
 
The Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist Leninist) is the largest 
communist party in Nepal. It was formed in 1991 with the merger of the CPN 
(Marxist) and the CPN (Marxist-Leninist) parties. The merger was a result of the 
first Jana Andolan (People’s Movement) of 1990 which ended the Partyless 
Panchayat System in Nepal. Although communist in name the party is more 
social democratic in orientation, having adopted in 1993 the principal of a 
“People’s Multi-party Democracy” (Janata ko Bahudaliya Janabad) (Nepali 
Times Online). There are two types of memberships in the CPN-UML: general 
and organised. Organised members are required to carry out more work on 
behalf of the party. According to the party website there are 73,220 organised 
members and 400,000 general members in Nepal (CPN-UML Online).  
8.2.3 Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist-Centre) 
 
In the mid-1990s, the Maoist fundamentally disagreed that a constitutional 
monarchy could fix the social, economic and political problems of Nepal. They 
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began a decade long armed insurgency in 1996 to overthrow the monarchy and 
push for fundamental change. They began to see that their military struggle 
would not win the political struggle they were aiming to achieve (Al Jazeera 
2016). The Maoist reached a peace settlement in 2006, decommissioned their 
weapon cache, and became a mainstream political party. In 2008, they won the 
most seats to form the first secular republic government in Nepal. The gulf 
between Maoist ideology and the concessions necessary to perform in a multi-
party democracy continues to internally divide the party. Out of the three parties 
involved in this field work they are furthest left on the political spectrum.  
8.2.4 General Structure and Administration of the Big Three 
Political Parties 
 
This section discusses the general organisational structure of the political 
parties. Each party has a central headquarter office in Kathmandu.  Executive 
party staff and members are supported by various departments which work to 
draft background papers, review policy, gather public opinions, and distribute 
newsletters and communication materials through the party (Dhungel 2005). 
Every five years or so, a National Convention/Congress is held. This is the 
highest decision-making body in the party organisation. Party member delegates 
are selected from all over the country to discuss and vote on the key policy 
issues and vote for the Party President/Secretary General. Situated below the 
National Convention/ Congress is a Central Working Committee (CWC), which 
oversees political operations and policy implementation as set by the National 
Convention/Congress. The diagram below gives a general overview of how the 
parties are structured. There are slight variations and different names used 
between the parties, but the basic organisational structures are similar.  
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Figure 8-1. General Political Party Organisational Structure 
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Based on the above, party decisions are made through democratic processes. 
However, Dhungel (2005) finds that “…personality and factionalism are the main 
reasons for the lack of internal democracy within the Nepali Congress” (Dhungel 
2005). Although Dhungel only mentioned the NC, this is a feature found 
throughout each of the parties, as evidenced by internal party factionalism and 
splinter groups that continually break away from the main political bodies to form 
new parties in Nepal.   
 
Each of the three political parties have district headquarter offices that 
administer the party at the district and local levels (including memberships, party 
meetings, conferences, and communications). The head of the party at the 
district level is the district chairman who is responsible for overseeing party 
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operations. The chairman is elected by the party. For each party at the district 
level, there is a district committee that is made up of members from the 
municipal and VDC units or cells.   
 
The primary policy document generated by political parties at the central level is 
their election manifesto (Dhungel 2005). The election manifesto or platform is a 
document that expresses each party’s values, goals, and plans, which is used 
as an election tool to garner votes and outline their priorities if elected to 
government. Each of the three parties 2013 election manifesto was reviewed for 
DRR content and summarised below.      
8.2.5 Political Party Reputation in Nepal- ‘Stealing for the Team’ 
and the ‘Demands of the People’ 
 
As discussed earlier in Chapter 4, local level elections have not been held since 
1997 meaning elected political members at the district and local levels have not 
been in place since their terms expired in 2002. From 2008-2012, the political 
parties participated in local decision making through the “all party mechanism”, a 
round table of sorts aimed at consensus building where local political 
representatives could participate.  However, as a Carter Centre report 
describes, the all-party mechanism stimulated rampant corruption and bullying 
behaviour. 
“Other interlocutors refer to the process of “finding consensus” as parties 
“dividing up the budget.” As one human rights advocate put it, “if one party 
resists, the get the medicine [pay-off] to keep their silence.” In some 
cases, party affiliated groups receive payments or other direct benefits 
from the budget. For example, a recent budget dispute in a VDC in 
Darchula was resolved when a smaller party received permission to 
distribute jobs to several of its supporters” (Carter Centre 2011: 4). 
The behaviour of the unelected political parties from the “all party mechanisms” 
led to MOFALD disbanding it in 2012, although it still exists informally. This 
entrenched political party behaviour is highly problematic for Nepal governance 
as it demonstrates that corruption is institutionalised and widely pervasive 
throughout Nepal. Mistree, writing generally about corruption in political parties, 
suggests that “parties are central actors as they facilitate the connections and 
protections necessary for corruption to take place” and that political party 
“corruption is frequently about ‘stealing for the team’, not necessary stealing for 
oneself” (Mistree 2015: 370).  
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Since the abolishment of the “all party mechanism” the central government, 
notably the Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Development, has attempted to 
minimise the role of unelected political parties through greater emphasis on a 14 
Step Annual Planning process and Ward Citizen Forums to encourage direct 
citizen participation. However, at the time of this fieldwork, political party 
behaviour continued to be a problem. As reported by a municipal Executive 
Officer: 
There is undue influence of political parties while performing our duty. That 
is the main challenge to maintain. To maintain balance with the political 
parties. Because the political parties are not totally fair, they are not as fair 
as needed. So we have to make an effort to make a balance with the 
political parties.  
Undoubtedly, the political parties have influence over the development priorities 
of Nepal. They galvanise and organise the public and reputedly represent their 
demands. Government bureaucrats affirmed that political party demands 
represented those of the people: 
Their [political party] demands are the demand of the people. Road, street 
light, drinking water, sanitation, solid waste management, etc., etc. The 
demands of the people is the demand of the political parties (LSMC 
Executive Officer). 
 
For better or for worse, the political parties—even when unelected—are 
influential in development decision making. The implications of this for DRR are 
significant. Without public accountability, political parties have less reason to 
embrace proactive public safety measures such as non-structural and structural 
mitigation. Additionally, increased funding for DRR at the local levels may just 
lead to increased misappropriation of public funds. However, beyond the muck 
and the mire, political parties remain key to understanding mainstreaming DRR 
throughout the government of Nepal. They can either broker positive policy 
change or prevent it altogether. The rest of this chapter is focused on better 
understanding how political parties may influence this policy dynamic. 
8.3 Political Party Election Manifestos: The Rhetoric of 
DRR 
 
The discussion turns its attention to the extent to which political parties have 
included DRR in their 2013 election manifestos.  Election manifestos are 
important documents to assess because they represent the culmination of party 
analysis of what will win an election and should then form the backbone of a 
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party’s policy formation once elected to government. As well, depending on the 
content found in the central manifestos one would later expect it to also be 
discussed by the district level respondents as well.  
8.3.1 Nepali Congress 2013 Election Manifesto and DRR 
 
Although the term disaster risk reduction is not used explicitly in the 2013 CA 
election manifesto, it does mention specific elements of DRR including 
embankment building, Chure Hill conservation, climate change awareness and 
prevention, sustainable development, and the construction of environmentally 
friendly infrastructure. Table 8-1 outlines translated key statements from the 
manifesto that relate to disaster management and disaster risk reduction. 
Table 8-1. Excerpts from Nepali Congress Party Election Manifesto (2013) 
Document Heading Statement 
Sustainable 
Development 
Sustainable development is the goal of Nepali 
congress. While using the natural resources, we 
should keep the future generation in mind. They 
should not be deprived of their right to live happily (p. 
31). 
Irrigation and 
Watershed 
Conservation  
 
Technical studies of at least two inter-basin water 
transfer project will be completed and will be brought 
into implementation. Likewise, master plan will be 
formulated and implemented to make irrigation facility 
available throughout the year in all the cultivable land 
of Tarai region. While implementing the irrigation 
planning, technology for reduction of water 
induced disaster will also be implemented side by 
side. Watershed conservation program will be 
conducted throughout Nepal. 
 
Special priority will be given to make irrigation 
available in two million hectares of land of Tarai 
region throughout the year, to build embankments in 
the rivers and for forest management. Budget will be 
allocated and programs will be formulated accordingly 
(p. 39). 
 
Tarai-Madhes special  
 
100 km of embankments will be constructed every 
year to minimize the side effects of floods. While 
constructing the embankments, housing 
arrangements will be made for the landless Dalit 
families in the reclamation ground. Embankments that 
are built on both sides of the rivers in Tarai will be 
developed as motorable roads. 
 
For the protection of biological and agricultural land in 
Tarai, conservation of Chure-Bhawar watershed will 
be conducted as a campaign program (p. 52). 
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Chure Conservation Program will be made effective 
to create environmental balance, to maintain bio-
diversity and for river control in the Tarai. Special 
program will be brought in order to prevent the 
growing desertification in Tarai.  
 
Special planning and structure will be made for 
rescue, relief and resettlement of the victims of natural 
disaster (p. 61). 
Science, technology, 
research and 
development  
 
Nepal Congress will favour the policy of spending 
budget equivalent to 1% of the GDP every year for the 
expansion of the national research capacity on the 
issues like agricultural technology, food processing, 
information technology, industrial technology, 
economics, social science, strategic science, climate 
change prevention and environment & biodiversity 
conversation (p. 46). 
 
Environment  
 
In order to reduce air pollution in the main cities 
including Kathmandu, industries and motor vehicles 
will be replaced with less polluting technologies. 
 
Effective programs will be conducted as a campaign 
in order to keep the important river-streams and 
waterbodies pollution free. 
 
The citizens will be made aware about climate change 
and its adverse effects. It will also be included in the 
formal education. 
 
Infrastructure development will be made environment 
friendly. 
 
Special policies will be formulated to stop the use of 
plastic bags. Manufacturing of environment-friendly 
bags will be encouraged (p. 54). 
Natural Resources 
Management  
 
The potential impact of climate change or man-
made or natural factors on natural resources will be 
studied and will be addressed. 
 
In compliance to the international treaties and 
agreements (where Nepal is a state party) related to 
the protection, promotion and sustainable use of 
natural resources, amendments will be done in the 
related policies and regulations and institutional 
arrangements will be made for their effective 
implementation. 
 
In order to solve the problem of destruction of houses, 
settlement and land in large part of Nepal's Tarai 
region and in the hills in the long term, Chure-Bhawar 
region will be conserved. For that, Chure region 
conservation program will be conducted as a national 
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campaign. 
 
Natural disasters will be reduced as a campaign (p. 
55). 
 
Problem of Squatters 
and unsafe housing 
 
Safe and healthy housing construction and income-
generating programs will be conducted targeting the 
landless, poor, and socially and economically 
backward class. Families residing in places with 
high risks of floods or other disasters will be 
transferred to safer places by constructing new 
housing (p. 65) 
 
8.3.2 CPN-UML 2013 Election Manifesto and DRR 
 
Table 8-2 presents an overview of key statements related to DRR and DM. 
These statements come directly from the English language version of the CPN-
UML 2013 election manifesto. The term DRR is not found, but there are DRR 
initiatives in the manifesto including: embankment building, reducing climate 
change effects, conservation of the Chure region, and notably enforcement of 
earthquake resilient building construction.  
Table 8-2. Excerpts from CPN-UML Party Election Manifesto (2013) 
Document 
Heading 
Statement 
Directive 
Principals 
The main political aim is to establish Federal Democratic 
Republic and to create socialism-oriented independent 
economy. Other principles include…balanced, environment 
friendly and distributive development… (p. 10) 
Vision Protection of Tarai through construction of “People’s 
Embankment” projects (p. 27) 
Roadmap for 
Economic and 
Social 
Transformation 
The public sector will also lead the process to ensure 
equitable development of the social sector, guarantee of 
minimum employment, poverty reduction, environmental 
protection and development, balanced regional 
development, industrial security and economic development 
( 
Problems of 
Landless and 
Homeless People 
The state will provide a housing facility to the families of the 
victims of natural disasters (p. 38) 
Natural 
Resources, 
Environment and 
Urban 
Development 
Minimum 40 percent green (forest) area will be conserved. 
Productivity of forest areas will be increased by ensuring 
effective conservation and management of the forest 
resources… 
 
Sustainable conservation of biodiversity and ecosystem will 
be made effective. State will act responsibility to minimise 
the effects of climate change and enhance the capacity of 
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Nepalese citizens to face climate change challenges (p. 41) 
 
To protect the Chure region, the green belt of Nepal, 
disastrous human settlements and unplanned agriculture 
sectors will be managed through systemic options. 
Establishment of environmental hazardous industries will be 
completely prohibited. People residing around the Chure 
region will be provided with modern energy facilities in order 
to minimize over-exploitation of natural resources. 
 
The “People’s Embankment” programme, which was 
initiated by the previous CPN (CPN-UML) government will 
be intensified. New dams will be constructed in all major 
rivers of Tarai-Madhes. Land reclamation, forest area 
extension and housing for landless people will be other key 
priorities to be included in the development plans (p. 42). 
Urbanisation and 
Housing 
Development 
Planned urbanisation, easy supply of drinking water, 
electricity and other facilities, garbage management and 
special greenery development programmes will be 
implemented in order to make clean, great and beautiful 
Kathmandu Valley and other cities. Mandatory provisions 
will be made to ensure earthquake resistant building 
constructions (p. 42). 
Identity of 
Tarai/Madhesh 
People: Progress 
of the Entire 
Nation 
Special programmes will be implemented to address 
problems of poverty, scarcity and underdevelopment in 
Tarai-Madhesh. Serious attention will be given to resolve 
border invasion, violent crimes, natural disasters and 
social discrimination in those areas (p. 46). 
8.3.3 Maoist 2013 Election Manifesto and DRR 
 
Table 8-3 presents an overview of key statements related to DRR found within 
the translated version of the 2013 Maoist election manifesto. Although not 
explicit in referring to DRR the election manifesto has statements about 
mitigating losses from floods and landslides, Chure Hill conservation, 
sustainable development, and notably the establishment of a National Disaster 
Management Authority.  
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Table 8-3. Excerpts from Maoist-Centre Party Election Manifesto (2013) 
Document Heading Statement 
 
General Every person has a right to security from natural disasters. 
 
Forests and 
Environment 
 
Rules and regulations will be made for the management of 
community forests and focus will be given for the maximum 
utilization of forest resources through their commercial 
development. 
 
Special attention will be given towards Environmental Balance 
for Sustainable Development. Any activities against that will be 
strictly prohibited. 
 
In order to protect Tarai-madhes area from desertification, 
Chure-bhawar will be declared as a Conservation area and 
the responsibility for its protection and the legitimate use will be 
given to the inhabitants there. 
 
In order to maintain healthy environment by promoting greenery 
in the urban areas, Urban Forest Development Program will be 
carried out with priority. 
Necessary steps will be taken to prevent environmental 
imbalance in the hilly region. 
 
Effective programs will be formulated to control urban and 
industrial pollution. 
 
Environmental conventions to which Nepal is a State Party will 
be effectively implemented. 
Irrigation and Water 
Related Disaster 
Control 
 
Revolution will be brought in the irrigation sector through large 
and medium types of irrigation projects in Tarai (in addition to the 
underground irrigation projects) and medium and small types of 
irrigation projects in the hills and mountainous area, and through 
new technology based projects.  
 
Focus will be given on the construction of agricultural ponds, 
canals and lift irrigation for the reliable irrigation in the fields on 
the bank of rivers in the hills.  
 
Short-term and long term planning will be made and 
implemented for the mitigation of losses during rainy season due 
to landslides in the hills and floods in the Tarai. 
 
Arrangements will be made to provide employment opportunities 
to the local communities through ‘People’s Embankment’ 
project in Tarai region. 
Flood related disasters will be reduced through the construction 
of embankments in large and medium-sized rivers in the next 10 
years and in the remaining and necessary rivers in the next 20 
years.  
Special programs will be brought to protect the villages and 
towns from floods and landslides. 
 
Our country is highly vulnerable to natural and man-made 
disasters like earthquake, water-related disasters, climate 
change etc. Therefore, initiatives will be made towards 
dealing with the natural disasters in a planned, systematic 
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Document Heading Statement 
 
and procedural way. In this regard, necessary revision of 
‘National Strategy for Disaster Risk Management 2009’ will be 
done and National Disaster Management Authority will be formed 
as soon as possible for effective disaster management under the 
leadership of Central Executive Head and action will be taken. 
8.3.4 Discussion of Political Party 2013 Manifestos  
 
Mining the 2013 second Constituent Assembly election manifestos of the Big 
Three parties for DRR proved surprising- more content was found than 
expected. There are aspects of DRR included in each of the manifestos, dealt 
with through mostly technical and broad statements. For instance, the CPN-UML 
makes specific mention of ensuring earthquake resistant building construction (a 
technical solution) and the NC state that “natural disasters will be reduced as a 
campaign” (presented in broad terms with no implementation details; emphasis 
added by author). It is apparent that disasters and minimising their 
consequences is politically expedient enough to warrant being an item in their 
election platforms. Interestingly the term DRR was not used explicitly in any of 
the manifestos, suggesting that parties and the people they are trying to 
represent are not widely aware of Hyogo Framework for Action terminology.  
 
The parties have prioritised climate change adaptation and other environmental 
factors. There is a clear link between development and environmental 
degradation (e.g. “infrastructure development will be made environment 
friendly”, “environmental protection and development”). The direct connection 
between poorly implemented development and increased disaster risks (i.e. 
road construction) is not evident. Perhaps acknowledging this fact in a manifesto 
may be seen to implicate the parties in past development failures. Both the NC 
and Maoists commit to enforcing existing international environmental treaties to 
which Nepal is a signatory.  
 
Looking at all three manifestos, one might be inclined to think the only disaster 
risk in Nepal is flooding in the Tarai. Tarai flooding has several major 
components in each of the manifestos: 1. large-scale building of embankments 
and 2. conservation of the Chure-Bhawar36 ecology.  There are several possible 
                                               
36 As mentioned earlier in Chapter 4, the Chure Hills (also known as Siwalik) are 
geologically and ecologically fragile hill region that marks the boundary between the 
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explanations for Tarai flood reduction prominence in the manifestos. Firstly, the 
frequency and magnitude of flooding in this region adds to its political salience. 
Additionally, the Tarai is an important geopolitical region for political parties 
because of its high population density37, its importance in agricultural production 
and food security, and due to the on-going Madhesi tensions (discussed in 
Chapter 4). Additionally, the political parties are under foreign pressure from 
India because of the cross border flood hazard shared by both nation-states. In 
contrast, only one reference to earthquake risk reduction strategy is found in the 
CPN-UML manifesto.  This is remarkable considering how well the earthquake 
risk in Nepal is publicised, particularly in Kathmandu Valley. The Maoist party 
was the only party to mention landslide mitigation, a hill/mountain hazard. What 
is clear from this is that at the time of the drafting of the manifestos, earthquake 
and landslide risk reduction were not as politically salient as Tarai flooding.  
 
The Maoist manifesto is by far the most comprehensive in dealing with DRR and 
DM issues. It states that “every person has a right to security from natural 
disasters” suggesting DRR is human right that ought to be provided as a public 
good.  Along with statements made about embankments and Chure 
conservation, they also point to institutional gaps and weaknesses in the Nepal 
government that they would amend through the establishment of a National 
Disaster Management Authority with executive level oversight. The Maoist 
manifesto also refers to revision of the National Strategy for Disaster Risk 
Management 2009, a document that was drafted while the Maoists led the GON 
in 2009. These institutional changes have likely come through advocacy by the 
INGO/NGO, NRRC, and academic communities concerned with disaster and 
development in Nepal (IFRC 2011; NRRC- Flagship 5 2016; Jones et al. 2014). 
The Maoists are the only party to have framed DRM in a way that suggests their 
party prioritised DRM regardless of public demand. 
                                                                                                                               
Tarai and the start of the foothills to the Himalayans. Their environmental integrity plays 
a significant role in minimizing the risk of floods (Pokhrel 2013; Shrestha 2012). 
Strategies to protect them include environmental conservation, livelihood strategies, and 
natural resource management. 
37 Nearly half of Nepali households live in the Tarai region (n= 2,527,558) as compared 
with Hill region (n= 2,532,041) and Mountain (n=363,698) (GON 2012). 
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8.4 Reality of Mainstreaming DRR Through the Political 
Parties 
 
It is one thing for the political parties to have included aspects of DRR into their 
election manifestos and quite another for them to actually advocate for its 
implementation and make it a party platform. Whether or not its inclusion in the 
election manifestos is mere rhetoric or a substantive policy direction within the 
parties is explored in the subsequent sections. It does so by examining the 
extent to which DRR has been promoted by the party central office, and also by 
assessing the level of awareness of the respondents.  
8.4.1 Is DRR being promoted within and throughout the political 
parties? 
 
After the election manifesto, another indicator of whether DRR was a 
substantive party platform would be whether or not a party has invested in 
DM/DRR training, awareness raising, or programmes.  
We have not conducted any programs directly, where we train or educate 
cadres or people to tell them to prepare for disaster management. I don’t 
think any other party has done that. If anyone is saying he has done that 
he is bull-shitting (NC Central). 
The work that was found at the central level was either very preliminary or none 
at all. The CPN-UML party was the only party to have established a DRR desk 
within its party central office. Its creation was initiated by the respondent, an 
CPN-UML Constituent Assembly member who is a high profile (former 
Education Minister) political champion and advocate for DRR in Nepal owing to 
his doctoral work and involvement in HFA and SFDRR negotiations. Not yet 
actualised, his long term vision was for the desk to serve as the central 
coordination point for mainstreaming DRR within and throughout the party down 
to the district and local levels: 
And just channelling from the top down it is easy. Just like this 
establishment of the department in the central level. Just establishment 
especially the desk in the central level. And just make a circular like that 
directives and all the things. It is circulated to the lower level, then 
definitely there will be department and cell and nucleus there in the party 
regional level, and local level. Like this. 
At the time of the interview, the DRR desk had a low profile within the CPN-UML 
party administration (located within the Education and Human Resource 
Department) but represented a step forward in raising the profile of DRR 
throughout the party.  
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The CPN-UML representative was not only promoting DRR within his party, but 
as a member of the Constituent Assembly, he was also advocating DRR within 
the CA and was planning to lead consultation efforts once the legislation on 
Disaster Risk Management reached the parliament (see Chapter 6). He spoke of 
adapting the SFDRR to the Nepal context, “I am so much motivated and guided 
by the HFA… [Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction] will be the 
guiding principle I think so, for making our vision on our Nepalese context”. His 
outlook and perspectives were unique in that he had advanced studies in DRR 
and was active in promoting DRM both within his party and throughout the 
Government of Nepal. His work is again discussed in the earthquake post-script 
concluding this chapter. 
 
Of the three central level respondents, only the Maoist reported that they had 
included DRR in their party manifesto but admitted that no detailed policies, 
plans, or programmes had been established to facilitate implementation.  The 
respondent did speak of future plans for the party to conduct DRR awareness 
and training programmes for cadres and the public and he spoke about the 
credence given to the issue through the party Chairman:  
Talking about the party, the documents are written by our Chairman. After 
the National Convention two years ago, every document that has been 
written includes this issue. The Chairman has mentioned this issue with 
great importance and he will present that as an important thing in the next 
National Convention. Like the government has different ministries, we also 
have different departments that look after different things. Like the Ministry 
of Science and Technology and the Environment, we also have similar 
departments that look after this issue. The department makes solid 
programs; the proposal however is kept forward by the Chairman of the 
party (Maoist Central). 
This was motivated by a belief that “disasters have created a huge impact and 
adverse effects on the overall development of the country.” In his words the 
party had “thought deeply” about DRR and CCA and would discuss at length 
during the party convention scheduled in ten months’ time (January 2016).  
 
Both the CPN-UML and the Maoist respondents indicated that the party 
mechanisms (e.g. party members, organisational structure) could be used to 
promote and advocate DRR initiatives from central to local levels. The NC 
representative offered a contrasting opinion. He was a member of the CA who 
represented a Kathmandu Valley constituency, and demonstrated less 
awareness of DRR than the other two central respondents. Yet his responses 
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are likely more representative of the majority of political party members at the 
central level. When he was asked if he believed that disasters had adversely 
affected Nepal’s development trajectory, he responded with “no, not really” and 
indicated that it had been almost 90 years since the 1934 earthquake. He did 
admit that the absence of a large-scale disaster in Kathmandu Valley resulted in 
people “wrongly taking it for granted”. Unlike the other two representatives, his 
outlook was far more Kathmandu centric rather than broadly party focused. He 
acknowledged that smaller disasters, “limited to 2-3 districts”, had occurred in 
other regions of the country. It is telling that he did not see the agglomeration of 
smaller regional disasters (outside Kathmandu Valley) as negatively impacting 
Nepal’s development trajectory.  
 
At first the NC (Central) representative confused DRR with disaster 
management. Once it was clarified he strongly discouraged the suggestion that 
the NC political party could play a role in advancing DRR implementation.  
…our main focus is to do organizational work for the politics. Create 
political agendas. Create networks. Training of the cadres. That is our 
main agendas. If you try to thrust something that really doesn’t fit too 
much, it is not really going to be that effective. It will look very nice in your 
report and books. But more than the political parties I think the 
government has to be responsible. 
His insistence was pragmatic. He worried that the Congress “old fogey’s” whom 
he described as “forty-five year old guys sitting in the village” would hear about 
DRR and think “this is not for me.” Instead he suggested that the youth wing of 
the party would be more receptive to embracing DRR and would be less of a 
“waste of time”. His comments indicate that there is a resistance to new 
development approaches and that DRR is not a topic that warrants getting on 
the ‘political agenda’ in the Nepali Congress.  
 
8.4.2 How well was the concept of DRR understood by 
respondents? 
 
With no or very minimal central party led activities related to DRR, this next 
section explores how respondents understood risk reduction and its link with 
development. To begin with, general awareness of DRR within the Constituent 
Assembly was deemed low: 
Many people don’t have the knowledge of this. Like your country Canada. 
The many politicians they don’t have, in Nepal also. We are 601 members 
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of parliaments in the house, but almost they are new. More than 80% are 
the new members of parliament. And they don’t have enough knowledge 
(CPN-UML Central).  
However, amongst the respondents there was little doubt that certain 
development activities are exacerbating disaster risks in Nepal. A respondent 
from the CPN-UML (Solukhumbu) clearly delineated the trade-offs of current 
economic and physical development in his district with increased disaster risks: 
Unless there is electricity and roads, people don’t get the feeling of 
development. Like just to charge a cell phone, electricity is required. Road 
is required in order to transport machineries and other materials for 
building an electricity project…We don’t have sufficient budget to build 
roads by avoiding too much destruction and preventing disaster in future 
like floods and landslides. Development has become a necessity while it is 
also inviting disasters (CPN-UML Solukhumbu). 
The importance of road construction for Nepal’s development was earlier 
discussed in Chapter 4. Roads were frequently discussed by respondents as a 
development agenda that is increasing disaster risk. For example, one central 
level respondent identified the link between road construction and landslide risk: 
While constructing roads, we are not doing that in a planned way. Enough 
study of the land and the adverse effects that construction can bring in 
future is not done. Without any technical team, dozers are used to dig the 
roads which results in landslides. The digging of roads in a haphazard way 
and the use of machines that cause harm to the environment should be 
stopped (Central Maoist). 
This linkage was also identified by another central level political respondent, as 
evidenced by his recognition that retaining walls were a missing but necessary 
feature for reducing the risk of landslides:  
…of the roads we built, most of the roads in rural area, the excavator goes 
and digs up the road and you have a plain road. The kind of roads you 
have in Canada, US, Japan, Europe, we don’t have that. We don’t have 
the roads that have all the retaining wall (Central NC).  
While roads were the most frequently discussed, they were not the only example 
given of development activities exacerbating disaster risks. The built 
environment was also identified. A respondent indicated how the built 
environment in Nepal is not able to withstand earthquakes: 
So whether you look at the construction here, whether it is houses, public 
buildings, temples, roads—none of them—the airport! They are not 
prepared for it. So our infrastructure, I think except for a few buildings, now 
I think the government has been quite strict to make it earthquake proof. 
As far as I am aware our parliament [building] is; it can go up to resist 
about 8 Richter scale. But I think most of the other infrastructures will go 
down if there is a huge earthquake (NC Central).    
Finally, two other examples were mentioned of the development-disaster 
linkage. One district respondent mentioned unregulated sand and stone mining 
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from rivers38as an activity that was increasing disaster risk (NC Bardiya). 
Another example was provided by a respondent who discussed copper mining 
and its role in causing a landslide (NC Solukhumbu).  
…three years ago there is one village… it is a disastrous village because 
there is one copper mine. [The copper mine] are digging under the village 
and there is a big landslide there. And various houses destroyed from that 
landslide (NC Solukhumbu).   
It is clear from the responses that the political party members understood how 
development activities exacerbate the risk of disasters. Conversely (and more 
obviously) respondents understood that disasters destroy key infrastructure. 
Again, the loss of roads was used to illustrate this point, particularly in Bardiya 
district: 
…the floods have been causing a huge destruction on the infrastructures 
like roads and bridges of Bardiya district every year (CPN-UML Bardiya). 
Similarly, the floods have destroyed or created threat on the physical 
infrastructure like road and bridges (Maoist Bardiya). 
However, in the majority of cases, respondents demonstrated a narrow view of 
what constitutes development. Respondents spoke mainly of how physical 
infrastructure development (e.g. roads, built environment, mining) exacerbated 
disaster risks (the exception being the Maoist respondent from Bardiya who 
discussed the issue of landlessness). As one respondent said, it is through 
physical infrastructure development that people get the “feeling of development.” 
Rarely did they discuss the development-disaster link in relation to other 
development determinants, i.e. how weak and corrupted political institutions 
exacerbates disaster risk. The closest the respondents came to implicating the 
dysfunctional nature of Nepali politics were seen in two responses from Bardiya 
district: 
The past and present leadership and the lack of will and vision in them to 
do something for this district is the main reason for the backwardness of 
Bardiya (Maoist Bardiya).  
The bureaucrats and the political leaders need to bring changes to their 
behaviour (NC Bardiya).  
 
All of the political party representatives from the districts had been lifelong 
residents of the district and active in politics for many years. None of them 
                                               
38 The stones and sand extracted from rivers are sold, crushed and used for construction 
purposes.  Because of DDC lack of oversight of private industry (Shrestha 2014) the 
volume of sediment being extracted is outpacing the deposits resulting in an increased 
flood risk and faster river flows (Shrestha 2013).  
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reported that they had received training in DM or DRR. In Bardiya district, all 
three party chairmen were informed about risk reduction strategies for flooding 
and each felt that flooding was adversely impacting the development of the 
district. All three had been chairmen of their parties during the torrential rain of 
2014 that caused the massive Karnali River flood in Bardiya and surrounding 
districts. Each respondent offered a different perspective on DRR focusing on 
the environmental, social or technical aspects of risk reduction. For example, 
when asked what DRR meant, the NC representative talked about the 
importance of environmental conservation to reduce flood risks: 
People should be made aware about the adverse effects of deforestation, 
uncontrolled extraction of stones and sand and things like that. 
Environment has to be preserved so that landslides and floods do not take 
place (NC Bardiya).  
He pointed to the fact that in the NC manifesto there is mention of building river 
embankments in order to reduce the risk of floods. 
 
The Maoist chairman spoke about the social consequences and the high 
vulnerability of the displaced and landless within the district: 
Floods are indeed impacting the overall development and growth of 
Bardiya. The floods have swept away human settlements and destroyed 
lives and properties. It’s obvious that it attracts everyone’s attention 
towards it. People’s lives have been affected and a big question has been 
aroused on how to do the proper management of flood victims. People 
have lost everything and have become landless (Maoist Bardiya).   
He further added:  
We have been giving priority to building houses. The homeless people 
need a place to live; they can’t always live under trees or in tents. But still 
our main priority is river control or minimizing the risk of fires and wildlife 
and to provide relief to the people. We believe in adopting mitigating 
measures in order to reduce the risk of disasters. 
He mentioned that climate change was addressed in the Maoist manifesto but 
did not think there was any mention of DRR or disaster management (as 
discussed above, the Maoist election manifesto was the most comprehensive in 
its inclusion of DRR/DM issues).  Despite this, he said that the party was 
“actively working to aware the people about disasters and finding ways for 
reducing the risk of disasters.” 
 
The Bardiya CPN-UML respondent was a structural engineer by profession. He 
had been active in promoting building code implementation in the district capital 
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municipality Guleryia and his view and understanding of DRR clearly came from 
his professional knowledge: 
Disasters are unpredictable and inevitable. We cannot completely control 
the disasters but we can work to minimize the risk or destruction it can 
bring. In order to minimize the risk of floods, embankments should be built 
in the rivers. Similarly, the families residing around the bank of rivers who 
are at high risk of floods should be made aware… Moreover, modern 
technologies for disaster risk reduction should be used and made 
available (CPN-UML Bardiya). 
His party had “made a commitment” by including DRR in their 2013 election 
manifesto. It “was an important issue” that his party would work to reduce 
disaster risks when his party was in government (at the time of the interview the 
central government was led by a coalition of NC and CPN-UML, and the Maoist 
were in opposition). He boasted that the NC and CPN-UML coalition 
government has increased river control spending from 80 million rupees to 390 
million rupees in light of the severity of the 2014 floods.  
 
In Solukhumbu, the party chairmen for the NC and CPN-UML (Maoist 
respondent was unavailable at the time of the field visit) also showed awareness 
of DRR. Unlike Bardiya, a large scale disaster affecting a large portion of the 
district had not occurred in recent memory, yet frequent smaller disasters (for 
example a fire that destroyed eight homes the previous year) were common. 
Because of the fragile hill/mountain terrain of Solukhumbu district the risks from 
development projects are much greater than in the flat Tarai and the chairmen 
seemed more sensitized to the risks that development brought. 
Development has become the must but at the same time it has brought 
destruction. People complain a lot about the destruction (CPN-UML 
Solukhumbu). 
The CPN-UML representative in particular showed a strong understanding of 
DRR. He talked of the “serious” impact disasters are having on the districts 
social and economic development discussing how a flood in Wakku VDC 
displaced many people and caused two schools to be relocated and a glacial 
lake outburst that destroyed five trail bridges. He had not received any specific 
disaster management training so his awareness of the issues surrounding 
disaster and development came from his personal experiences as a party 
member and lifelong resident of Solukhumbu. He described himself as “the son 
of an ordinary farmer” and linked his political efforts with his personal 
experience:  
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I was active in such kind of works from the past and I believed that every 
one of us has to give our best from our side. These days, we are focusing 
on one toilet in each house. This will help reduce the spread of diseases 
and prevent epidemics. I am inspired from the beginning because my 
mother died of dysentery when I was 2 years old. As I grew up I developed 
a thought to do something for the society because of which I am involved 
in this. 
His counterpart, the NC (Solukhumbu) Chairman, spoke about the various 
campaigns the district Nepal Congress party had worked on to minimize disaster 
risks in the district. For example, each July the NC party in Solukhumbu 
campaigns against deforestation. He spoke of a sub-committee that used to 
exist at the central level that had been working on the issue of disasters but it 
had not been functioning in the past three years. When it was functioning it 
would circulate documents throughout the party. The work that the NC was 
doing on deforestation was a local initiative brought about because of the effect 
it was having on the district. He also said the NC cadres received disaster 
management training on an annual basis. However, this was not comprehensive 
training, but rather when the party was running an annual meeting they would 
include an awareness session on disasters.   
8.4.3 Discussion 
 
This section has answered the first question posed in the introduction: To what 
extent is DRR being promoted within and throughout the political parties? What 
is rhetoric and what is reality? As found, there is very little promotion of DRR, 
despite elements of its inclusion within each of the election manifestos, within 
and throughout the parties. Despite this, there are a few striking things that 
comes from the above discussion.  
 
Firstly, at the central level there is the early start of a possible political advocacy 
coalition forming, as seen with the  establishment of the DRR desk within the 
CPN-UML party. Likewise, in the Maoist party, DRR/DM had been included in its 
election manifesto and the respondent indicated that the Party Chairman 
Pushpa Kamal Dahal, (who would later become Prime Minister in 2016) was 
supportive of DRR. Efforts to integrate DRR from the central level are at an early 
stage of implementation in two of the three parties (CPN-UML and Maoist) and 
apparently non-existent in the other (NC).  
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The central level respondent who strongly discouraged the idea of his party 
playing a role in pushing for DRR was the only outlier opinion found. His 
opinions were distinct, strongly opined, and out of the three, perhaps the least 
rhetorical. He could not see local level party members promoting DRR, but he 
did see the youth wing as amenable to the idea. His response suggests that 
policy innovation and change is not embraced by the establishment, whereas 
the youth wing is more amenable to new policies and change. His frankness 
tempers the other positive responses provided by his counterparts, and certainty 
seems true in light of the background discussion presented in Chapter 4 into 
Nepal’s government and political history.  
 
However, the district respondents in particular, clearly grasped the development-
disaster nexus. Their understanding of DRR has not come through specialised 
training or central level party interventions. Instead, the district chairmen (in 
particular the CPN-UML respondent from Bardiya) understood DRR through 
their own lived experiences as political party chairmen and local residents. This 
seems to suggest—at least the district level—party members may not be as 
dismissive of DRR as the above central level respondent suggests. Nor should 
district level political party chairmen be discounted when considering shifting the 
DM paradigm to DRR.  
8.5 Barriers and Opportunities for Political Parties to 
Influence Policy Paradigm Change 
 
Having established that political parties are key actors in mainstreaming DRR 
throughout government development sectors, this section examines the barriers 
and opportunities to this proposition. One major barrier has already been 
identified. In Chapter 4, the case of the rampant corruption within the Nepal 
Electricity Authority was discussed. And the obvious opportunity political parties 
have to influence change is to push for development projects through the District 
Development Committee to include risk reduction approaches. The following 
discussion is based on what the respondents identified as party barriers and 
opportunities. 
 
This research shows that political party members see their ability to influence 
DRR implementation as dependent on internal party process (i.e. the party 
needs to establish a clear central level vision concerning DRR and conduct 
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training and awareness initiatives). For example, a district level respondent 
suggested his party could do more for DRR at the district level if the central NC 
party initiated training and programmes for cadres:  
 
The party should provide trainings about DRR to its members and cadres 
from time to time. This will help create a better influence and increase our 
ability to do DRR works. We can do that. It’s due to lack of programme in 
the party about that. If the party realises that as an important thing and 
includes that in the plannings  of the party, we can obviously do that (NC 
Bardiya).  
 
Coupled with the above, two of the central level respondents agreed that the 
absence of a clear party vision of DRR was hampering efforts for the party to 
advocate for DRR. The Maoist (Central) believed:  
a concept on DRR has to be built in the parties but in order to bring that 
into action, plans and programmes have to be made…. The state has to 
have vision regarding this issue.  
The CPN-UML (Central) representative agreed that it was important that:  
all political parties have to mention, clearly mention, their ideas and visions 
and goals regarding DRR and CCA in their election manifesto. 
 
The need for party vision was echoed by the NC (Solukhumbu) respondent as 
well, mentioning the lack of “concrete vision” around DRR in his party.  
Another obvious barrier that came from the data is the current institutional 
arrangements created by the out-dated legislation (see Chapter 6). One 
respondent described the current institutional arrangements as keeping the 
political parties ‘in the wings’.  
But actively the Nepal government policy and legal framework, disaster 
management and disaster risk reduction and co-ordination are with the 
CDO main coordination. And DDC, LDOs and politics parities, they are the 
wings, they are a component. But the coordinating body is CDO is the 
government policy and legal framework (NC Solukhumbu). 
In the districts, the connection between the district development committee 
(DDC)—responsible for oversight of district development—and its potential role 
in integrating DRR was missed by most political party respondents. For 
example, a respondent discussed DRR in terms of technical and short term fixes 
offered by the District Disaster Relief Committee, overseen by the Chief District 
Officer (a staff member appointed by MOHA): 
We have DDRC under the chairmanship of CDO which works to minimize 
the risk the destruction caused by the floods by adopting risk reduction 
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techniques before the monsoon starts. In the flood last year, the DDRC 
worked in a very effective way on the rescue works (CPN-UML Bardiya). 
His comment suggests the issue of DRR is not being addressed as a 
development issue by the district development committee in any substantive 
way.  
 
One party respondent, echoing the concerns of the district and local bureaucrats 
in Chapter 7, cited the frequent transfer of the LDO as a general barrier for 
working on development issues in Solukhumbu: 
The problem in this district is that the office heads are frequently changing. 
If we talk about LDO, our current LDO came in this district just about 5 
months ago. The LDOs are changed 2-3 times within a year. That is 
obviously not a good trend as development works will be hampered due to 
the frequent change in the LDOs. Around 10-11 months ago we 
sanctioned budget in various sectors for development works but we were 
not able to use the budget because of lack of LDO. Therefore, the 
challenge within the bureaucracy is that the office heads are changing 
frequently and they take time in taking over the responsibilities (CPN-UML 
Solukhumbu). 
In speaking with the respondents, it was clear that the allocation of funding for 
development works was another barrier to DRR. From the district perspective, 
having their party lead the government increased their prospects for large 
infrastructure funding. Funding is allocated politically rather than based on 
hazard and risk assessments.  
If the government is led by a single party, the party brings a lot of 
programmes as mentioned in their manifesto. But if it’s a coalition 
government, the party cannot do all the programmes they want. For larger 
projects and programmes, national policies are formed and that drives the 
work on such projects. In case of smaller programmes, more programmes 
go to that place where there are more public demands, more public 
awareness and participation, and active political involvement. That, 
however, also depends on the districts, the political parties and the 
politicians (NC Solukhumbu).  
As mentioned in the above quote, public awareness of DRR was also discussed 
as a barrier for the party respondents at the district level. Without public 
pressure, the political parties had little motivation to advocate for DRR in 
government development projects.  
The public are not very much aware about this issue either. There are very 
few demands from the public for risk reduction works (Maoist Bardiya). 
Actually disaster problem and issues is not the limelight in our country 
right now. This time Nepalese society and our communities are really 
talking about constitutional political process. This is our mainstreaming 
debate here (NC Solukhumbu). 
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Solukhumbu is a rural district and very less people are educated. 
Awareness level is very low. We have not been able to provide necessary 
awareness to people. Even here in the head quarter, there is the lack of 
awareness in many people (CPN-UML Solukhumbu). 
Finally, this section looks at the opportunities that came to light in the party 
respondents. An untapped opportunity exists for political parties to mobilize their 
cadres to actively mobilize to participate in DRR initiatives. The parties can 
influence change through their vast organisational structures. The NC party 
respondent in Solukhumbu reported that his party had cells in all thirty district 
VDCs and in the one municipality. This included nearly 10000 general members 
and 2500 active members throughout the district. In the CPN-UML 
(Solukhumbu) there are 41 members in the UML district committee, 1056 active 
members and 1500-1600 general members in the district. Additionally there are 
auxiliary organisations such as student and women associations affiliated with 
each party in the district. Already, in times of disaster, political parties mobilise 
their membership base to assist with response and relief: 
First of all, we asked all our members and cadres in this district for help. 
As per that, the cadres were deployed at different places to help the 
people who suffered the flood. We pressurized the government and 
requested various organization and people for immediate help. Our cadres 
worked together with them for providing rescue and relief for the victim 
(NC Bardiya). 
When any disaster takes place, we immediately go to the affected area 
and help the people. I myself am actively involved in this. Our members 
reach the villages when there are fire cases. We believe that we have to 
help the people in need and during emergencies (CPN-UML Solukhumbu). 
Although much less frequently, party members are also mobilized for DRR work. 
In Solukhumbu district, both the NC and the CPN-UML reported that their party 
cadres volunteered during tree planting initiatives.  
Every year our Nepali congress, we planned a plantation program. This is 
in July. We launch a plantation program. Auspicious of our leader BP 
Koirala and we campaign against deforestation because of landslides and 
our water resources. Now I think this is a success here. We are hopeful 
and positive (NC Solukhumbu). 
Presumably, through central party visioning and awareness programme 
development, the parties can further mobilize their members for risk reduction 
activities.  
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8.6 Political Party DRR Influence and Advancement in 
Bardiya and Solukhumbu 
 
Despite what the NC central respondent said—that it was a “waste of time” to 
integrate DRR throughout the party—over the course of this research it became 
apparent that party representatives were engaging in, albeit limited, DRR work. 
What is striking is the different approach being taken in each district.  
In Bardiya, the primary DRR initiative political parties discussed was the Karnali 
River Control Project, a controversial large scale embankment building project 
aimed at reducing flood risk.  
We have been making some initiatives. Like, the office of Karnali River 
Control Project has been recently established in Rajapur. It’s a huge 
project with an aim to control the Bheri and Karnali  River in an organised 
way. When our party was in government  we made initiatives for that and it 
has now been possible (Maoist Bardiya).  
As discussed above, embankment building featured prominently in all three 
election manifestos. Remarkably, the Bardiya respondents indicated that they 
were working in coordination to push for the embankment building and river 
control: 
For the river control in Rajapur, certain budget is also being allocated. As 
per the commitment of our party, the coalition government of the CPN-
UML and Congress sanctioned budget for the risk reduction…” (CPN-UML 
Bardiya). 
Similarly, the parties have come to the conclusion that a master plan has 
to be made for controlling the Babai River. If possible, a separate project 
like the Karnali River Control Project has to be started for the Babai River 
as well in order to reduce the water-borne disasters in the district (Maoist 
Bardiya). 
On the face of it, the multi-party coordination around embankment building 
appears to be a proactive DRR initiative. However, current thinking about risk 
reduction approaches in the Tarai suggests that embankments are not best 
practice. Embankments are exacerbating flood risk, since they are being 
constructed haphazardly and are not part of a comprehensive flood risk 
management strategy. A recent multi-agency report on the Karnali River 2014 
flood reported:  
“These embankments, however, are not part of a wider integrated flood 
risk management program…There is little upstream-downstream and 
right-left bank coordination. This is a problem because many of these 
projects are expected to take several years and the construction process 
will significantly influence flood patterns and the potential communities 
along the river face. Sedimentation rates and ‘safe failure’ principles are 
not being addressed” (ISET et al. 2015: 27).  
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Although the respondents made it appear that the embankments were coming 
from political party advocacy, in fact the politics of it was much greater. As 
previously mentioned (Chapter 4), Tarai flooding is a cross-border hazard 
shared with India. The funding and impetus for the embankments comes from 
India. This was revealed in an interview held at the central level with the Ministry 
of Irrigation (Department of Water Induced Disaster Prevention):  
That’s why in cooperation the Indian Government also supported and the 
technologically and financially and the Nepal government is using the 
technology and mitigation works. Mostly we are making the embankment 
and river training works to the foothills up to the border of India and Nepal. 
The big projects are there. So these are the one part of the project, the 
central level projects because the India government support the Nepal 
Government in related to flood. These are the central level projects…. 
That is the name of the project, the Peoples Embankment.  
Absent from the Bardiya discussions was any mention of Chure hill conservation 
strategies (also found in all three election manifestos) or other approaches to 
flood risk reduction (e.g. flood resistant buildings, education strategies). The sole 
focus of each of the three party members was on embankment building.  
The DRR approaches discussed in Solukhumbu were different from Bardiya.  
 
Firstly, the political parties in Bardiya did not speak about engaging in a 
coordinated strategy for DRR. Also the DRR approaches were much smaller in 
scale and more advocacy and livelihoods based. Tree planning and 
deforestation initiatives within the district have already been discussed as was 
the CPN-UML respondents efforts of hygiene promotion through his ‘one toilet 
per house’ strategy.   
And we lobbied to stop this mining project. Because of this we save the 
village and save the farmer and people’s lives from further landslides (NC 
Solukhumbu). 
The political party respondents from Solukhumbu identified some intriguing and 
holistic DRR solutions. Although the effectiveness of their efforts are not under 
investigation, it is interesting how they framed the DRR work that was occurring. 
Their approaches were tailored to the local needs of the community. In the 
example of the ‘one toilet’ initiative, the respondent understood health as a 
component of a resilient district. This is further support for the conclusion that 
party respondents had a local understanding of DRR even without central level 
awareness and training campaigns.  
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8.6.1 Discussion 
 
This section answers the final question posed in the introduction: How and why 
are political parties influencing DRR advancement in Bardiya and Solukhumbu? 
This section has uncovered two very distinct approaches taken by the political 
parties in Bardiya and Solukhumbu. The differences can obviously be attributed 
to the different geographies and hazards found in each district. The distinct way 
that the parties have approached DRR strategies may shed some light on what 
stimulates parties to adopt DRR approaches in the first place, 1) external 
funding and  political pressure, 2) and local knowledge and understanding of 
risk.   
 
In Bardiya, political parties reported that they are actively advocating for 
embankment construction. This makes sense since the district is frequently 
affected by floods. Each party took some ownership for the establishment of the 
Karnali River Control Office and spoke of it as a coordinated multi-party strategy. 
Why they galvanized around this approach rather than Chure Hills conservation 
for example is difficult to answer. Their coordination around embankment 
construction sounds eerily similar to the coordinated round table approach of the 
‘all party mechanisms’, which resulted in a well-documented tactic for dividing 
the spoils of development budgets. While there is no evidence in this research 
that supports the contention that the political parties are profiting from the 
embankment funds, in light of the widespread and systemic party corruption it 
should not be discounted. Embankments also fit Nepal’s development appetite 
for physical infrastructure solutions that allow for ‘high-optic’ development 
solutions. By ‘high-optic’ it is meant large scale infrastructure that visibly shows 
development progress. Notwithstanding these negative associations, Bardiya’s 
example also demonstrates the power that external funding and pressure has on 
stimulating DRR promotion.   
 
The type of DRR work the political parties undertook in Solukhumbu is more 
interesting because it was beyond the influence of external DRR interventions.  
Prior to the earthquake, Solukhumbu had received very few DRR interventions 
from NGOs. There was far less donor funding for mitigation in Solukhumbu than 
in Bardiya. As such, the DRR solutions proposed by the party respondents were 
much smaller in scale, less coordinated amongst the parties, and addressed 
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more livelihood issues that reflected the physical environment of the district. 
What this data shows is that left to their own devices, the Solukhumbu 
respondents devised strategies that addressed their particular locality concerns. 
As much as the respondents advocated for centralized ‘visioning’ of DRR, this 
section clearly illustrates that top-down party prescriptions could overshadow 
locally derived DRR solutions.   
8.7 Post-Earthquake Post Script 
 
The only significant political development found during the post-earthquake 
research was in the development of the National Campaign for Disaster Risk 
Reduction (NC for DRR), a coalition of thirteen MP’s who were actively 
campaigning for stronger DRM legislation.  The central level UML member 
discussed in this chapter was its chief organizer. While the draft DRM legislation 
was waiting to be read by parliament for years, the earthquake stimulated its 
progression through the Constituent Assembly. As discussed in Chapter 6, the 
draft legislation as currently written would establish a National Disaster 
Management Authority under MOHA. The NC for DRR group reported during an 
interview, that they managed to the have the legislation sent back for revisions 
to MOHA. One of the key stipulations was the NDMA was to be autonomous 
and under the prime ministers executive office.  At the time of writing (January 
2016) no further progress on the legislation had been made. The development 
of a small political coalition is encouraging. How effective they may be in the 
future as a coalition is yet to be determined. 
8.8 Chapter Summary 
 
Over the course of recent Nepali history political parties have either been 
banned outright (e.g. during the Partyless Panchayat System discussed in 
Chapter 4) or they have been suppressed by an despotic monarchy for periods 
of time. In these times, the political parties coalesced, fought, and succeeded in 
achieving representative power through multi-party democracy. Arguably they 
are at their best when up against autocratic adversary. Now that Nepal is 
progressing on a path of a republic federal democracy, political parties have 
overreached in their pursuit for power. Evidence of this is found in their untoward 
influence on the bureaucracy and by their corrupt behaviour at the district and 
local levels. Perhaps because they have been dismissed as serious leaders of 
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DRR facilitation and implementation, no prior research had been done on their 
perceptions and understanding of DRR. This chapter set out to fill this gap in 
knowledge by examining how the Big Three political parties understood and 
were integrating DRR and their role as potential policy brokers. Surprisingly, 
party members are found to be knowledgeable and supportive of DRR (with 
some caveats) and opportunities exist for integrating DRR throughout the 
parties.  
 
Disasters and reducing the risk of disasters is a politically salient topic in Nepal, 
otherwise elements of it would not have been included in all three parties’ 
election manifestos. Based on the results of this chapter, the political parties are 
willing participants for integrating DRR throughout and within the party. To date, 
there have not been any large DRR awareness campaigns targeted at the 
parties that would make them aware of DRR as prescribed by UNISDR or the 
Hyogo Framework for Action. Very few of the party members interviewed had 
received any formal training in DM or DRR. Their understanding came largely 
through exposure to disaster in their district, or through exposure to events like 
the Juri landslide and the Karnali River floods. They understood the causal 
mechanisms and the intersection of development with disasters through 
witnessing the landslide consequences caused by increased rudimentary road 
construction.  And they understood the social and economic costs of disasters 
on Nepal’s overall development.  However, their understanding had significant 
limitations that will adversely impact efforts to integrate DRR into development 
processes if not addressed.  
 
For better or worse, the political parties in Nepal influence and dominate 
development agendas. A complicating factor is that political parties have a 
myopic, and some say self-serving, view of development. Another limiting factor 
is that political parties prioritise DRR investment only in districts that are 
politically valuable for them. It is clear from the results of this research that DRR 
funding is strongly influenced by central level political influence. Budget is doled 
out not based on risk and hazard assessments, but based on political affiliations.  
One way to counteract this is through strong public awareness and local level 
advocacy. But according to one of the respondents, without central level 
affiliation, local level advocacy only brings smaller programmes to the districts. 
This unscientific and pork barrelled approach to DRR funding might be lessened 
once Nepal has transitioned into a federal state. A strong case then can be 
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made for DRM to become a provincial level responsibility, since provincial 
governments and elected provincial politicians would be more responsive to 
regional hazards and risk assessments.  
 
Nepal’s fixation on DRR development being physical infrastructure led is clearly 
witnessed amongst the political parties (as evidenced by embankment inclusion 
in all three election manifestos). Favouring embankment building in the Tarai 
over subtler and more effective methods of flood risk reduction—such as 
conservation of the Chure Hills—is part of the overall development ethos of 
Nepal. It is also likely that the parties have embraced embankments—so much 
so that they coordinate amongst themselves to advocate for them—because of 
the gains large scale infrastructure can yield. Embankments are tangible flood 
risk reduction initiatives that bring political and economic capital to local and 
district politicians. Encouragingly, in the absence of large scale development 
infrastructure possibilities (e.g. in Solukhumbu) and without central level 
manifesto guidance the party members discussed local livelihood and advocacy 
initiatives as methods for dealing with DRR.  The efficacies of these solutions 
are unknown, but what is remarkable is that they were being discussed in 
relation to DRR signifying that district politicians had formulated local solutions. 
In the context of DRR integration throughout the party, it is essential that this 
local wisdom is not lost through top-down centralised campaigns.  
 
These results have implications for the broader mainstreaming/integration 
research within the government. The current dysfunctional and intrusive 
relationship between the political parties and the bureaucracy proves 
troublesome for mainstreaming DRR. The grip that the political parties have on 
the bureaucracy means the political parties determine development priorities 
and activities. To this end, they are the policy brokers in Nepal. Referring back 
to the ACF model in Chapter 3, the policy broker is the one who mediates 
between the competing coalitions to determine which policy to enact. It is 
doubtful that the creators of the ACF envisioned the policy brokers to have the 
thuggish and unchecked qualities they display in Nepal, but nonetheless, it is the 
reality of the governance environment. Political parties are the policy brokers in 
Nepal, and their involvement can positively influence change, as evidenced by 
the post-earthquake formation of the central level National Campaign for 
Disaster Risk Reduction.  
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Their influence is so great that even if the empirical data reviewed in Chapters 6 
and 7 had revealed a coherent and consistent mainstreaming DRR policy 
throughout the government, without the political parties buy-in at the district and 
local levels, DRR would not be realized. Efforts to integrate DRR throughout the 
government are challenged by the pressure exerted by the political parties at the 
DDC and VDC levels.  The difficulty lies in that the political parties are the ‘voice 
of the people’, and those voices are not asking for DRR. Central government 
appointees, especially the LDO, are meant to be implementing DRR strategies, 
but their hands are tied through political pressures and lack of public demands. 
In this case, it is imperative that political parties integrate DRR awareness and 
training throughout in an attempt to persuade local level party representatives to 
incorporate DRR into development at the local and district levels.  
 
As long as the status quo development approaches continues to benefit political 
party members there is little to no room for innovative DRR approaches and 
policy change. Current development implementation in Nepal is a closed system 
dominated by the parties, offering little room for innovations unless the political 
parties sanction them. Any real progress on DRR policy integration will only 
occur once DRR in Nepal is reframed as a politically viable alternative.  
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9 Discussion, Implications and Final 
Conclusions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Over the last seven chapters, this research has traced mainstreaming DRR from 
its roots as a global neoliberal policy solution, followed its diffusion into Nepal’s 
national development lexicon, and down throughout the government 
administrative levels. This chapter begins with a discussion of the two objectives 
that have framed this research. The second part of the chapter deals with the 
research implications and final conclusions.  
9.1 Discussion: Understanding the Rhetoric and Reality 
of Mainstreaming DRR in Nepal   
 
Chapter 1 outlined two main objectives for this research:  
1. To critically interrogate the concept of mainstreaming DRR and the 
drivers behind its promotion as a disaster policy prescription;  
2. To examine the rhetoric and reality of mainstreaming DRR throughout all 
levels of government in Nepal.  
The first objective of this research was achieved in the literature review chapters 
2 and 3 and is briefly summarized here. While it is a somewhat unorthodox 
approach for a thesis to use the literature review to further a research objective, 
it was borne out of necessity. No other literature has established the parallels 
between:  
 
neoliberal epochs  New Public Management  and mainstreaming DRR 
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The idea of mainstreaming complex policies such as gender or DRR arose from 
the need for bureaucracies and organisations to better manage wicked policies, 
by encouraging a cross-governmental approach to tackling problems. When 
mainstreaming became popularized in the 1990s, governments had been 
subjected to neoliberal public sector reforms the previous decade, which 
fragmented and diminished their ability to tackle complex policy problem (a key 
tenet of neoliberalism is the reduction in the size of government bureaucracies 
and outsourcing of key services). The irony is that mainstreaming is a neoliberal 
policy intended to fix the first wave of neoliberal public management policies. Of 
concern is that the disaster vulnerability literature implicates neoliberalism as a 
driver of disaster risk. 
 
The second research objective still requires further discussion. Chapters 4, 6, 7, 
8 presented data from various facets of the Government of Nepal including the 
central, district/local, and the political parties. Throughout the background and 
empirical chapters, the rhetoric of policy change was unpacked from the reality 
of achieving that policy change within a Government of Nepal context. This has 
unravelled the policy jargon and left many loose ends. To tidy up those loose 
ends and to come to a comprehensive explanation of what was occurring, the 
following discussion returns to the theories and frameworks discussed in 
Chapter 3.   
 
Since the literature has very little to say about policy mainstreaming, the policy 
paradigm and policy integration literatures are used to frame the discussion of 
mainstreaming DRR in Nepal. The Advocacy Coalition Framework, Hall’s theory 
of social learning and paradigm policy change, and Candel and Biesbroek’s 
frameworks are each discussed and critiqued in relation to the case-study 
evidence from Nepal. Collectively, each theory and framework adds to an 
explanation of what was occurring in Nepal.  
9.1.1 Advocacy Coalition 
 
Now that central (Chapter 6), district/local (Chapter 7), and the political parties 
(Chapter 8) have been discussed, there is a fuller picture of the actors involved 
in the disaster policy subsystem. To that end, the ACF can now be employed to 
visually illustrate the existing disaster policy subsystem. The ACF also serves as 
a conceptual tool to analyse the process of policy change (i.e. competing policy 
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advocacy coalitions vying for dominance) that was found in Nepal. Figure 8-1 is 
an expanded view of the disaster policy subsystem in Nepal39. For use in Nepal, 
the ACF had to be slightly modified as some of its contentions did not reflect the 
reality of the policy environment in Nepal. These modifications are discussed 
following Figure 9-1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(source: adapted from Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1993) 
 
                                               
39 As discussed in Chapter 3: a subsystem is a conceptual term to denote the space 
where policy coalitions compete for dominance; a coalition is a conceptual term to 
delineate groups that share similar policy beliefs. 
Coalition A
MOHA
Policy Stance/Belief: 
Maintain existing 
mechanisms for 
disaster management. 
Resources: 
Government disaster 
management funds. 
Current legislation. 
Coalition B
NRRC
Various central 
ministries 
NPC
Local bodies (e.g. 
LSMC)
INGO/NGOs
Policy Stance/Belief: 
Devolve ownership of 
DRR to other sectors.
Resources: Limited. 
Funding sources 
external to 
government. 
Policy Brokers:
The Political Parties
Undermine 
attempts to 
change policy 
instruments, 
goals, frames.
NRRC building 
ministry/sector 
ownership. No 
concerted 
overall strategy.
Limited decision making on DRR by political 
brokers. Blockage caused by corruption, 
political instability, lack of awareness, 
culture/history.
Limited DRR Policy Outputs
Limited DRR Policy Impacts
DRR Policy Subsystem
Figure 9-1. ACF Disaster Policy Subsystem in Nepal 
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9.1.1.1 The Advocacy Coalitions  
 
Based on the results of the fieldwork, there are two coalitions within the disaster 
policy subsystem: coalition A that consists of the Ministry of Home Affairs that 
stands for the traditional disaster response approach to policy, and coalition B 
that consists of various actors such as the NRRC, MOFALD, and the LSMC that 
have come to understand the value of integrating DRR throughout development 
decisions. Coalition B is denoted by a dashed line rather than a solid one 
because it has not yet fully coalesced. Coalition B is made up of disparate actors 
who are mostly in the early stages of integrating DRR into their sector work 
streams. As discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, at both the central and district/local 
levels there was evidence of policy entrepreneurs (e.g. the Joint Secretary in the 
NPC) and/or divisions (e.g. as found in MOFALD, Ministry of Agricultural 
Development), and a local government (e.g. LSMC) who were showing signs of 
advocating and integrating DRR into work processes. Apart from the NRRC, 
coalition B had no mechanisms to unite coalition members to work in a 
concerted manner to contest MOHA’s policy dominance. As such, coalition B 
remains largely theoretical at the moment rather than a fully actualized coalition 
that is able to advocate for integrating DRR throughout sectors.  
 
The development of coalition B was mainly being mobilized through the NRRC 
Flagship programme and the donor funding attached to it. The ACF serves as 
an explanatory tool of what the NRRC was accomplishing at a conceptual level 
in relation to policy change. The NRRC was building more than just capacity 
within key central ministries. It was developing a coalition of ministries with a 
shared understanding of DRR being a cross-sector responsibility. Key 
government ministries—such as the Ministries of Education, Health and 
Population and MOFALD—were showing signs that they are gaining ownership 
of the DRR policy agenda. Unquestionably, a primary impetus for ministries to 
incorporate DRR was the result of increased donor funding. Yet the offshoot of 
more funding was that a government advocacy coalition was being formed 
around the issue of DRR. This is important because MOHA is a very powerful 
ministry. Its grip on the disaster policy agenda is strengthened through the 
global (and Nepali) culture of disaster management being the purview of first 
response organisations, the existing disaster management legislation, and 
MOHA being the recipient of the bulk of funding for disaster management. To 
counter MOHA’s dominance in the disaster policy subsystem, other government 
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sectors need to actively push for policy change. The impetus needs to come 
internally through the government (with the importance of the role political 
parties play not being discounted), indicating a political rather than technocratic 
change agenda. 
 
One of the premises of the ACF noted in Chapter 3, is that policy subsystems 
have an inter-governmental dimension. This is why the LSMC is included as part 
of coalition B40. In theory, as more ministries and local bodies integrate DRR into 
their work streams, the harder it will be for MOHA to undermine DRR policy 
change. However, the reality in Nepal is that the lack of district and local 
elections has marginalized local bodies, meaning LSMC’s influence within the 
policy subsystem is minimal. 
9.1.1.2 The Policy Brokers 
 
As discussed in Chapter 8, political parties are the policy brokers in Nepal. The 
original conception of the ACF likely did not conceive policy brokers to exhibit 
the lawless behaviours that Nepal’s political parties exhibit. Nonetheless, the 
political parties at the national and local levels are the ones who have control 
over development agendas. The ACF then gives them a central role in the policy 
change process. Based on party member responses in Chapter 8, the political 
party respondents seem receptive to DRR. They understood DRR in the context 
of their local environment. Through awareness raising, the parties can broker 
DRR policy change as was evidenced by the political National Campaign for 
Disaster Risk Reduction. 
9.1.1.3 Limitations of the ACF 
 
In Chapter 3 it was noted that the ACF discussed coalitions as holding shared 
policy beliefs. The authors of the ACF equate policy views with a belief system 
in order to denote how difficult it is to achieve policy change, especially if the 
policy is aligned with one’s deep core beliefs. From the fieldwork, it is difficult to 
qualify MOHA’s resistance to change as the result of a deeply held policy belief, 
especially when the rhetoric of change did not match the reality. While it is 
impossible to truly know MOHA’s institutional policy belief concerning DRR, one 
                                               
40 It should be noted, that in the course of researching DRR in Nepal, there were reports 
of other local bodies taking a proactive role in implementing building codes. 
 237 
 
plausible explanation is that control of the disaster response policy paradigm 
equates to power over disaster related issues and a monopoly over donor 
funding. In the ACF, funding is considered as a secondary aspect to policy 
beliefs. However, based on the Nepal case-study, a secondary aspect like 
funding holds far greater weight than policy beliefs. Considering the above, 
Figure 9-1 was amended to read ‘policy stance/belief’ (in the original ACF it only 
refers to policy belief) to better reflect the Nepal policy environment. However, 
members of the emerging coalition B were more likely to discuss DRR policy in 
a way that suggested DRR aligned with their policy beliefs. This was particularly 
evident in the responses from the first respondent from the NPC, some 
members of the LSMC, and the engineers who discussed their work in the 
Department of Education. These respondents conveyed a shared concern and a 
belief in public safety.  
 
Having just argued that the ACF reliance on policy beliefs is overstated in a 
Nepal context, this also refutes the ACFs contention on the role of external 
shocks in prompting policy change. A contention of the ACF is that it takes a 
large external shock to the policy subsystem to alter policy beliefs. This research 
occurred in the midst of the 2015 earthquake, an event that presumably qualifies 
as an external shock that could change disaster policy. Seeing as coalition B 
was still in the developing stages, the earthquake could have acted as a 
galvanizing force in unifying the coalition. Or the earthquake could have shifted 
the dominant policy beliefs of coalition A (MOHA). Neither of these scenarios 
occurred. Instead, the earthquake seemed to further entrench MOHA’s 
dominance and reinforced the disaster response paradigm. It is difficult to 
explain why the earthquake was not enough of an external shock to promote 
change and opens an avenue for further studies on disaster events and policy 
change. 
 
9.1.2 Paradigm Policy Change  
 
Having used the ACF to illustrate the existing disaster policy subsystem in 
Nepal, it is now time to dig deeper into the theories of paradigm policy change 
discussed in Chapter 3 to formulate some explanation as to why and how 
change was occurring. Hall (1993) and others such as Olson (2000) theorized 
on the complexity and difficulty of changing policy paradigms. Hall (1993) in 
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particular proves prescient when reviewed against the case-study evidence from 
Nepal. Conceptualizing the current disaster management policy environment as 
a policy paradigm resistant to change, is useful not only for framing the analysis 
but also for understanding why MOHA used the rhetoric of mainstreaming to 
stymie efforts to change disaster policy.  
 
To briefly recap, Hall defined a policy paradigm as “a framework of ideas and 
standards that specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments 
that can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they 
are meant to be addressing” (Hall 1999: 279). He further explains, a dominant 
policy paradigm becomes insulated from external change “… because so much 
of it is taken for granted and unamenable to scrutiny as a whole” (ibid: 279). This 
is precisely what was found in Nepal regarding the disaster response paradigm. 
The Nepal disaster response paradigm is sustained by the out-dated NCR Act, 
and was being insulated by MOHA’s actions to maintain its control as the lead 
disaster institution. Institutionally, all power and control for disaster related 
issues rests with MOHA, and culturally there is general acquiescence amongst 
bureaucrats that it is MOHA’s role to respond to disasters using its paramilitary 
police force. In Nepal, the disaster response paradigm is a formable paradigm, 
that until the NRRC began its efforts to build capacity and awareness in other 
ministry sectors, has had very little internal government scrutiny.  
 
Hall classified orders of policy change by first, second, and third order—with first 
order change being minimal change and third order being a “wholesale” change 
in policy. In Chapter 3, it was argued that change on the level of third order 
ought to be the central aim of mainstreaming DRR. Change is a big component 
of mainstreaming DRR throughout government sectors, as it is not only about 
changing the disaster management policy paradigm, it is also about changing 
development sector policies and processes.  
 
By thinking of mainstreaming DRR as a third order change process, it helps to 
explain the tension that existed between a) the rhetoric of what MOHA says it 
wants to do by mainstreaming DRR, and b) the reality of what it actually has 
done. When the MOHA respondent spoke about all government sectors 
incorporating DRR into their work streams, to the extent that traditional DM 
planning would become obsolete (see Chapter 6), it was saying MOHA 
supported third order policy change to occur. Instead, as evidenced by the 
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existing state of legislative and policy reforms, the actual output amounted to a 
limited first order change. The goals and instruments related to DM have 
remained the same, the only action that suggests change is the endorsement of 
the non-legally binding National Strategy in 2009 (and it is important to note that 
the impetus for the National Strategy was driven by actors external to the 
government (e.g. the HFA, NSET-Nepal, the UN and donor communities)). The 
disconnect between MOHA’s third order change with its minimal efforts at first 
order change is another way of framing the rhetoric and reality argument.  
 
Hall and other policy scholars agree that third order change is difficult to achieve 
because the established dominant policy actors subvert the change agenda by 
forcing policy discourse into a particular frame. This was clearly evident in Nepal 
and best seen through MOHA’s continual framing of disaster as a response 
rather than development agenda with ministry focal point participants (discussed 
in Chapter 6). It was also evidenced by MOHA reworking the draft DRM 
legislation to maintain control of the proposed National Disaster Management 
Authority.  
 
Policy paradigm change was also being stymied through the GON non-decision 
making and control over the disaster policy agenda. In Chapter 3 Olson (2000) 
noted three key factors in governments not engaging in disaster mitigation 
issues: issue suppression, non-decision making, and agenda control. While little 
evidence was found to suggest that MOHA had suppressed information, non-
decision making and agenda control stand out from the empirical and 
observational evidence. The delay in passing adequate DRM legislation is a 
form of non-decision making. It is in this negative space of doing nothing where 
MOHA and the policy brokers in the Constituent Assembly appeared to exist 
despite the rhetoric of the GON taking strategic action. It is in this realm too that 
transparency becomes skewed and corruption festers.   
Agenda control is another tactic used by MOHA to prevent policy change. There 
is ample evidence from the pre-earthquake fieldwork that MOHA was working 
subversively to maintain control over the disaster agenda. Because of MOHA’s 
response role, the 2015 earthquake further strengthened MOHA’s grip on the 
disaster policy agenda. Instead of changing the policy paradigm, the earthquake 
reinforced the central role that MOHA plays in disaster policy. This weakened 
the momentum for DRR policy change that was found in the pre-earthquake 
fieldwork.  
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Hall states that an accumulation of “abnormalities, experimentation with new 
forms of policy, and policy failures precipitate a shift in the locus of authority over 
policy…” (Hall 1993: 280). As noted, the post-earthquake fieldwork did not 
reveal any indications that the 2015 earthquakes shifted government 
perceptions of DRR. Despite the destruction and lives lost, there was no 
redoubling of efforts to implement DRR. In the aftermath of the earthquake, the 
Government became preoccupied with passing the Constitution and later during 
the final fieldtrip, the government was preoccupied with rebuilding the 
earthquake damaged areas. The public criticisms that existed were around the 
poor government earthquake response and the slow pace of recovery. The 
disaster response status quo was being maintained.  
 
Nonetheless, third order policy change can and does occur. Hall and others 
argue that third order change typically requires the involvement from broader 
“social and political forces” (Rayner 2014: 68) than just the policy makers within 
the policy domain. In Nepal, external actors to the government were indeed 
driving the policy change agenda. Specifically, they had coalesced as the Nepal 
Risk Reduction Consortium. The evidence from the fieldwork indicates that 
wide-spread government awareness and buy-in of the DRR agenda was 
missing. As seen in the ACF discussion above, an advocacy coalition was being 
formed within the GON through the work of the NRRC. This appeared to be 
addressing the lack of widespread government acceptance of DRR and may 
possibly lead to the discrediting of the disaster management paradigm. The 
focus of this research was only on the government actors within the advocacy 
coalition and thus it is unknown how public opinion and the involvement of other 
actors such as researchers and journalists may contribute to achieving third 
order change. It is the collective discrediting from a broad range of actors that 
Hall (1993) argues is an important component of policy paradigm change.  
9.1.3 The Role of Social Learning and Ideas in Changing Nepal’s 
Disaster Policy Paradigm 
 
The concept of social learning was also valuable for explaining what was 
occurring in Nepal. It is evident from the central, district/local, and political party 
findings that individuals within the bureaucracy matter and are a key factor in 
changing the policy dynamic in Nepal. Candel and Biesbroek state:  
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“Agency-centred mechanisms help to explain why and how dimensions of 
integration change toward enhanced or weakened policy integration. The 
most notable agency-centred mechanisms of policy integration identified 
so far include well known mechanisms of social learning…coalition 
building… and policy entrepreneurship” (Candel and Biesbroek 2016: 
218). 
As outlined throughout this research, those that do push and influence policy 
change face great obstacles (i.e. corruption, inter-ministry competition, 
hierarchical centralisation) and must work with political deftness and stamina. 
Even in the absence of legislation to compel ministry work on DRR, central level 
ministries showed indications that DRR related work was becoming a part of 
their work streams (as evidenced by MOFALD, MOAD, MOHP, and NPC). In 
Hall’s parlance, government sectors were attempting “to adjust the goals or 
techniques of policy in response to past experience and new information” (Hall 
1993: 278) in spite of MOHA’s attempts to subvert policy change. The new 
information on DRR and the corresponding incorporation of it into ministry and 
local level work streams is indicative of social learning. Respondents who had 
greater awareness and understanding of DRR were less content to assign 
MOHA full responsibility for disaster related policy (e.g. Chapter 6.4.1). 
Pragmatically, social learning cannot be 100% attributed to the change in 
ministry behaviours. While a growing recognition and awareness of sector 
responsibilities concerning DRR is a factor, so too is the additional donor 
funding that are attached to these initiatives. However, the interest and 
enthusiasm that some of respondents showed for the issue of DRR is an 
encouraging sign of social learning. 
 
As further evidenced by the findings from the LSMC (Chapter 7), social learning 
had shaped bureaucrat ideas around disaster management and disaster risk 
reduction in a way that had a legacy. Bureaucrats in the LSMC were some of the 
first to learn about earthquake resilient construction and building codes. They 
saw themselves as policy innovators. Of all the field site locations in Nepal, the 
LSMC had the most developed disaster management institutionalisation and the 
best cross-sector understanding of disaster risks. The building code was 
adopted just before local level elections were abolished. There was a sense of 
nostalgia from the respondents that indicated the BCI policy innovation meant 
more than just risk reduction, but also represented a time when bureaucrats had 
some autonomy to formulate policy and take risks. It is important to note that 
LSMC did not have municipal by-law related to DRM or an overall DRM policy 
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document. This suggests that its institutional environment relied on senior 
bureaucrat understanding and support of DRR. DRR in the LSMC existed 
without a centralised legal policy document being in place.   
 
Also in political parties (Chapter 7), it is easy to see how social learning is key to 
transforming DRR policy. Regardless of bureaucratic efforts, the political parties 
remain significant barriers to change. They hold the key to district and local level 
development approaches. To date there have been no campaigns to raise 
awareness of DRR within the parties themselves. Nonetheless, it was clear that 
the district respondents understood the link between development and disaster. 
The fact that elements of DRR existed in the election manifestos is evidence 
that DRR is a politically salient topic. At the central level, the example of the 
National Council for Disaster Risk Reduction campaigning for stronger DRM 
legislation (see Chapter 8) is evidence of the impact the political parties can 
have in Nepal.  
 
Social learning and ideational approaches to policy change are useful 
approaches for understanding the Nepal policy context. Instead of looking at 
mainstreaming DRR in Nepal as a technical exercise requiring top down 
prescriptive policy and legislative tools (which in any case did not exist), social 
learning provided a much richer understanding of what was occurring inside the 
bureaucracy and how individual bureaucrats were contributing to the process.  
The best two examples come from MOFALD (lead of Flagship 4) and LSMC. 
Without existing national legislation, DRR activity—albeit somewhat limited—
was occurring. It is hard to see that legislation would improve the work that was 
being done in either body. Flagship 5 is mandated to strengthen DRM policy and 
legislation. However, it was hard to find any discernible outcomes from these 
efforts, whereas the more substantive evidence of change was found in work 
that involved raising DRR’s profile within sectors that had not traditionally played 
a role in disaster management (in particular, Flagship 1 and Flagship 4). This is 
an indication that too much emphasis is given in international frameworks for 
establishing the central legal and policy frameworks for DRR. In a nation-state 
such as Nepal, where overall governance processes are weak, implementation 
is best served through awareness raising, education, and funding in targeted 
sectors. In other words, through the process of social learning.  
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Most importantly, an ideational approach to policy change in Nepal appropriately 
refocuses attention on individuals within the government. It is a recognition that 
the staff within the Government of Nepal are central to achieving policy success. 
This recognition of the importance of government staff differs from years of 
development approaches by INGOs/NGOs that have bypassed the government 
due to political instability and in response to the neoliberal “roll back” of the state 
discussed in Chapter 2. Bureaucrats, especially those at the district and local 
levels, were aware of the challenges and problems that exist throughout the 
Government of Nepal. In the case of LSMC, they were motivated by the thought 
that they were improving the municipality where they lived and stimulated by the 
recognition that they had at one time been innovative policy pioneers. It is unfair 
to judge the bureaucracy with sweeping generalisations. While the institutions 
may be weak, the individuals within it are diverse and key to engendering 
substantive change.    
9.1.4 Reality of Policy Integration/Mainstreaming in Nepal 
 
Next, the following section definitively puts the issue of whether mainstreaming 
DRR is mere rhetoric to rest. Candel and Biesbroek (discussed in Chapter 3) 
provide the conceptual framework used to assess the level of policy integration 
found in Nepal. The authors attempted to create a framework for policy 
integration that captures the “dynamic process that entails various elements that 
do not necessarily move in a concerted manner but may develop at different 
paces or in opposite directions” (Candel and Biesbroek 2016: 211). The 
framework draws on existing policy change literature to incorporate four primary 
dimensions of policy integration: policy frame, subsystem involvement, policy 
goals, and policy instruments. Since mainstreaming DRR was a part of the 
MOHA led central government rhetoric, the central government data is 
objectively assessed against the criteria set out by Candel and Biesbroek for 
each dimension. 
 
The framework is applied to assess the DRR policy frame (Table 9-1) in Nepal. 
Candel and Biesbroek conceptualize policy frame as meaning the extent that a 
policy issue has been identified/framed as a cross-cutting problem. For the most 
part, the respondents at all levels of government recognised that development 
and disaster risk were linked. As a consequence, they understood that different 
sectors had a role to play in minimizing disaster risk outcomes. However, this 
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was not a universal understanding and it was strongly dependent on the DRR 
awareness level of the respondent. Although most of the central level 
respondents were the DM/DRR focal points for their ministry, DRR was still 
considered by several respondents to be the policy domain of MOHA. Despite 
the rhetoric of DRR being a cross-sector policy problem, there was no strong 
push for integration. It is important to highlight that there are other examples 
from within the GON that had framed policy issues as a cross-sector issue. As 
found with climate change, the government had framed the issue as a cross-
sector policy problem and substantiated it by creating an inter-ministry budget 
code. This suggests that the reason DRR is not being framed as a cross-sector 
policy problem is that it is accorded low priority within the GON. 
 
Table 9-1. DRR Policy Framing in Nepal. 
Policy Frame 
 
  
Low integration                                                               High integration  
     
                                       X     
 
Policy Frame 
 
 
 
 
The problem is 
defined in 
narrow terms 
within the 
governance 
system; the 
cross cutting 
nature of the 
problem is not 
recognized and 
the problem is 
considered to 
fall within the 
boundaries of 
the specific 
subsystem. 
Efforts of other 
subsystems 
are not 
understood to 
be part of the 
governance of 
the problem.  
There is no 
push for 
integration. 
 
 
There is 
awareness that 
the policy 
outputs of 
different 
subsystems 
shape policy 
outcomes as 
well as an 
emerging notion 
of externalities 
and do-no-
harm. The 
problem is still 
predominately 
perceived of as 
falling within the 
boundaries of a 
particular 
subsystem.  
There is no 
strong push for 
integration 
 
As a result of 
increasing 
awareness of 
the cross-
cutting nature of 
the problem, an 
understanding 
that the 
governance of 
the problem 
should not be 
restricted to a 
single domain 
has emerged as 
well as 
associated 
notions of 
coordination 
and coherence. 
 
General 
recognition that 
the problem is 
and should not 
solely be 
governed by 
subsystems, 
but by the 
governance 
system as a 
whole. 
Subsystems 
are desired to 
work according 
to a shared, 
‘holistic’ 
approach, 
which is 
particularly 
recognized 
within 
procedural 
instruments 
that span 
subsystems 
(see Policy 
Instruments) 
(source: Candel and Biesbroek 2016: 219) 
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The next dimension of policy integration involves the level of subsystem 
involvement (Table 9-2). Nepal was on the lower end of subsystem involvement 
but showed some signs of progress. At the central level, a few ministry 
respondents were beginning to show indications that they recognized the failure 
of a response focused approach to disaster management and were beginning to 
incorporate DRR activities within their own sectors. However, the density of 
interactions to facilitate this comprised of mainly infrequent and informal 
exchanges of information with MOHA. As discussed in Chapter 6, MOHA was 
found to be using these interactions to undermine the process of change by 
reinforcing disaster response management rather than DRR. Assuming this 
roadblock is removed, perhaps the process of policy integration could be 
expedited.  The other avenue of involvement was through the NRRC Flagship 
Programme. It is unknown the level of involvement and density of interactions of 
these meetings. However, the lead ministries (Education, Health, Irrigation, 
MOFALD) of the flagships showed greater ownership and awareness of DRR in 
the interviews. It is safe to assume that their involvement in DRR was having an 
impact on framing DRR as a policy problem that to be addressed by their 
Ministries.  
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Table 9-2. DRR Subsystem Involvement in Nepal 
Subsystem Involvement 
 
  
Low integration                                                               High integration  
 
                         X 
 
Subsystem 
Involvement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One dominant 
subsystem, 
which governs 
the issue 
independently. 
Formally, no 
other 
subsystems are 
involved, 
although they 
may be in terms 
of substantial, 
non-intentional 
policymaking 
 
Subsystems 
recognize the 
failure of the 
dominant 
subsystem to 
manage the 
problem and 
externalities, 
which results 
in the 
emergence of 
concerns 
about the 
problem in one 
or more 
additional 
subsystems 
 
Awareness of 
the problem’s 
cross-cutting 
nature spreads 
across 
subsystems, 
as a result of 
which two or 
more 
subsystems 
have formal 
responsibility 
for dealing with 
the problem. 
 
All possibly 
relevant 
subsystems 
have developed 
ideas about 
their role in the 
governance of 
the problem. 
The number of 
subsystems that 
are formally 
involved is 
equal to or 
higher than at 
previous 
manifestations, 
but 
complemented 
with a less 
engaged set of 
alternative 
subsystems  
 
                                 X 
 
Density of 
Interactions 
 
No interactions 
 
Infrequent 
informal 
exchange with 
dominant 
subsystem 
 
More regular 
and formal 
exchange of 
information 
and 
coordination, 
possibly 
through 
coordinative 
instruments at 
system-level 
 
High level of 
interaction 
between 
formally 
involved 
subsystems, 
that maintain 
infrequent 
interactions with 
a less engaged 
set of 
subsystems. 
(source: Candel and Biesbroek 2016: 221) 
 
The next dimension, policy goals, looks at the extent that mainstreaming DRR 
was embedded throughout the GON and the level of coherence that exists 
between the sectors to solve the problem of DRR (Table 9-3). What constitutes 
a policy goal is the explicit incorporation of the problem (i.e. DRR) into sector 
policy and strategy. Here there were a few indications of progress, for example:  
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 MOFALD incorporated DRR considerations into both its Minimum 
Standards and into the LDO and EO performance contracts; 
 MOAD had recently established a full-time position to integrate DRR into 
central ministry planning; 
 The NPC had incorporated DRR into its national development plans. 
The second indicator looks at policy coherence. Nepal scored very low. There 
was no policy coherence between the ministries as a result of there being no 
overarching and clearly articulated government strategy for DRR integration. 
 
Table 9-3. DRR Policy Goals in Nepal. 
Policy Goals 
 
  
Low integration                                                              High integration  
 
                             X 
 
Range of 
policies in 
which problem 
is embedded 
 
Concerns only 
embedded 
within the goals 
of a dominant 
subsystem 
 
Concerns 
adopted in 
policy goals of 
one or more 
additional 
subsystems 
 
Possible further 
diversification 
across policy 
goals of 
additional 
subsystems 
 
Concerns 
embedded 
within all 
potentially 
relevant policy 
goals 
 X 
 
Policy 
coherence 
 
Very low or no 
coherence. 
Occurs when 
cross-cutting 
nature is not 
recognized, or 
when 
subsystems 
are highly 
autonomous in 
setting 
(sectoral) goals 
 
 
Because of the 
rising 
awareness of 
externalities 
and mutual 
concerns 
subsystems 
may address 
these to some 
extent in their 
goals 
 
Coordinated 
sectoral goals, 
which are 
judged in the 
light of 
coherence. 
Subsystems 
attempt to 
develop 
synergies. 
 
Shared policy 
goals 
embedded 
within an 
overarching 
strategy  
 (source: Candel and Biesbroek 2016: 222). 
Finally, the degree to which policy instruments have been developed to guide 
cross-sector integration in Nepal is assessed (Table 9-4). Nepal ranks very low 
in this dimension. Examples of possible policy instruments could be funding 
mechanisms, regulations, tax exemptions, or stakeholder consultations. Apart 
from its inclusion in the National Strategy and in the NPC development plans, no 
central level policy instruments exist in Nepal to foster cross-sector DRR policy 
integration. As seen across the central level and in the LSMC, the work that was 
occurring was occurring without guiding legislation or policy. It is important to 
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note that DRR policy instruments were proposed. For example, there was talk of 
DRR inclusion in the revised education legislation and the DRM act was still 
pending. 
Table 9-4. DRR Policy Instruments in Nepal. 
Policy Instruments 
  
  
Low integration                                                              High integration  
 
X 
 
Range of 
subsystems’ 
policies that 
contain policy 
instruments 
 
Problem only 
addressed by 
the substantive 
and/or 
procedural 
instruments of 
a dominant 
subsystem 
 
As a result of 
increased 
awareness of 
externalities 
one or more 
additional 
subsystems 
(partially) 
adapt their 
instruments to 
mitigate 
negative 
effects 
 
Possible further 
diversification 
of instruments 
addressing the 
problem across 
subsystems 
 
Instruments 
embedded 
within all 
potentially 
relevant 
subsystems and 
associated 
policies 
 X 
 
Procedural 
instruments at 
system-level 
 
No relevant 
procedural 
instruments at 
system-level 
 
Some 
procedural 
information 
sharing 
instruments at 
system-level 
 
Increasing 
number of 
system-level 
procedural 
instruments 
that facilitate 
subsystems to 
jointly address 
the problem 
 
Broad range of 
procedural 
instruments at 
system-level, 
including 
boundary-
spanning 
structures that 
coordinate, 
steer and 
monitor 
subsystems’ 
efforts 
 X 
 
Consistency 
 
 
 
 
 
No 
consistency. 
Sets of 
instruments 
are purely 
sectoral and 
result from 
processes of 
policy layering. 
 
Subsystem 
consider 
externalities of 
sectoral 
instrument 
mixes in light 
of internal and 
inter-sectoral 
consistency 
 
Subsystems 
seek to jointly 
address the 
problem by 
adjusting and 
attuning their 
instruments. 
Consistency 
becomes an 
explicit aim 
 
Full 
reconsideration 
of subsystem 
instrument 
mixes, resulting 
in a 
comprehensive, 
cross-
subsystem 
instrument mix 
that is designed 
to meet a set of 
coherent goals. 
(source: Candel and Biesbroek 2016: 224) 
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A useful theoretical principle noted by Candel and Biesbroek is that the policy 
integration process does not move in a concerted manner. This was true in the 
Nepal case-study. Traditionally, mainstreaming DRR (or policy integration) has 
been modelled as a top down policy process that assumed integration occurring 
uniformly throughout all sectors (e.g. Lafferty and Hovden discussed in Chapter 
2). The Nepal case study illustrates that policy integration is best understood as 
a patchwork of progress that is driven as bureaucrats and politicians learn about 
DRR policy and then endorse it by internalising it into their work streams. It is 
impossible for social learning to occur evenly across a bureaucracy. However, 
this patchwork approach is not captured through the above frameworks that 
Candel and Biesbroek suggest.   
 
9.1.4.1 Limitations of Processual Framework 
 
While Candel and Biesbroek set out to create a dynamic framework and to 
highlight the process of policy integration, when the empirical findings from 
Chapters 6-8 are considered the framework only presents a very basic, static, 
and generalized overview of DRR integration throughout the GON. While it 
answers what the state of DRR integration is in Nepal, it does not offer any 
explanation of why it was not progressing. The framework makes a useful 
contribution by capturing Nepal’s ineffective approach to mainstreaming DRR, 
but its application does not go much further than this.  
 
What would make the framework more effective, especially for a Nepali 
governance context, is if it also modelled the historical, institutional and political 
dynamics that are part of the process of policy integration and that may present 
significant barriers to the integration process. Fortunately, these barriers were 
discussed in Chapter 4. The authors of the framework do touch on some of 
these aspects when they discuss policy disintegration as a theoretical principal. 
Some examples given by Candel and Biesbroek as to why disintegration may 
occur include collaboration fatigue, changes of government, political actors 
replacing existing paradigms, etc. (Candel and Biesbroek 2016). The Nepal 
context illustrates that these processes of disintegration are as much of a part of 
the process as policy framing, goals, instruments, and subsystem involvement. 
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There is nothing theoretical about Nepal’s systemic corruption and MOHA’s 
agenda control.  
 
Despite the limitations with the above processual frameworks, it is interesting to 
note that they do show some indications of progress (i.e. policy frame and 
subsystem involvement). What was happening in Nepal to stimulate these 
changes? While the mainstreaming DRR agenda as promoted by MOHA was 
superficial at best, there were indications that the roots of policy change were 
starting to take hold. Evidence from the Nepal case-study shows the main driver 
of this was the NRRC Flagship approach in building sector awareness and buy-
in of incorporating (or mainstreaming) DRR into sectors.  
9.1.5 Reflections on the use Policy Change Theories and 
Frameworks  
 
On the whole, the theories and frameworks discussed above proved useful for 
helping to explain the tensions that exist between the established disaster 
response policy paradigm and the difficulty in changing the policy paradigm to 
DRR. In the absence of legislation and policy to compel change, the idea of 
social learning pinpoints the essentialness of bureaucrats within the GON for 
achieving policy change. The above literature also contributes to a critique of the 
traditional way mainstreaming is envisioned as policy. The top down, uniform, 
and technocratic approach to mainstreaming seems erroneous when confronted 
with the reality of the policy change literature that argues third order change is a 
tough and an overtly political slog. Third order change is rarely achieved and 
when it does often takes decades to be realized. The idea of uniformly 
integrating DRR policy throughout the GON is upended by the policy change 
literature.  
9.2 Research Implications and Conclusion 
 
The following section is a reflection on the implications and overall conclusions 
to come from this research.  
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9.2.1 Implications for DRR Policy 
 
There are several significant policy implications to be derived from this research. 
First those specific to Nepal are discussed, and then the implications for DRR 
policy in general are addressed. 
9.2.1.1 Nepal Mainstreaming DRR Policy Implications: 
 
Perhaps the most significant policy implication to follow from this research is the 
awareness that within the GON there is active resistance to DRR policy change. 
This leaves the policy community with two options: either find a way to counter 
this resistance or to make MOHA accountable for undermining efforts to reform 
the disaster policy subsystem.  
 This research has illustrated how opportune it is for policy makers in 
Nepal to appropriate global neoliberal buzzwords and turn it into GON 
rhetoric to suit their purposes.  
 The notion of top-down MOHA led mainstreaming should be abandoned 
and replaced with a ‘patchwork’ approach that does not seek integration 
as a concerted undertaking. Policy change theory rooted in social 
learning approaches suggest that mainstreaming DRR throughout the 
government should be approached on a sector by sector basis, with an 
emphasis on building awareness and coalition building. 
 Short-term DRR integration projects need to be replaced with longer 
term approaches. The NRRC Flagship Programme was found to be a 
main driver in building a DRR advocacy coalition and its efforts ought to 
be continued.   
 The 2015 earthquake(s) was/were not a stimulus to change the disaster 
response policy paradigm, at least as far as the GON was concerned.  
 The political parties ought to be seen as key players for brokering policy 
change within the disaster policy subsystem. As found in this research 
political party members, especially district politicians, understood the 
risks facing their communities and the disaster and development nexus.  
 There is a growing number of bureaucrats who are becoming champions 
of DRR within the GON and are working to influence change. It should 
also be recognized that these bureaucrats face an uphill battle because 
of a multitude of systemic challenges.  
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 As exemplified by the LSMC, local governments in Nepal can be the 
originators of innovative policy solutions. The implication being that local 
governments must be included as part of the overall DRR advocacy 
coalition.  
9.2.1.2 General policy implications about mainstreaming DRR 
 
This research is Nepal specific and so generalisation about the policy 
implications of this research in another nation-states context must be made 
conservatively. That being said, there are some generalizable implications: 
 Neoliberalism is a driver of disaster risk and global policy prescriptions 
(i.e. mainstreaming) that perpetuate neoliberalism by maintaining the 
status quo need to be reconsidered. 
 It is likely that the DRR policy agenda is facing resistance in other 
countries from the lead ministry/institution responsible for disaster 
management.  
 In problematic and developing government situations, the idea of 
mainstreaming a complex policy throughout should be critically 
examined.  
9.2.2 Original Contribution to the Disaster Scholarship 
 
This research makes several significant contributions to scholarship. Many of 
these have been discussed in the preceding section 9.2.1. This discussion looks 
at some of the broader contributions this research has made to disaster policy 
scholarship. 
 
Firstly, it contributes to the disaster vulnerability paradigm by bridging it with the 
policy and public administration fields. By doing so, it highlights the importance 
of critically challenging the policy rhetoric that is derived from neoliberal 
institutions. It also contributes to a better understanding of the implications of 
neoliberalism on DRR policy by looking at what is rhetoric and what is reality. 
This fills a significant gap in the disaster literature pertaining to policy and public 
administration.   
 
Secondly, it furthers the conceptualization of mainstreaming by arguing that 
change underpins the process of mainstreaming. It does this by using 
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conceptual frameworks from the field of policy change. This contests the 
deterministic view that mainstreaming can be achieved by top-down legalistic 
approaches. Instead, it demonstrates the real politics that surround changing the 
policy paradigm from disaster management to disaster risk reduction. Keeping 
with the theme of change, this research also contests that idea that disasters 
can be ‘windows of opportunity’ for change. The case-study points to the 2015 
earthquake not serving this function. Instead, it served to further entrench the 
status-quo. Why this was the case requires further study.  
 
Thirdly, using Nepal as a case-study this research has added new insights into 
how global policies are adopted at the national and local levels in complex and a 
fragile government. Social learning was found to be key to stimulating the 
process of change discussed above. In an environment where legislation and 
policy implementation are weak, individual bureaucrats are shown to be 
essential for changing policy paradigms. The advocacy coalition framework was 
a useful conceptual tool for mapping out how change may be brought about in 
Nepal. Given the dominance of MOHA, a broad coalition of other ministries, 
politicians, and local governments is needed for substantive change to occur. In 
Nepal, efforts to build a coalition (mainly by the NRRC) was having a greater 
effect on stimulating mainstreaming DRR, than the weak effort of top-down 
mainstreaming DRR advocated by MOHA. This research has discredited the 
widely held idea of top-down mainstreaming DRR.  
 
9.2.3 Future Research Avenues 
 
This research opens up several new avenues of inquiry. Some possible future 
research agendas are listed below: 
 A comparative study in a different developing country using the same 
policy change theories and frameworks to see if the same rhetoric and 
reality argument applies.  
 Examine how the 2015 earthquakes have influenced bureaucrat opinions 
about disaster policy in Nepal. This being done with an eye to further 
understand external shocks and third order policy change.  
 Serious tensions still exist within the evolution of disaster management. 
Of particular interest is to examine why the discredited civil defence era 
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still influences modern day emergency management and how the legacy 
of that era is preventing the profession from modernizing.  
 
9.2.4 Limitations of Research 
 
There are two main research limitations. The first issue is resultant from the 
scope of the research project: to examine how mainstreaming was occurring 
throughout the GON. This demanded that fieldwork occur over a wide territory of 
the government and would have benefited from a larger sample size. The 
second was the use of interviews as the main method of data collection. Both of 
these limitations resulted from issues of constraint and control.  
 
Ideally, more in-depth interviews—particularly throughout the central 
government level—would provide a clearer picture of how bureaucrats 
understood DRR and their ministry’s role in policy mainstreaming. Those 
interviewed were mainly bureaucrats that were already associated with DRR, 
either as Flagship representatives or as the designated DRR focal point. As 
such, they were not representative of the majority of ministry employees that 
have no direct DRR responsibilities. Sample size is also a limiting factor in the 
political party discussion. Gaining access to senior level party members was the 
most challenging aspect of this research. However, it was possible to gain 
interviews with political party members and with other central level bureaucrats. 
The root cause of this limitation concerns the limited resources available to 
conduct this research. The capacity of the researcher to transcribe and conduct 
in-depth interviews was constrained by lack of time, finances, and capacity. The 
other limitation identified concerns the use of interviews as the primary method. 
As already noted, the issues concerning interviews were discussed in detail in 
section 5.4.5. 
 
Despite these limitations, it is unlikely that a larger sample size would profoundly 
alter the conclusions drawn from the empirical chapters. A larger sample size 
would provide a fuller picture of the lack of understanding that exists around 
DRR, which would help illuminate the full extent of the existing DRR advocacy 
coalition. That being said, the findings of this research illustrate with certainty 
that there is little progress being made to mainstream DRR throughout the 
government. Finally, the use of interviews as the primary method provided both 
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nuanced and rich data from which the conclusions were drawn. While some of 
the respondents may have overstated the governments efforts to mainstreaming 
DRR, the overall results prove otherwise.  
9.3 Conclusion 
 
This research bridged two spheres of influence: that of the supranational 
jurisdiction where disaster and development policies are scripted and formulated 
in frameworks, and that of the nation-state of Nepal, a least developed country 
and the intended recipient of supranational funding and policy 
recommendations. In concluding this work, it is important to highlight the 
interdependence of these two spheres- where the strength of the supranational 
relies on the weaknesses of the nation-state, and vice versa. Global policy is 
crafted and prescribed to countries in need such as Nepal. However, in this 
transaction is a hidden perpetuation of the status quo. Global policy is designed 
to maintain the neoliberal economic imperative, so prefers to couch policy in 
vague and often meaningless buzzwords, such as mainstreaming. MOHA, the 
ministry responsible for disaster management policy within the GON, 
enthusiastically adopts policy jargon that is unlikely to upset its own control over 
disaster policy. In this interplay, time and money are wasted and little is done to 
minimize the risk of disasters.  
 
This research has found a serious lack of critical assessment—both in the global 
supranational and within the GON—surrounding DRR policy. Having thoroughly 
examined both the rhetoric and the reality of mainstreaming DRR in Nepal, it is 
apparent that both jurisdictions have a stake in undermining the reforms that are 
known to be necessary. As witnessed by the 2015 earthquake in Nepal, the 
stakes are far too high for researchers to not examine the rhetoric and reality 
that surrounds disaster policy.  
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